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PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA:
MATERIAL DISCLOSURE ABOUT CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM?
WALTER HUTCHENS*
1. INTRODUCTION
This article examines private securities litigation in the People's
Republic of China ("PRC" or "China").' The Supreme People's
Court of the PRC has recently enacted rules that establish
parameters for private securities litigation.2 This Article analyzes
the new rules, their context, and their significance. The analysis
reveals that several daunting obstacles confront plaintiffs who
wish to bring private securities litigation in China. Based on these
obstacles, it appears unlikely that this form of investor protection
will flourish in the PRC. However, the complexity of China's
political economy prompts qualification of that forward-looking
statement. If this form of litigation does flourish in China, its
* Assistant Professor, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of
Maryland; J.D. and M.A. in East Asian Studies, Washington University in St.
Louis. Before joining the Maryland faculty, Professor Hutchens practiced law in
New York and Beijing with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.
1 Specifically, this Article discusses private securities litigation on the
mainland of the People's Republic of China ("PRC" or "China"); Hong Kong's
stock market is inside the PRC since the reversion of Hong Kong to mainland
sovereignty on July 1, 1997, and the PRC considers Taiwan to be a province of the
PRC. However, both Hong Kong and Taiwan regulate their stock markets
independently. Nonetheless, regulators from Hong Kong have been important
players in the formation of mainland stock exchange policy. Anthony Neoh
(Liang Dingbang) and Laura Cha (Shi Meilun) are two former Hong Kong
securities regulators who have worked for the mainland China Securities
Regulatory Commission ("CSRC"). Regulatory models from Taiwan have also
influenced PRC stock market policy, particularly with respect to the mainland's
recently-enacted Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor ("QFII") system.
2 See Guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yinfade minshi
peichang anjian de ruogan guiding [Several Regulations Concerning the
Adjudication of Civil Compensation Securities Cases Based upon
Misrepresentation], (Supreme People's Court, Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter PSL Rules]
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030110/905268.html
(last visited June 1, 2003); 17 CHINA L. & PRAC. 53, 53-62 (Mar. 2003). Translations
from Chinese used herein are by the Author unless otherwise noted.
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impact could be enormous. Millions of domestic securities market
participants could be affected. Due to regulatory changes
identified in this article, many foreign investors could also be
affected. Additionally, analysis of China's approach to private
securities litigation provides material disclosure about the current
status of China's legal system. It offers a window into the
emergence of the rule of law and civil society in China and
illuminates core difficulties of PRC reform efforts.
More than nine hundred private securities suits are now
pending in China.3 The international accounting firm KPMG has
already been named as a defendant for its role in auditing a PRC
listed company.4 Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J.P.
Morgan Chase & Company ("JP Morgan") are among the many
globally prominent firms pursuing opportunities created by recent
reforms in China's securities sector, and they too may become
entangled in this form of litigation.5 In addition to its importance
for domestic and foreign investors, the development of private
securities litigation in China also offers rich material for
comparative law scholars. The robust debate in law reviews over
recent years concerning how securities markets evolve and how
they can best be regulated has largely ignored the important case
of China. By detailing the functional and structural context of PRC
securities markets, this article can help scholars who are not China
specialists consider the PRC in those debates.
Section 2 describes private securities litigation in general,
recounts its development in China, and provides critical
background on China's securities markets by identifying some of
their "special characteristics." Section 2 also explains the utility of
a U.S. perspective for evaluating PRC securities regulation while
acknowledging the danger of applying an inappropriate model to
China. Section 3 critiques the substance of the new Supreme
3 See Li Guoguang Gaoji Touzizhe: Dui Susong Fengxian Yingyou Xinli Zhunbei
[Li Guoguang Tells Investors: Prepare Psychologically for Litigation Risks] SHANGHAI
ZHENGQUAN BAO WANGLUO BAN [SHANGHAI SECURITIES TIMES ONLINE EDITION],
Jan. 10, 2003 (reporting comments of Vice President of Supreme People's Court
that nine hundred private securities suits are pending throughout China) (on file
with author).
4 See KPMG Faces Suit from Minority Shareholders, CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
12, 2003 (reporting private securities litigation in PRC against KPMG for its role as
auditor for PRC-listed Jinzhou Port) (on file with author).
5 See Walter Hutchens, China's Securities Markets Open to Foreign Investment,
CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 34-38 (discussing rules allowing foreign
investment in PRC investment banks and fund management companies).
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People's Court rules on private securities litigation, identifying
several significant obstacles plaintiffs will face. Among these
obstacles, plaintiffs cannot attack insider trading and market
manipulation through private securities litigation in China, and
even some victims of disclosure fraud are denied relief.
Government action must precede all private suits, and U.S. style
class actions are not permitted. Finally, the jurisdictional
requirements favor defendants. Given these aspects of the new
rules, Section 3 then considers the prospects for private securities
litigation in China, finding some reasons to hope that private
securities litigation can flourish despite the many obstacles.
Section 4 expounds upon the potential significance of private
securities litigation in China, underscoring its relevance for
domestic securities market participants, foreign. investors, and
academics. Section 5 broadens the analysis, contemplating what
China's approach to private securities litigation discloses about
China's legal system. It finds that ignorance of alternative
approaches is rarely a factor driving PRC legal development, at
least at a national level. China's approach to private securities
litigation also discloses that state control remains at the core of
Chinese regulation, although an extensive body of law has been
developed to shape, and sometimes, limit, the exercise of that
control. It is also apparent that PRC courts remain weak and
engage in procedurally dubious rulemaking. Entrepreneurial
lawyers, however, are now significant actors with respect to some
PRC legal developments. Additionally, public discourse, though
still subject to authoritarian repression in many areas, can be
surprisingly critical of the government with respect to certain
matters. Finally, China's approach to private securities litigation is
analogous to some of the complexity and uncertainty that
characterize PRC reform efforts. China's reform ambitions -legal
and otherwise - often collide with political intransigence and
prudential concerns, giving reforms an ambiguous character. No
one knows where these complex dynamics will lead. There can be
no assured outcome with respect to private securities litigation,
much less with respect to overall political evolution in China.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. General Description of Private Securities Litigation
Private securities litigation is civil litigation concerning
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securities.6 It is different from administrative enforcement or
criminal prosecution. Those forms of action may penalize a
defendant's behavior without providing any compensation to
harmed investors. Also, those forms of action generally require
active intervention by a governmental party-an administrative
agency or criminal prosecutor must challenge some behavior
whereas in private securities litigation an aggrieved investor seeks
relief directly.7 Defendants are typically firms that issue securities,
parties that trade securities, and other market participants such as
underwriters, accounting firms, law firms, and individuals who
work in these organizations.8 The basis for relief is generally that
some kind of fraud has occurred, typically false disclosure, insider
trading, or market manipulation. 9  Claims are not usually
predicated on general tort or contract theories alone, but rather are
based on statutory or regulatory causes of action specific to
securities law.' 0
In addition to providing defrauded investors with a means to
6 There is no universal definition of "securities." The PRC Securities Law
does not define "securities," though the scope of the law is defined as applying to
the issuing and trading of stocks, bonds, or other "securities" approved by the
State Council within the PRC. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa
[hereinafter PRC Securities Law], art. 2. (1999), translated in 13 CHINA L. & PRAC.
25, 25-66 (1999) (National People's Congress, Dec. 29, 1999). The scope of U.S.
securities laws is broader, extending to the amorphous realm of investment
contracts. See, e.g., SEC. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301(1946) (establishing a test
for determining when an investment contract constitutes a security, and stating,
"[tihe test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.").
7 Of course, the government has a role in private securities litigation. The
dispute resolution forum and the rights and obligations being disputed are
created with government participation. See Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and its
Discontents: Understanding Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (1992)
(arguing that PRC market development requires not only the diminishment of
state economic planning but also state activism to build legal infrastructure).
8 For a thorough discussion of securities regulation, see 1-11 Louis LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURmEs REGULATION (3d ed. 1989-2002). See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra ch.3 (providing information on the coverage of the Securities Act of 1933);
see also 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra ch. 6 (outlining the registration and post-
registration provisions of the 1934 Act); 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra ch.7 (explaining
the regulation of the securities markets); 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra ch.8 (providing
information on the regulation of the brokers, dealers, and investment advisers).
9 See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, ch. 9 (outlining the elements of fraud
among issuers and insiders); see also 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, ch. 10
(providing information on market manipulation).
10 See 1-3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 8, ch. 1-3 (documenting the basis for
applying the statutory and regulatory causes of action in securities law).
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recover damages, private securities litigation can also stimulate the
development of securities markets by strengthening incentives for
legal compliance. In a given case, the number of plaintiffs and
amount in controversy can be enormous; everyone who owned or
traded a particular security may seek to recover damages when its
value declines. The threat of such massive liability can stimulate
behavior to avoid it. For example, companies are more likely to
comply with disclosure duties if not doing so subjects them to
serious liability risks. Markets with less disclosure fraud are then
able to attract more funds and investors. The availability of capital
then attracts more firms willing to operate transparently in return
for comparatively low-cost external financing. This virtuous cycle
can stimulate the development of robust securities markets.
Private securities litigation is authorized by many jurisdictions
with substantial securities markets, though the degree to which it
flourishes in practice varies substantially.1 The availability of class
actions and the incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers, such as large
contingency fees, influence the preponderance of private securities
litigation in particular jurisdictions. The world's preeminent
securities markets are those located in the United States, where
private securities litigation plays an important role.12 United States
securities law has influenced the development of PRC securities
law,13 and this article will generally apply a U.S. perspective to the
development of private securities litigation in China.14
2.2. The Development of Private Securities Litigation in China
Effective February 1, 2003, Chinese courts shall adjudicate
private securities litigation on the basis of rules issued by the PRC
Supreme People's Court. These rules, titled Several Regulations
11 See William Boston & Silvia Ascarelli, [Lawsuits] Are Latest Fashion in Europe
As Shareholders Latch On to U.S. Trend, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at C1 (reporting on
the rise of shareholder lawsuits in Germany and noting that damages and class
actions are not on a "U.S. scale ").
12 For statistics on U.S. private securities litigation, see Stanford Law School,
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003).
13 See Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective
Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WAsH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 119,
143-44 (2003) (finding U.S. models influential in PRC Securities Law). See also infra
note 48 and accompanying text (describing echoes of U.S. law in the special
characteristics of PRC securities markets).
14 For additional discussion of this approach, see discussion infra Section 2.4.
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Concerning the Adjudication of Civil Compensation Securities
Cases Based upon Misrepresentation ("PSL Rules"), provide
detailed parameters for private securities litigation in China.15
Organized in thirty-seven articles, the PSL Rules address: who
may sue whom for what; who is eligible as plaintiff and defendant;
and what behavior is actionable. The PSL Rules also address: the
statute of limitations applicable to private securities litigation;
which PRC courts have jurisdiction; what evidence plaintiffs must
produce, when courts are to find causality between asserted illegal
conduct and investor losses; what procedural forms of litigation
are possible, and how to calculate damages.16
The development of China's approach to private securities
litigation has not been straightforward. A number of cases were
filed before promulgation of the PSL Rules.' 7 However, no PRC
court granted relief to a plaintiff, despite the existence of various
legal provisions upon which they might have relied. For example,
the PRC's General Principles of Civil Law provide that tort victims
15 See PSL Rules, supra note 2.
16 See Gao Fa Chutai Guanyu Zhengquan Minshi Qinquan Shoubu Xitong Sifa
Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Unveils the First Systematic Judicial Interpretation
Concerning Securities Torts], XINHUA NETWORK, Jan. 9, 2003 (outlining general
provisions of the PSL Rules).
17 In 1996, Liu Zhongmin sued Shandong Bohai Corporation for RMB 1,040
(USD 125) after shares he bought in the company lost value following assessment
by the CSRC of a penalty against the company for false accounting disclosure.
His complaint was rejected in the first instance, and the verdict was upheld on
appeal. Liu Zhongming v. Bohai Group, Jizhongjinghizhongzi No. 41, (Jinan
Intermediate People's Court, Aug. 12, 1998), available at
http://business.sol.sohu.com/10/25/article204292510.shtml (last visited on June
1, 2003).
PRC and foreign sources often erroneously cite another noted case as the first
attempt at private securities litigation in China. On December 4, 1998, Jiang
Shunzhen, an aggrieved shareholder of Shanghai-listed Hongguang Industrial
Company Limited sought to recover losses of RMB 3,136 (USD 378), by suing
twenty-four parties, including the underwriter Guo Tai Securities Corporation,
the accounting and appraisal firms involved in the initial public offering ("IPO")
and various other individuals. The Pudong People's Court rejected the suit in
April 1999, even though the CSRC previously determined that the company
engaged in fraudulent behavior, including falsely inflating profits and hiding
negative financial information. See Zhengjiacazi [1998] 75 hao [CSRC
Administrative Investigation No. 75, 19981; see also Wenhai Cai, Private Securities
Litigation in China: Of Prominence and Problems, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 135, 146
(1999) (describing the rejection as a "landmark case"); Trish Saywell, Demanding
Action, FAR EASTERN EcoN. R., May 13, 1999, at 42-43 (discussing the case in the
greater context of increased litigation in China).
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are entitled to civil compensation.'8 More specifically, the PRC
Securities Law, effective since July 1, 1999, provides that issuers,
underwriters and their responsible directors and other corporate
officers can be liable for losses suffered by investors because of
false or misleading statements or material omissions in disclosure
documents.19 The 1993 Provisional Rules on Stock Issuance and
Trading, which preceded adoption of the PRC Securities Law and
continue to be in effect to the extent that the Securities Law did not
supplant specific provisions, proscribe various miscreant practices
and provide that violators are liable for civil compensation. 20 More
recently, the Governance Standards for Listed Companies,
promulgated in January 2002 by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission ("CSRC")21 and the State Economic and Trade
18 See Fagui Huibian Minfa Tongze [General Principles of the Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China] in 2 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 225
art. 106 (Jan. 1, 1987), art. 213 (1983-1986) [hereinafter General Principles of the
Civil Law]; see also Cai, supra note 17, at 146. The drafters of the PSL Rules note in
a book on the PSL Rules that a key difference between civil liability and criminal
or administrative liability is that civil liability, unlike criminal or administrative
liability, does not require a specific legal provision. They proffer, for example, that
tort liability can arise from meeting the general elements of a tort, which they
identify as an act, causality, fault, and damages. See Li GUOGUANG & Gu WEI,
ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XUJIA CHENSHU MINSHI PEICHANG ZHIDU [THE CIVIL
LIABILITY SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES MARKET MISREPRESENTATIONS] 34 (Falu Chubanshe
2003) [hereinafter PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY] (on file with author). Thus, the
Supreme People's Court justices who drafted the PSL Rules acknowledged that a
judge can find liability for disclosure fraud even without the explicit provisions of
the PRC Securities Law.
19 Article 63 provides:
If the share prospectus, method of offer of corporate bonds, financial or
accounting report, listing report document, annual report, interim report,
or ad hoc report announced by an issuer or distributing securities
company contains a falsehood, misleading statement or major omission
and thereby causes investors to sustain losses in the course of securities
trading, the issuer or distributing securities company shall be liable for
damages and the responsible director(s), supervisor(s) and or manager of
the issuer or distributing securities company shall be jointly and
severally liable for such damages.
PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 63.
20 See Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Administration of the
Issuing and Trading of Shares Tentative Regulations], State Council, art. 77 (1993),
(providing "Weifan ben tiaoli guiding, gei ta ren zaocheng sunshi de, yingdang yi
fa chengdan minshi peichang zeren" ["Anyone whose violation of these
Regulations causes loss to others shall bear civil liability for compensation
according to law. "j), translated in 6 CHINA L. & PRAc. 23, 42 (1993).
21 See generally China Securities Regulatory Commission website, available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCsite/eng/eindex.htrn (last visited on Sept. 30,
2003]
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Commission, also provide that investors can seek compensation
through civil litigation when their rights are harmed.22 Despite
such clear language, PRC courts rejected the initial cases brought
by aggrieved investors.23
As intrepid plaintiffs continued to file suits, the Supreme
People's Court took significant steps with regard to private
securities litigation: (1) on September 21, 2001, the Supreme
People's Court issued a notice instructing lower courts to
temporarily not accept private securities litigation cases,24 (2) on
January 15, 2002, the Supreme People's Court issued a notice
indicating courts may accept private securities litigation based on
false disclosure,25 and (3) on December 26, 2002, the Supreme
People's Court adopted the PSL Rules, publicly issued on January
9, 2003, and effective February 1, 2003, providing specific
parameters for the handling of private securities litigation based on
false disclosure. 26
After a flurry of private lawsuit filings against Guangxia
(Yinchuan) Industries Corporation, a PRC listed company that
nearly suffered an Enron-like implosion following revelations of
egregious disclosure fraud including the outright fabrication of
USD 89.98 million in profits, the Supreme People's Court issued a
notice temporarily barring all private securities litigation. 27 Within
2003).
22 See Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Notice on Issuing the Guideline on the
Management of Listed Companies], art. 4, China Securities Regulatory
Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission Uan. 7, 2002) (stating
that shareholders can seek to protect their rights through civil litigation in
accordance with laws and regulations).
23 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24 See Guanyu Sheji Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Bu Yu Shouli de
Tongzhi [Notice Concerning Temporarily Not Accepting Civil Compensation
Cases Related to Securities], Supreme People's Court, Sept. 21, 2001 [hereinafter
September 21, 2001 PSL Notice].
25 See Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfade
Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme
People's Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Acceptance of the Issue of
Accepting Cases of Securities Markets Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False
Statements in the Securities Markets], Supreme People's Court, Jan. 15, 2002
[hereinafter January 15, 2002 PSL Notice].
26 See PSL Rules, supra note 2.
27 See Securities Market Calls For Civil Compensation, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
Dec. 3, 2001 (noting that Guangxia's stock price rose 440 percent in two years,
then collapsed after the firm was revealed to have wildly fabricated revenues and
profits), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/03/eng20011203
_85851.shtml (last visited June 1, 2003).
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four months the Supreme People's Court lifted its "temporary
ban," but it did so only with respect to private securities litigation
based on disclosure fraud. 28 The ban remains in place for private
securities litigation predicated on other types of action such as
insider trading or market manipulation.29 Even after Chinese
courts were notified that they may accept private securities
litigation based on bad disclosure, nearly a year passed before the
PSL Rules provided lower courts with specific operational
instructions for handling such claims.
According to court officials, more than nine hundred private
securities litigation cases have already been filed in China.
30 Most
of these suits are against about a dozen companies, already found
guilty of flagrant disclosure rule violations in administrative
actions, which suffered dramatic declines in their share prices. As
of this Article, no private securities lawsuit has been resolved by
judicial decision in China,31 although the first settlements of private
28 A helpful chart comparing the final private securities litigation with the
January 15, 2002 PSL Notice that initially proclaimed courts could accept private
securities litigation (reversing the September 21, 2001 PSL Notice that temporarily
ordered courts not to accept such cases) is provided in CAIJING MAG., Jan. 20, 2003
at 84, available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/mag/preview.aspx?ArtD=385
4 (subscription required) (online version does not include the chart found in the
print edition).
29 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, pmbl. (addressing only claims for
misrepresentation); see also Notice of the Supreme People's Court on the Relevant
Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by False
Statements in the Securities Markets (Jan. 15, 2002) (addressing only claims for
misrepresentation), available at www.isinolaw.com/jsp/common/content (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003); Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Not Accepting
Civil Cases of Compensation Concerning Securities Temporarily (Sept. 21, 2001)
(halting all civil litigation concerning securities), available at www.isinolaw.com/
jsp/common/content (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
30 See Li Guoguang Tells Investors, supra note 3 (announcing up to nine
hundred suits).
31 Some listed companies involved as defendants in the first waves of private
securities litigation in China include ST Shandong Bohai, ST Shanghai Tongda
Innovation Investment, ST Yantai Dongfang Electronic Information, ST Shanghai
Jiabao Shiye, ST Fujian Jiuzhou Group, Xian Shengfang Keji, ST Yi An
Technology, Shenzhen Sanjiu Medical, ST Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industry, Hubei
Tianyi Science and Technology, Daqing Lianyi, and ST Chengdu Boxun Shuma
Technology. For a catalog of these suits in English, see Economist Intelligence
Unit, Courting Disaster, Allowing Private Investors to Sue Listed Companies for Faking
Numbers is a Good Idea. But Will it Happen?, 24 Bus. CHINA 1-2, n.8 (Apr. 2003)
(providing a detailed chart of pending litigation, and citing the Royal Institute of
International Affairs as the source).
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securities litigation occurred in early 2003.32 According to court
officials involved in drafting the PSL Rules, PRC courts will
eventually accept private securities litigation based on acts other
than inadequate disclosure "when market and legal conditions are
ripe," but the time table for this is not clear.33
The development of private securities litigation in China is of
course, part of the general development of securities markets in
China, and it is important to embed the discussion of the PSL Rules
in that context, examining in particular the "special characteristics"
of China's securities markets.
2.3. Special Characteristics of PRC Securities Markets
On the surface, China's capital markets appear much like those
of other jurisdictions.34 The PRC Company Law permits the
32 While no PRC court has yet rendered a judgment in a contested case, the
Chinese press reported widely on one case which settled through court-assisted
mediation one month before the PSL Rules were enacted. See Zhongguo Shouli
Zhengquan Minshi Peichang an Shenjie, 11 Gumin Huo Pei 22 Wan, [China's First
Securities Civil Compensation Case Resolved, 11 Investors Obtain 220,000 in
Compensation], GuoJI JINRONG BAO [INT'L FIN.], Nov. 26, 2002 (reporting that eleven
plaintiffs settled claims through mediation against the former Chengdu
Hongguang Industry Corporation after three years of litigation, jointly obtaining
the equivalent of USD 25,000). The CSRC imposed an administrative penalty on
the firm for claiming (before listing) profits of RMB 54 million (USD 6.5 million) in
1996 when in fact the firm had lost RMB 103 million (USD 12.5 million). The
CSRC imposed a fine of RMB 1 million (USD 120,000) in 1998. See also Investors
Win for All in Securities Market, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 29, 2002, available at
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cm.en/doc/2002 (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
33 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 37.
34 William Alford has eloquently described how the familiarity of PRC legal
vocabulary can obscure rather than reveal Chinese realities:
[B]ecause contemporary Chinese legal developments may seem less
exotic and distant to us than ... imperial Chinese law., by reason of
the language within which the new developments are cast, the modern
setting within which they occur, and our growing personal interaction
with Chinese colleagues-we must be doubly vigilant in examining these
developments. We must guard against the tendency, that even the most
cautious among us may share, to see the Chinese as now finally
realizing - or at least saying they realize - the need to organize their legal
and economic life the way we believe that we have chosen to do, and so
validating the grand theories and other constructs through which we in
the West seek to order our existence. In our inquiries, we must pay
more careful heed to the setting within which the familiar language and
new developments are presented.
William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 945, 955 (1986).
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formation of limited liability corporations35 and the PRC Securities
Law permits the issuance and trading of shares.36 China's listed
companies have shareholders and boards of directors.37  In
addition to equity, Chinese companies can issue debt and even
hybrid instruments such as convertible bonds.38 Investors may
directly purchase securities or they may invest through funds.39
35 Article 3 of the PRC Company Law authorizes the creation of both limited
liability companies (youxian zeren gongsi) and joint stock companies (gufen youxian
gongsi). Only joint stock companies are able to publicly issue shares and thus be
exposed to litigation under the PSL Rules. See LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 293, 294 (1999) [hereinafter PRC Company Law]; id. at 328, art. 151.
36 Id. arts. 102-11 (1999). PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, at 32-38
(discussing the issuance and trade of securities).
37 PRC Company Law, supra note 35, arts. 102-11 (Shareholder Powers); arts.
112-18 (Board Powers). In fact, in response to perceived problems with corporate
governance, the CSRC has required that the boards of directors of listed
companies include a number of "independent directors" See Guanyu Zai
Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian [China Securities
Regulatory Commission, Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an
Independent Director System in Listed Companies], China Securities Regulatory
Commission, Aug. 16, 2001. For similar U.S. requirements, see New York Stock
Exchange, Listed Company Manual, available at http://www.nyse.com/listed/
listedcomanual.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
38 See Dan Slater, Chinese Convertible Bonds: Treat with Care, FinanceAsia.com,
June 5, 2003 (reporting RMB 5.6 billion (USD 602 million) raised in the first
quarter of 2003 from the sale of convertible bonds, exceeding the amount raised
by sale of stocks for the same period), available at http://www.financeasia.com/
Articles/E867A3D6-642E-11D781FA0090277E174B.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
But see id. (quoting the CFO of China Unicorn, complaining that "the domestic
bond market is still quite undeveloped and issuance approval is slow and
complicated").
The key PRC regulations on convertible corporate bonds are: Kezhuanhuan
gongsi zhaiquan guanli zanxing banfa [Interim Measures for Administration of
Convertible Corporate Bonds], State Council, Mar. 25, 1997; Shangshi Gongsi
Faxing Kezhuanhuan Gongsi Zhaiquan Shishi Banfa [Implementing Measures for
Issuance of Convertible Corporate Bonds by Listed Companies], China Securities
Regulatory Commission, Apr. 26, 2001; Gongkai Faxing Zhengquan de Gongsi
Xinxi Pilu Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze di 13 hao-Kezhuanhuan Gongsi Zhaiquan
Muji Shuomingshu (2003 Nian Xiuding) [Standards for the Content and Format of
Information Disclosure by Companies Publicly Issuing Securities, No. 13-
Convertible Corporate Bonds (as amended 2003)], China Securities Regulatory
Commission, Mar. 24, 2003; Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, Kezhuanhuan Gongsi
Zhaiquan Shangshi Guize [Shanghai Securities Exchange, Listing Regulations for
Convertible Corporate Bonds], Nov. 4, 2002; Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo,
Kezhuanhuan Gongsi Zhaiquan Shangshi Guize [Shenzhen Securities Exchange,
Listing Regulations for Convertible Corporate Bonds], Nov. 1, 2002.
39 See generally Tingting Tao, The Burgeoning Securities Investment Fund
Industry in China: Its Development and Regulation, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 203, 215
(1999) (discussing the regulatory framework of securities and investment funds in
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Chinese issuers are subject to extensive disclosure requirements
when they initially offer securities to the public and on a periodic
basis thereafter. 40  Such disclosure includes audited financial
statements. 41 A Chinese prospectus must contain risk factors
(fengxian yinsu), and descriptions of the company's capital
structure including the identity of its major shareholders and the
holdings of the company's officers.42 The intended use of the funds
raised in a public offering must be disclosed.43 Indeed, the legal
standard for what must be disclosed in China-beyond that which
is specifically detailed in laws and regulations - is that issuers
must disclose all that is material to an investor making an
investment decision.44 The PSL Rules adopt U.S. "fraud on the
market" theory so that eligible plaintiffs need not show direct
reliance on faulty disclosure.45 Some defendants can also escape
liability under the PSL Rules if they demonstrate that an investor's
losses were caused by systemic market forces or other factors
unrelated to the problematic disclosure.46 All this is strikingly
China).
40 See PRC Company Law, supra note 35, art. 156 (mandating periodic
disclosure requirements); Gongkai Faxing Zhengquan de Gongsi Xinxi Pilu
Nirong yu Geshi Zhunze di yi Hao-Zhaogu Shouming Shu (2003 Xiuding)
[Standards for the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies
Publicly Issuing Securities, No. 1 -Share Prospectuses (as amended 2003)], China
Securities Regulatory Commission, Apr. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/files/20030414/0304141.doc (last visited June 1, 2003)
[hereinafter, CSRC Share Prospectus Requirements] (detailing IPO disclosure
requirements for prospectuses required by PRC Company Law).
41 See id. (requiring audited financial statements in prospectuses); Gongkai
Faxing Zhengquan de Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze di er Hao-
Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi [Standards for the Content and Format of
Information Disclosure by Companies Publicly Issuing Securities, No. 2- Annual
Reports], art. 9, China Securities Regulatory Commission, Jan. 6, 2003 (requiring
audited financial statements in annual reports of listed companies).
42 See CSRC Share Prospectus Requirements, supra note 40, ch. 2, pts. 4 (Risk
Factors), 9 (Capital Structure), 10 (Financial Information).
43 See id. ch. 2, pt. 11 (Use of Proceeds of Share Offering).
44 See id. art. 3 (providing that the specific disclosures called for are "minimal
requirements" (zui di yaoqiu) and that all information with a material influence on
an investor's investment decision should be disclosed regardless of whether or
not it is called for specifically (bu lun ben zhunze shifou you mingque guiding, fan dui
touzizhe zuochu touzi jueding you zhongda yingxiang de xinxi, jun ying pilu).
45 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 18 (mandating when the people's court
shall determine a causal relationship between a misrepresentation and a serious
insult).
46 Id. at 19. However, issuers are subject to strict liability.
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familiar to U.S. securities lawyers. Indeed, until the recent
reassignment of Gao Xiqing, two of the CSRC's four vice-ministers
held U.S. law degrees and had practiced at least briefly in the
United States. 47
Despite the echoes of U.S. law, companies listed on China's
securities exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen operate in a vastly
different regulatory environment than companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq National Market. A number
of "special characteristics" 48 profoundly affect how China's
securities markets operate. 49 Identification of some of these special
characteristics will benefit an exegesis of the PSL Rules.50
47 Domestic critics of the CSRC have labeled a contingent within the CSRC as
"the sea turtle faction" (hai gui pai), a pun in Chinese on "the faction returned
from overseas." See Former CSRC Vice-Chairman Lands Fund Job / As a Part-Time
Appointee, Gao Xiqing is Open to Other Roles in the Government, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 26, 2003 (reporting that former CSRC Vice-Chairman Gao Xiqing was
appointed deputy head of the National Council for Social Security Fund after
leaving the CSRC and that he and Laura Cha (a.k.a. Shi Meilun), who continues as
a CSRC Vice Minister, are part of the "returned students" faction and have been
blamed for policies driving down the market). See also Potter, supra note 13, at 143
n.116 (noting that "Gao Peiji, former general counsel for the Shenzhen Securities
Exchange, was trained at Berkeley").
48 The phrase "socialist market economy with special Chinese characteristics"
remains common in Chinese political discourse. The phrase has been adapted
enthusiastically. Formulations of "blank with Chinese characteristics" are
common. See, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 31 (discussing the PSL
Rules and "[litigation with Chinese characteristics"); RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS (Kluwer Law International 1997); Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization:
Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 28-33 (2000) [hereinafter
Chinese Privatization] (titling a section, "Privatization with Chinese Characteristics:
Creating a Non-State Sector"); Nicholas C. Howson, China's Company Law: One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 CoLuM. J. ASIAN L. 127, 142
(1997) (quoting "piercing the Corporate Veil 'With Chinese Characteristics': The
State Reaches Through to 'its' Assets"); Michael Irl Nikkel, "Chinese
Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's
Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503 (1995); R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong
With Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 29 (1993).
49 An earlier version of this list appeared in an article on new rules
permitting foreign investment in PRC investment banks and fund management
companies. See Hutchens, supra note 5, at 37 (identifying a number of general
characteristics of China's stock markets); see also Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance in
China, available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M000015000/M00015757.pdf
(noting equivalent "special characteristics").
50 CSRC Vice Minister Laura Cha noted that the appeals to "special
characteristics" are often used "as an excuse" in which "all unexplainable
problems" are wrapped. See Shi Meilun Tan Jianguan [Laura Cha Discusses
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2.3.1. Most PRC Investors are Individuals, Not Institutions
Most investors in the PRC's securities markets -and thus most
potential plaintiffs in private securities litigation in China - are
dispersed individual investors, referred to as "scattered
households" (san hu). Although a relatively high percentage of the
U.S. population owns shares, in the U.S., this ownership is
generally mediated through mutual funds.5' The funds industry is
in its infancy in China.5 2 The vast majority of Chinese investors
remain individual "retail" investors, not institutional investors.53
2.3.2. Most Listed Companies are Reformed State-Owned
Enterprises, Not Private Firms
Commonly, securities markets allow private entrepreneurs to
access public equity and debt markets to raise capital. In China,
however, listed companies are almost never private companies. 4
Rather, they are state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") that have been
transformed into joint stock companies (gufen youxian gongsi) under
the PRC Company Law.55 China's securities markets have been
consciously designed from the "top down" to support the reform
Regulatory Supervision], CAIJING, Jan. 20, 2002 ("There is a phenomenon, which is,
things that are not understood are all summed up as China's special
characteristics. China's special characteristics have become a type of excuse.") (on
file with author).
51 See generally Josh Friedman, BofA Fires Two Officers over Illegal Fund Trades,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12. 2003, at B1 (noting that the U.S. mutual fund industry "counts
95 million Americans as customers").
52 See Xiangcai Authorised to Launch Series Fund, S. CHINA MORNING PoSr, Feb.
19, 2003, available at http://biz.scmp.com/bizchina/ZZZOIRMA3CD.html
(reporting that "China has an unsophisticated fund management sector, where 54
of 71 existing investment funds are closed-end, and products familiar to more
mature markets such as guaranteed and bond funds remain novel ideas"); see
generally Tao, supra note 39 (discussing the regulatory framework of securities and
investment funds in China).
53 The drafters of the PSL Rules acknowledge this. See PSL DRAFTERS'
COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 38 (citing statistics that 99.47% of PRC brokerage
accounts have been opened by individual investors).
54 Zhou Xiaochuan, the previous CSRC chairman, estimated that about two-
hundred private enterprises (minying qiye) are listed in the PRC. See Li Zhangzhe,
ZHONGGUO GUSHI FAZHAN BUOGAO 2002 [CHINA STOCK MARKETS DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2002] (2003) [hereinafter, CHINA STOCK MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT:
2002] (reporting Chairman Zhou's comments) (on file with author).
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of SOEs, not to allow private firms to raise capital.
56
2.3.3. Most Shares of Listed Firms are Illiquid, Unlisted Shares
Just as China's securities markets do not serve private issuers,
they do not function as a means to privatize the SOEs that are
listed. In the "corporatized" SOEs that dominate China's securities
markets, only about one-third of the firm's shares are typically
floated on the public markets.5 7 These liquid shares (liutong gu) are
the ones available on the mainland exchanges, generally as A-
shares, though a small number of issuers have foreign-currency
denominated B-shares. The rest of the issuer's shares generally
remain in government hands, either directly as state-owned shares
(guoyou gu) or indirectly as legal-person shares (faren gu).58 This
limited floatation of shares means that listed PRC companies are
"publicly owned," not through their listed, tradable shares but
through their unlisted, illiquid shares. Because listed companies
remain state-owned through unlisted shares, an "overhang" of
unlisted, illiquid shares (collectively, fei liutong gu) haunts China's
securities markets. Investors worry that a deluge of state-owned
shares into the markets could diminish the value of currently-listed
shares by altering the current balance of supply and demand.59
56 See e.g., Liu Ban, Private Sector Catches Listing Fever, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 25,
2003 (Hong Kong ed.), available at http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/cn/dos/2003-
02/25/context_155786.htm (noting the historical paucity of private firm IPOs on
PRC securities markets because "the domestic stock market was positioned to
mainly serve the reform and listing of State firms") (on file with author).
57 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 26 (noting that the PSL
Rules were formulated on the basis of two-thirds of the shares in PRC stock
markets being illiquid). See also Panorama, Shichang Tongji [Market Statistics]
(detailing statistics on PRC securities markets including the market capitalization
of all outstanding liquid shares), available at http://www.p5w.net/p5w/home/
data/gengra/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
58 Fang Jun, Guo You Gu JIANCHI TousHi [EXAMINATION OF STATE-OWNED
SHARE REDUcTION] 16-17 (2002) (including table), (stating that most illiquid shares
are state-owned shares and that these legal-person shares (faren gu) dominate the
capital structure of listed companies, exceeding illiquid shares two-fold).
59 Efforts over the last two years to sell some portion of state-owned shares in
order to fund China's social security fund backfired. The CSRC enacted a policy
in mid-2001 requiring that companies conducting an IPO or issuing additional
shares to make ten percent of the offering consist of state-owned shares. See
Interim Measures on Selling of State-Owned Shares for Raising Social-Security
Funds, State Council, June 12, 2001 [hereinafter QFII Rulesi. After this plan was
announced, the markets fell dramatically. On June 24, 2002, the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock markets increased by the largest single-day percentage in their
history following an announcement that the sell-off of state-owned shares would
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The illiquid capital structure of most listed firms also means that
China's securities markets do not create markets for corporate
control. 60
2.3.4. Foreign Exchange Controls Impose a "Chinese Wall"
Between PRC Capital Markets and Global Capital Flows
The currency of the PRC is not freely convertible. The State
Administration of Foreign Exchange ("SAFE") has extensive rules
about how funds can enter and leave China.61 The "people's
money" or renminbi ("RMB"), denominated in units called yuan,
cannot be sent abroad without SAFE approval, and foreign
exchange or hard currency coming into China is subject to similar
restrictions. 62 If Warren Buffett went to the local branch of a
be halted. See Jun, supra note 58.
60 Writing before the PRC Securities Law was adopted, two commentators
noted that the predominance of illiquid shares and commitment to government
control in China preclude a market-based on corporate control.
Certain transactions that are routine in Western economies and that
contribute to the vigor and efficiency of the economy are all but
impossible under Chinese conditions. Mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers, and corporate takeovers all have potential for restructuring
allocation of resources and improving management of enterprises.
Those transactions are largely dependent, however, on alienability of
ownership in enterprises. In China, state shares and legal person shares,
which comprise the preponderance of all outstanding stock, are critical
impediments to alienability. Though one enterprise might buy some of
the outstanding stock of another on the securities markets, it cannot
possibly buy enough to take control. (citations omitted).
Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities
Law, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 134 (1996) (citation omitted).
61 See generally SAFE website (cataloging various foreign exchange
regulations), available at http://www.safe.gov.cn (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). But
see Michael Vatikiotis & Bertil Lintner, The Renminbi Zone, FAR E. EcoN. REV., May
29, 2003, at 24 (reporting that an estimated sum of greater than RMB 30 billion
(USD 3.6 billion) is in circulation outside of China despite currency controls).
62 Zhang Baoying, deputy head of finance for China Unicorn, a firm listed in
Hong Kong and New York with its operations in mainland China, noted in an
interview that these currency controls can affect operations:
Chinese interest rates are not set by the market, but administratively.
We pay around 5.5% for a one to three-year loan, but we could pay three
percentage points less than that in Hong Kong. On the other hand, we
would need government approval from the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for every transfer from Hong Kong banks to
the mainland.
See Dan Slater, China Unicorn, FINANCEASIA.COM, (May 9, 2003) (describing
requirements that SAFE Approve transfers from Hong Kong banks to mainland
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Chinese brokerage company to open an account to trade Chinese
A-shares, his money would not be welcome. 63 A PRC resident
wishing to use his or her RMB savings to buy shares, even those of
Chinese companies, listed in Hong Kong or New York, would not
be able to do so either. Thus, China's system of currency control
has effectively cut China's securities markets off from global
capital flows. There have been incremental reforms to chip away
at the "Chinese wall" separating China's securities markets from
the international financial system, but these reforms remain
marginal,64 and the RMB is not expected to become fully
convertible in the near to medium term.65
2.3.5. Shares are Classified by Ownership and Trading Location,
Not Rights Per Se
China has an alphabet soup of share types: A-shares, B-shares,
H-shares, and N-shares. There are also legal-person shares and
state-owned shares. These labels do not, however, refer to classes
China), at http://www.financeasia.com/a.cfm?O=E867AAF3642E11D781FA009
0277E174B (last visited June 1, 2003).
63 This could change if Buffett invested through a vehicle that obtained QFII
status under the rules issued in 2002. Even then Buffett's money would not be
allowed to flow in and out of China as speculative capital. The QFII rules impose
a minimum one-year lock up on investments. After one year, no more than 20%
of funds brought into the PRC can be remitted at any one time, and there is a
three-month wait between all remittances. See Provisional Measures on the
Administration of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Investing in Domestic
Securities, art. 26, China Securities Regulatory Commission, Dec. 1, 2002. Also,
how much money Buffett could invest would be subject to approval,. Id. art. 10
(requiring application to SAFE for investment quota).
The PRC prohibitions on capital flows however, do not prohibit Buffett from
buying shares of PRC firms that have, with government permission, been listed
overseas. Recently, Buffett made such a purchase, buying shares of Hong Kong-
and New York Stock Exchange-listed PetroChina. See Sarah McBride, China Offers
Challenge for Buffett, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2003, at Cl (reporting on acquisition of
thirteen percent of the publicly traded shares of PetroChina by Berkshire
Hathaway, an investment company headed by Buffett).
64 For example, PRC citizens with legally-earned foreign currency can now
purchase B-shares. See Guanyu Jingnei Jtimin Geren Touzi Jingnei Waizigu
Ruogan Wenti de Tongzhi [Notice on Investment of Chinese Citizens on Listed
Foreign Capital Stocks in China], China Securities Regulatory Commission, Feb.
21, 2001.
65 Interestingly, neither the PSL Rules nor any existing SAFE regulations
address whether foreign investors victorious in PRC private securities litigation
can repatriate their awarded damages.
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of shares with different customized rights as might be created by a
company issuing common and various classes of preferred stock.
Rather, these labels indicate who may own the particular block of
shares, where they are traded, and in what currency they are
denominated. 66 A-shares are the mainstay of China's securities
markets; they are the RMB-denominated shares listed in Shanghai
and Shenzhen. B-shares are also listed on the PRC exchanges but
are denominated in foreign currencies (U.S. dollars in Shanghai
and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen). N-shares and H-shares are
shares of PRC-registered companies which have been listed on
overseas stock exchanges in New York and Hong Kong,
respectively. (The same pattern is sometimes used with reference
to L-shares listed in London and S-shares listed in Singapore.) 67
The PRC Company Law makes no provision for shares of unequal
rights, and China does not generally permit preferred shares with
special negotiated rights. While Chinese companies with shares
listed on overseas exchanges are subject to the securities regulatory
regimes of those jurisdictions,68 the PSL Rules apply only to shares
listed on exchanges approved by the CSRC, i.e. A-shares and B-
shares traded on the Chinese mainland in Shanghai and
Shenzhen.69
66 Another label, "red chips," indicates where a firm is incorporated. China
Unicorn is a red chip. Its business is based in mainland China, but the listing
vehicle for China Unicorn is a Hong Kong-registered company. Thus, H-shares
are shares issued in Hong Kong by mainland-registered companies, while red
chips are those companies that not only list shares overseas but also register
(incorporate) their listing vehicle in a jurisdiction other than the PRC mainland
(while having most of their assets and business operations on the mainland). Red
chip Unicorn is listed in both New York and Hong Kong. Red chips now
constitute a significant percentage of the market capitalization of the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange. See generally CHARLES DE TRENCK ET AL., RED CHIPS AND THE
GLOBALISATION OF CHINA'S ENTERPRISES (2d ed. 1998).
67 Of course, firms sometimes list in more than one overseas market. For
example, both PetroChina and Sinopec have issued both H-shares and N-shares.
68 Nasdaq-listed Netease has been subjected to private securities litigation in
the United States, for example. See Netease has quarterly net profit, company's results
mark an important milestone for China internet sector, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2002,
at A8 (noting four unsettled class action shareholder lawsuits against Netease
after the firm admitted problems with the disclosure of its advertising revenues).
69 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 2, 3 (limiting jurisdiction to trading on
PRC-approved securities exchanges, which would exclude United Nations
sanctioned exchanges inside the PRC and foreign exchanges, which were of
course not established with PRC approval).
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2.3.6. Government Approval Requirements are Ubiquitous
Government approval requirements are ubiquitous in the laws
and regulations governing PRC securities markets.70 Government
approval is required for a company to conduct an initial public
offering ("IPO") or secondary offering.71 Whether or not a firm
may issue corporate bonds and the interest rates that may be paid
on them is determined by the government, not market forces.72
Whether a PRC company may list overseas is subject to CSRC
approval. 73  Mergers of listed companies are also subject to
approval. 74 Recently, the CSRC has conducted two rounds of
"deregulation" eliminating a number of specific approvals it had
required. 75 These changes, however, were relatively minor. 76
70 "[Wihile on its face the Company Law promises the creation and
organization of a semi-independent group of economic actors, in fact it both
expresses and enables continuing state control over the economic and industrial
system in China." Howson, supra note 48 at 172; see also Robert C. Art & Minkang
Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 289 (1995) (noting that under the Chinese Company Law, a
firm's "processes of incorporation, operation, and capitalization...are.. .plainly
matters of governmental control and permission, not of right").
71 See PRC Company Law, supra note 35, arts. 152(1), 153, 154 (1993)
(amended 1999) (requiring approval for an IPO); id. art. 139 (requiring approval
for a secondary offering); PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 10 (requiring
CSRC approval to list); see also, Gu & Art, supra note 60, 138 ("A reform that
would be considered radical in China, though not elsewhere, would be to permit
market factors, rather than extensive government regulation, to'determine which
companies can issue shares."). In addition to the government approvals required,
the PRC Company Law imposes various merit-based requirements that must be
met for a company to publicly issue shares. These include a requirement for three
years of continuous profitability. See PRC Company Law, supra note 35, art. 152.
However, companies meeting the objective criteria are only eligible to list; they
are not entitled to list until government permission is obtained. See id. art. 153.
72 See Qiye Zhaiquan Guanli Tiaoli [Provisions on the Administration of
Enterprise Bonds], art. 10, State Council, Aug. 2, 1993, (providing for annual
national plans that control the amount of corporate bonds to be issued); id. art. 18
(capping corporate bond interest at forty percent over government-set interest
rates for individual bank deposits for the same period).
73 See PRC Company Law, supra note 35, art. 155 (1993) (requiring CSRC
approval to list overseas).
74 See id. art. 183 (1993) (requiring approval to merge).
75 See Guanyu Di Yi Pi Quxiao Xingzheng Shenpi Xiangmu (32 xiang) de
Tongzhi, [Notice Concerning the First Batch of 32 Cancelled Administrative
Examination and Approval Items], China Securities Regulatory Commission, Dec.
21, 2002 (canceling various approval requirements); Guanyu Quxiao Di Er Pi
Xingzheng Shenpi Xiangmu Ji Gaibian Bufen Xingzheng Shenpi Xiangmu Guanli
Fangshi de Tonggao [Notice Concerning Cancellation of a Second Batch of
Administrative Examination and Approval Items and Modification of the
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Requirements for government approval are still fundamental
features of China's securities markets. Indeed, under the PRC
Securities Law, CSRC approval is required "for each brokerage
firm branch office opening in China.7"
2.3.7. Rapid Development Creates a Policy Cauldron
Chinese securities markets are young,78 and their development
rapid. The two mainland securities exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. 79 In
1991, only fourteen companies traded on China's securities
exchanges; today, there are more than 1,200. The PRC Securities
Law came into effect in 199980 and the PRC Company Law was
Management Style for some Administrative Examination and Approval Items],
China Securities Regulatory Commission, Apr. 1, 2003 (eliminating more approval
requirements).
76 Many of the rescinded items are for preliminary approvals. Approval is still
required; the CSRC simply gave up a requirement that initial permission be
obtained even to proceed with an application. The main substantive items in the
first batch related to law firms. The CSRC had required lawyers and law firms
engaging in securities work to be licensed by the CSRC. It has cancelled those
requirements, apparently willing to let the market (or at least the Ministry of
Justice or some other department) determine competence in providing legal
advice.
77 See PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 123.
78 Stock markets existed in China before the founding of the People's
Republic. However, the revolution's ideology was hostile to their continued
existence and the pre-1949 markets were shut down. See generally W.A. THOMAS,
WESTERN CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE
(2001) (providing an account of the genesis, development, and collapse of the
Shanghai Stock Exchange prior to the Communist takeover of 1949). Although
China's current era of economic reforms began in the late 1970's after the death of
Mao Zedong, the two current stock exchanges were not founded until 1990. Two
useful works on the initial development of China's stock markets are CARL E.
WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, 'To GET RICH Is GLORIOUS!': CHINA'S STOCK MARKETS
IN THE '80S AND '90S (2001) and ELLEN HERTZ, THE TRADING CROWD: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK MARKET (1998). For more background
information on Chinese corporate law, see I.A. TOKLEY & TINA RAVN, COMPANY
AND SECURITIES LAW IN CHINA (1998).
79 See Shanghai Securities Exchange Opens, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 19, 1990
(announcing the opening of the Shanghai Securities Exchange), available at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english; Shenzhen Securities Exchange Opens, Xinhua
News Agency, July 3, 1991 (announcing the opening of the Shenzhen Securities
Exchange), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english.
80 See generally Xian Chu Zhang, The Old Problems, the New Law, and the
Developing Market-A Preliminary Examination of the First Securities Law of the
People's Republic of China, 33 INI'L LAW. 983 (1999) (discussing the PRC Securities
Law); Jackie Lo, New PRC Securities Law Fails to Fully Unify Regulation of Securities
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enacted in 1994.81 Policy innovations and reforms continue to occur
at a torrid pace.82 Two years ago, one could correctly say that (a)
PRC courts do not permit investors to sue listed companies for
false disclosure, (b) there is no general legal basis for foreign
Issues in China, 13 CHINA L. & PRAC., Feb. 1999 at 21-24 (giving an early reaction to
the PRC Securities Law); Anthony Zaloom and Liu Hongchuan, A Legal
Framework for Securities, CHINA Bus. REVIEW, May-June 1999 at 26-31 (providing a
second reaction); Daniel M. Anderson, Note, Taking Stock in China: Company
Disclosure and Information in China's Stock Markets, 88 GEo. L.J. 1919 (2000) (offering
an informative review of disclosures).
81 The PRC Company Law was adopted by the National People's Congress
("NPC") in 1993 and became effective in 1994. A number of helpful articles
concerning China's Company Law have appeared in U.S. law journals. See
generally, Gu & Art, supra note 60, 273 (describing the economic and historical
context of the reform); Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock
Companies in China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301 (describing the process of
privatization in China); Howard Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing
in the People's Republic of China, 17 HOUS. J. I'NTL. L. 399 (1995) (explaining how the
Company Law works); Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism
in a Transitional Economy, 5 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 457 (1996) (outlining past and
existing economic policies); Nicholas C. Howson, China's Company Law: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127, 140-71
(1997) (comparing the 1994 Company Law to PRC corporate law before the
Company Law was adopted); Yabo Lin, New Forms and Organizational Structures of
Foreign Investment in China Under the Company Law of the PRC, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. 327
(1994) (detailing how foreign investment works under the Company law); Fang
Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP.& INT'L L. 149 (1995)
(analyzing the corporatization process in China); Joaquin F. Matias, From Work-
Units to Corporations: The Role of Chinese Corporate Governance in a Transitional
Market Economy, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1 (1999) (discussing the tense relationship
between an enterprises's autonomy and corporate governance); William H.
Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market "Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L.
267, 286-94 (1996) (focusing on SOEs); Guanghua Yu, The Emerging Framework of
China's Business Organizations Law, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (1997) (surveying the
plethora of business entities now operative within the PRC). For student articles
that tackle particular aspects of the Company Law, see Michael Irl Nikkel, Note,
"Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's
Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503 (1995); Chuan Roger Peng, Note, Limited
Liability in China: A Partial Reading of China's Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 263 (1996).
82 See Jean Davis, Zhu Sanzhu's Securities Regulation in China, 30 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 534, 535 (2002) (book review) (noting that "[niew rules of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission and new regulations of the PRC's two
mainland stock exchanges are appearing daily"). The bewildering pace of change
affects not only securities regulation, but PRC law in general; see, e.g., Randall
Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China's Alien "Legal System,"
2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 37, 38 (2003) (hereinafter The X-Files) ("The pace
of reform makes it difficult even for those within China to keep abreast of the
latest developments. New laws and regulations are being issued at breakneck
speed, old laws and regulations are amended continually, and whole new
regulatory regimes and institutions are being created.").
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investment in China's investment banking sector, (c) PRC citizens
may not buy B-shares and (d) no foreign capital is permitted to
enter the A-share market. None of the above are true today. While
certain fundamentals, remain largely undisturbed, particularly
those identified here as having special characteristics, have been
the pace of change makes the study of Chinese securities
regulation, and consequently of private securities litigation in
China, a moving target.83
2.3.8. Developing in a System with Weak Courts and Constrained
Judges
The PRC isnot a jurisdiction with broadly "empowered" courts
and judges. Comparatively weak PRC courts and judges operate
in an ostensibly civil law8 4 system that does not theoretically
permit judge-made law.85 More importantly, PRC judges and
courts lack independence and are subject to structural conflicts
likely to affect their handling of securities law cases and private
83 For readers of Chinese, a series of books by Li Zhangzhe is particularly
helpful for following PRC securities market developments. See, e.g., CHINA STOCK
MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 2002, supra note 54. The magazine Caijing is also
quite useful. See http://www.caijing.com.cn/mag/default.aspx (subscription
required).
84 See generally Susan Finder, Court System, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA ch. 2.1
(Freshfields ed., 2001); BROWN, supra note 48 (analyzing Chinese judicial
administration and process); Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese
Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System] (discussing the various
problems plaguing the enforcement of Chinese court decisions and their
implications for economic reforms); Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the
People's Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145, 216 (1993) [hereinafter Supreme
People's Court] ("The increasing distribution of cases by the Court and lower
courts is evidence that the Chinese judicial system is in a transition period from
complete reliance on statute law to a mixed system of statute and case law."). But
see Nanping Liu, "Legal Precedents With Chinese Characteristics": Published Cases in
the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107 (1991) (showing that
certain reported decisions may carry force as precedents).
85 Securities markets exist under a variety of legal systems, and a taxonomy
between common and civil law systems is inadequate to describe the variety of
legal systems in the world. China has a mixed system, drawing on elements from
a variety of sources. In general, China does not emphasize case law. This is
relevant to the debate concerning whether common law jurisdictions are more
hospitable to the development of securities markets than civil law jurisdictions.
See generally supra note 84 (showing that the force of precedent in Chinese
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securities litigation.86 Specifically, governments at the same level
control PRC courts at the same level through appointment and
budgetary powers.87 For example, the Qingdao People's Congress
controls the budget and personnel of the Qingdao People's Courts.
Additionally, adjudicative committees oversee PRC courts.88 These
committees, consisting of representatives from branches of
government other than the court system, supervise the work of the
courts. In sensitive cases, they may direct judges to act in
particular ways. Institutionally, the weakness of courts is likely to
influence the development of private securities litigation in China,
particularly given the other "special characteristics" identified
above. PRC courts adjudicating private securities litigation may
frequently be controlled by the same level of government which
constitutes the majority shareholder in the defendant corporation,
creating the obvious danger of partiality.8 9
2.3.9. Securities Markets are Part of a Cultural Revolution in
China
Securities market developments are at the vanguard of China's
ongoing cultural, political, and economic transformation.
Commonly observed, China's traditional business culture is
characterized by discretionary power, secrecy, a substantial
government role in large scale production, and personal
connections (guanxi).9o Conversely, it is commonly asserted that
86 See, e.g., Laifan Lin, Judicial Independence in Japan: A Re-Investigation for
China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 198 (1999) ("The financing of the courts still
depends on the administrative organizations. The judicial organizations do not
have financial independence."). See generally Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got To
Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 1, 57-64 (1991) [hereinafter What's Law Got To Do With It?]; Power and Politics in
the Chinese Court System, supra note 84, at 6-15 (1996) (describing the complicated,
independent structure of the Chinese court system).
87 See Zhonghu Renmin Gongheguo Faguan Fa [The Laws of the People's
Republic of China] art. 11 (Science Press, Beijing 1995).
88 See generally Margaret Y.K. Woo, Adjudication Supervision and Judicial
Independence in the PRC, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1991) (examining Chinese judicial
decision-making as reflected in the procedure of adjudication supervision).
89 See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits
of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161,195 (2001) ("On the other hand, because of the institutional
arrangements whereby the local people's congresses appoint and remove judges
and local governments fund the courts, government officials are able to pressure
judges to find in favor of... local companies in commercial disputes.").
90 A single sentence to summarize millennia of Chinese business practices is
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securities markets depend on the rule of law, transparency, and the
interactions of private parties who are often strangers.91 The
development of securities markets is, therefore, a fascinating point
of friction in an ongoing cultural revolution that is even
stimulating growth of professions and institutions previously
unknown in the PRC such as specialized branches of the
accounting and legal professions, investment banks,92 and
of course a gross oversimplification, but the features identified, while contestable
(as is the notion of "China" itself), are useful characterizations of the context in
which PRC securities markets are developing. Concerning China's traditional
business culture, see generally HILL GATES, CHINA'S MOTOR: A THOUSAND YEARS OF
PETTY CAPITALISM (Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (finding two dominant modes of
production in Chinese economic history: the petty capitalist and the state-
tributary, while large-scale private sector actors are generally absent). Concerning
how this traditional culture interacts with modern corporate and securities law,
see J.Ray Bowen II, & David C. Rose, On the Absence of Privately Owned, Publicly
Traded Corporations in China: The Kirby Puzzle, 57 J. ASIAN STUDIES 442 (1998)
(arguing that the threat of government confiscation drives economic activity into
government institutions and family firms in China). For an example of the kinds
of problems Bowen's argument is predicated upon, see Beijing Youth Daily
Online, Getting Along With the Government (describing repeated official harassment
of Jiang Caiyi, proprietor of a small grocery store in Shenyang), available at
http://www.bjyouth.com/article.jsp?oid=2076459 (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). But
see Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (1999-2000)
(arguing that traditional clan organizational forms are functionally akin to
modern corporations).
91 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131
(1997) (seminal works arguing minority protections are required for dispersed
share ownership to develop); Simon Sackman & Margaret Coltman, Legal Aspects
of a Global Securities Market, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET:
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 19, 19 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996) (asserting that
"adequate standards of investor protection are required in relation to offerings of
securities."). See generally DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
92 The term "investment bank," translated literally as "touzi yinhang" and
colloquially shortened to tou hang, is commonly used in financial circles in China.
However, laws and regulations generally use the term "securities company"
(zhengquan gongsi) to refer to firms that provide underwriting (chengxiao) and
brokerage (jingji) services.
Under the PRC Securities Law, securities companies are classified as either
comprehensive (zonghe lei) firms or brokerage (jingji lei) firms. PRC Securities
Law, supra note 6, art. 119. Only comprehensive securities companies can engage
in securities underwriting. Id. arts. 129(1), 129(2), 129(3), 130. Comprehensive
firms may also provide brokerage services and trade for their own accounts. Id.
arts. 129(1), 129(2). Brokerage securities companies may only provide brokerage
services. Id. art. 130.
Firm commitment (bao xiao) and agency (dai xiao) underwritings are both
permitted under the PRC Securities Law. Id. art. 21. Any public offering in excess
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putatively, independent regulatory agencies.93 The development
of securities markets in China also encourage the development of
notions such as risk consciousness among investors and
expectations of legal compliance and transparency for officials. 94
To observe the development of securities markets in a regime
whose founding principles called for the eradication of private
property and which previously shut down stock exchanges in
China is a striking policy reversal at the very least.95
2.3.10. No History of Private Securities Litigation
Another special characteristic of PRC securities regulation,
particularly in contrast to the current U.S. system, is that PRC
listed companies have not, historically, faced a threat of private
securities litigation.96  To enforce disclosure rules and other
securities laws and regulations, China relied primarily on
administrative and occasionally criminal sanctions; private
enforcement has been comparatively unimportant.97 Perhaps
of RMB 50 million yuan (approximately USD 6 million) must be underwritten by
an underwriting syndicate. Id. art. 25. See also http://www.xe.com/ucc
(providing a currency converter) (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
93 The CSRC is independent of the securities industry in the sense that it is
not a creation of market participants such as investment banks. However, it is not
independent of the Chinese Communist Party. See Sebastian Heilmann, The
Chinese Stock Market: Pitfalls of a Policy-driven Market, (Sept. 2002) (discussing the
Financial Work Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as a control
mechanism for the CSRC and other regulatory bodies of the financial sector),
available at http://www.chinapolitik.de/studien/chinaanalysis/no_15.pdf.
94 See Chen Jie, ZHENGQUAN QIZHA QINQUAN SUNHAI PEICHANG YANJIU
[SECURITIES FRAUD TORT INJURIES: RESEARCH ON COMPENSATION] (discussing an
increase in the willingness of PRC investors to seek legal remedies) (on file with
author).
95 At its First National Congress in Shanghai, in 1921, the Communist Party
adopted a platform calling for the abolition of private property. See Zhongguo
Gongchandang Lici Dangzhang de Zhiding Ji Xiuzheng Jiankuang [Summary of
Previous Formulations and Revisions to the Chinese Communist Party
Constitution], at www.cctv.com/specials/80zhounian/sanji/bj060808.html (last
visited June 1, 2003). But see THOMAS, supra note 78 (discussing pre-revolution
stock markets). See Chris Buckley, Capitalists in Chinese Legislature Speak Out for
Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at 45 (reporting advocacy of greater
protection of private property by delegates to the National People's Congress in
March 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/12/intemational/
asia/12CHIN.html.
96 Such litigation is a significant feature of the U.S. securities markets. See
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (providing statistics on U.S. private
securities litigation), at http://securities.stanford.edu (last visited June 1, 2003).
97 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 183 (noting that the PRC
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private securities litigation will become a more significant aspect of
PRC securities markets now that the Supreme People's Court
promulgated the PSL Rules. The degree of change will, of course,
depend in large measure on the specific provisions of the rules
which this Article will analyze.
2.4. How to Approach Chinese Securities Regulation
The above background provides the reader with sufficient
context to make the upcoming analysis of the PSL Rules coherent.
It generally imparts an explanation of securities litigation, how it
developed in China to date, and what special characteristics
distinguish PRC securities markets from more familiar models.
Before launching into analysis of the PSL Rules, it is useful to
pause for a methodological sidebar. What are the appropriate
assumptions for analyzing the PSL Rules? Against what model or
standard should they be judged? Unless we know what they are
"for", how can we know what is "right" or "wrong" with the PSL
Rules?
Donald Clarke recently identified and characterized as
inadequate, at least for some purposes, the Ideal Western Legal
Order ("IWLO") approach to Chinese law.9 8 In this approach, an
analyst uses notions of an IWLO to measure legal developments in
China.99 Measured against the IWLO standard, the analyst almost
always finds China's approach wanting.100 Professor Clarke
Securities Law and PRC Economic Law in general stress administrative and
criminal liability while slighting civil liability (zhong xingzheng xingshi zeren er qing
minshi zeren); Hongchuan Liu & Zili Ren, Halfvay to Effective Shareholder Protection,
17 CHINA L. & PRAc. 29, 30 (2003) (noting that the PRC Securities Law "paid little
attention to civil remedies available to defrauded investors" in contrast to
administrative and criminal provisions); Potter, supra note 13, at 147 (noting that
"[t]he reporting requirements and compliance rules of the bureaucratic
supervisory system play a more central role than the prospects for private action
through either judicial or administrative process. Indeed, recurring efforts to
expand the capacity for private litigation on corporate and securities matters
continue to face strong resistance").
98 See Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle
Just a Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (C. Stephen Hsu ed.,
2003) [hereinafter Puzzling Observations] (exploring different models used to
understand the Chinese legal system).
99 Id. at 95-100.
100 Something like an Ideal Western Legal Order ("IWLO") approach has
certainly been used with regard to PRC securities laws. See, e.g., William I.
Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China's
Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 479-80
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postulates that a different model for understanding Chinese law,
such as one that understands "legal" developments in China as the
fruit of a fundamentally different system of governance with
different goals, might make PRC contract, administrative, and
constitutional "law" seem less crude, and less riddled with
"mistakes." 101 For example, the characteristic vagueness of PRC
law 02 can be understood as a virtue, not a shortcoming, if the
purpose of PRC law is reconceptualized. Rather than existing to
provide clear notice to private parties of legal rights and duties,
PRC legal enactments exist to facilitate management of a complex
society by an administrative state. Authorities in such a regime
seek to provide guidance to subordinate actors while preserving
the discretion to respond to circumstances flexibly. Vagueness and
other perceived deficiencies of PRC law may actually be strengths,
given the goals and assumptions of PRC legal enactments.
This arresting insight has implications for the study of PRC
securities regulation. If the PRC is attempting to build robust
capital markets with dispersed ownership similar to the securities
markets in the United States, identifying disparities between PRC
and U.S. securities laws and evaluating whether such disparities
aid or inhibit the PRC's developmental goals is likely to be a
fruitful exercise. However, if the PRC is attempting to do
(2002) (reviewing Chinese securities law and policy and arguing that China must
shift to laissez-faire market policies in order to sustain market growth); Todd
Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the Turn of
the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking
Industry in the People's Republic of China in an Effort to Increase Investment Capital, 20
Hous. J. INT'L L. 451, 488-91 (1998) (describing Chinese economic reforms and
advocating further liberalization); Frank C. Razzano; Is China Entering the Free
Market?, 26 SEc. REG. L.J. 317, 324-25 (1999) (critizing the PRC's authoritarian
approach to securities market regulation and advocating western liberal economic
reforms). Such works are not without merit. They have descriptive value, and
their negative analytical conclusions may be entirely accurate, granting the
assumption that China's target is to establish robust securities markets like those
existing in the United States.
For an approach decidedly unlike the IWLO model, see generally Frances H.
Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance? The Chinese Experiment, 32
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 77 (1998) and Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance:
A New Model from China, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1199.
101 See Puzzling Observations, supra note 98, at 95 (proposing a different
approach to modeling the legal system).
102 See generally Claudia Ross & Lester Ross, Language and Law: Sources of
Systemic Vagueness and Ambiguous Authority in Chinese Statutory Language, 31
U.B.C. L, REV. 205, 209-11 (1997) (discussing inherent ambiguities in Chinese
statutory language).
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something else, this approach is likely to be of only marginal utility
and may contribute to misunderstanding PRC law. So, is there any
value in assessing the PSL Rules from the perspective of U.S.
norms concerning private securities litigation, or is this a dubious
IWLO exercise?
Undeniably, PRC securities markets and their regulatory
environment are radically different from U.S. securities markets
and their regulatory environment. Pittman Potter has noted that
PRC regulatory norms and Western regulatory norms offer
distinctly "competing visions of regulatory culture" with Chinese
norms of "patrimonial sovereignty" in opposition to Western
conceptions of "responsible agency" as the appropriate role for
government.103  Beyond these normative orientations, PRC
securities markets have developed for more than a decade with the
clear goal of assisting SOE reforms. Thus, PRC securities markets
are largely a product of government engineering, not private
ordering, and they are designed to bring private capital under
government control, not to privatize government assets. This is all
very unlike U.S. securities markets. Given the stark differences,
should evaluation of PRC securities regulation, and the PSL Rules
take place specifically with reference to Chinese goals, not U.S.
models? Is evaluating PRC securities regulation from a U.S.
perspective not too narrow, perhaps even an example of disgusting
ethnocentric triumphalism?04
Actually, analysis of the PSL Rules from a U.S. perspective is
desirable for several reasons. The PSL Rules developed with
reference to U.S. models, so evaluation of the PSL Rules from a U.S.
perspective can help reveal the operation of what Professor Potter
terms the "selective adaptation" of foreign legal norms in China.105
Moreover, not all analysis comparing China to the U.S. and finding
China deficient is necessarily crude IWLO analysis. One can avoid
idealizing the Western (or U.S.) legal order, and one can be
sensitive to the different cultural and historical context of PRC
103 See Potter, supra note 13, at 125 (contrasting the Western and Chinese
regulatory cultures in economic sectors).
104 See Puzzling Observations, supra note 98, at 114-16 (discussing and critical
evaluating charges of ethnocentrism in comparative law).
105 See Potter, supra note 13, at 119-21 (defining and discussing "selective
adaptation"); see also PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE (Routledge, 2001) (analyzing the
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legal approaches. 0 6 Additionally, no matter What the "special
characteristics" of Chinese securities markets are today, PRC
officials do not indicate that they expect China's securities markets
to facilitate SOE reform then whither away. Rather, many PRC
officials hope that the scale and importance of China's securities
markets will continue to grow.1 07 In discussing how to foster the
growth of their securities markets, PRC commentators routinely
consider U.S. models. 08 Given that China is shopping the world
for regulatory approaches, it is hardly unseemly to compare PRC
approaches with U.S. practices. Also, while securities markets
naturally reflect the context in which they exist, they also seem to
pose certain fundamental problems that transcend local cultures.
The problem of information asymmetry and resulting impulse for
investor protection is common to securities markets in all
jurisdictions. A comparative law fact-finding mission that
investigates how various systems address particular issues may
discover alternative approaches to common problems.10 9 Finally,
PRC legal enactments concerning securities markets routinely
claim that "investor protection" is a purpose of the enactment. It is
hardly obnoxious to analyze with reference to other jurisdictions
the likelihood that a system will accomplish its own asserted
purposes.
To understand PRC securities markets, one must grasp that
they serve a transitional economy and are dominated by
government rather than private ordering. PRC securities
regulation is consequently characterized by administrative
paternalism that facilitates cautious, state-modulated
transformation of the old economic order. But it is vapid
comparative analysis to simply nod at Chinese differences and
conclude, "that explains it; they have a different model." PRC
106 See William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law,
61 WASH. L. REV. 945, 948-55 (1986) (arguing PRC legal developments must be
understood with reference to Chinese historical traditions); The X-Files, supra note
82, at 61-84 (noting highly negative depictions of PRC law and calling for a
balanced approach to criticism).
107 See generally, KArruO ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XIN JUMIAN
[DEVELOPING THE NEW PHASE OF CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKETS] (Zhou Zhengqing
ed., 2002) (containing speeches by Zhou Xiaochuan and other former CSRC
officials expressing hopes for growth in PRC securities markets) (on file with
author).
108 See, e.g., PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18.
109 For a critique of this sort of functionalist approach, see Teemu Ruskola,
Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179,189-91 (2002).
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securities regulation is too complex and dynamic for that.110 The
development of PRC securities regulation is also characterized by
aspirations for a new economic order with different organizing
principles. A U.S. perspective, appropriately contextualized, can
help one understand precisely how historical legacies and
reformist ambitions collide in China's securities regulatory regime.
3. CRITIQUE OF CHINA'S RULES ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
Chinese newspapers have hailed the PSL Rules as a major
advancement for securities law in China."' Official sources have
declared that the PSL Rules provide the first functional basis for
private securities litigation in China.112 The preamble to the PSL
Rules recites "the protection of the lawful rights and interests of
investors" (baohu touziren hefa quanyi) as a motivating purpose of
the PSL Rules."13 However, the PSL Rules impose many practical
obstacles to bringing such lawsuits, 114 and it is unclear what their
110 Professor Clarke's discussion of the IWLO and other models for
understanding PRC law is subtle and nuanced, taking into account the dynamic
nature of PRC conditions. See Puzzling Observations, supra note 98, at 95-114
(exploring different models used to understand the Chinese legal system).
111 See e.g., Zhongda Tupo Changqi Li Hao / Ge lie Renshi Pingshuo Gao Fa
Guiding, Zhengquan Shichang Bao [Important Breakthrough with Long-term Benefits,
People from All Walks of Life Comment on the Supreme People's Court's Rules], CHINA
SEC. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003 ("wulun shi guangda zhong xiao touzizhe, zhuanjia xuezhe,
haishe quanshang, shangshi gongsi, jun biaoshi guiding de fabu shi wo guo zhengquan
shichang fazhihua jincheng de zhongyao lichengbei" [[Tihe masses of medium and
small investors, scholars, securities firms and listed companies indicate that the
PSL Rules are a milestone in the process of developing the rule of law in China's
securities markets.]), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/ jinji/35/159/
20030110/905274.html (last visited June 1, 2003).
112 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18 at 277 (printing the
comments of the Vice President of the Supreme People's Court from a press
conference given to unveil the PSL Rules).
113 PSL Rules, supra note 2, pmbl.
114 Some of these ideas were first developed in postings to China Law Net
("CLNET") shortly after the PSL Rules became effective. See Walter Hutchens,
"China Court Accepts First Class-Action Shareholder Suit," a series of CLNET
postings on Feb. 19-20, 2003, including exchanges with Matthew C.J. Rudolph and
Knut Pissler (on file with the author). Concerning CLNET, see generally
http://www.law.washington.edu/clnet/.
Some obstacles to bringing private securities litigation in China are also
identified by the Economist Intelligence Unit. See, e.g., Economist Intelligence
Unit, supra note 31 (noting that private securities litigation for disclosure fraud "is
a good idea in theory, but putting it into practice will be extremely difficult
because of the huge scale of wrong-doing in the past, the fact that the government
is implicated and the fact that many shareholders gambled their money away and
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impact will be in practice.115
3.1. Narrow Scope Denies Recovery to Victims of Insider Trading and
Market Manipulation
The PSL Rules do not authorize litigation for all forms of
securities fraud.116 Rather, the PSL Rules allow Chinese courts to
accept only private litigation based upon bad disclosure, referred
to as misrepresentations (xujia chenshu). Misrepresentations are
defined to include outright false statements, misleading
statements, and material omissions.117 The PSL Rules provide no
basis for private securities litigation based on insider trading
(neimu jiaoyi) or market manipulation (caozong shichang)."8 In fact,
the "temporary" ban on accepting private securities litigation
issued by the Supreme People's Court in September 2001 remains
in effect for all suits except for those based on bad disclosure.119
Indeed, the drafters of the PSL Rules have indicated that courts
adjudicating private securities litigation based on bad disclosure
must disentangle any damages a plaintiff suffered due to insider
trading or market manipulation and deny recovery for that portion
of a plaintiff's damages. 20
have no right to compensation"). The perspective of this article is sympathetic to
plaintiffs, but the Economist piece points out, quoting Professor Clarke, that many
investors bought speculatively and did not take seriously the disclosure upon
which suits can now be based. See also Liu & Ren, supra note 97, at 29-32.
115 The PSL Rules do not reach misrepresentation in private placements, only
in IPOs or trading on the national exchanges. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 2;
see also Liu & Ren, supra note 97, at 31 (criticizing the narrow scope of the PSL
Rules both in terms of the failure to cover private placements and the failure to
cover forms of fraud other than misrepresentations).
116 The PSL Rules do not reach misrepresentation in private placements, only
in IPOs or trading on the national exchanges. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 2
(limiting the scope of the PSL Rules to cases arising from a misrepresentation in a
"securities market"); see also Liu & Ren, supra note 97, at 31 (criticizing the narrow
scope of the PSL Rules both in terms of their failure to cover private placements
and forms of fraud other than misrepresentations).
117 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 17.
118 See id. pmbl. (addressing only civil damages claims for misrepresentation);
January 15, 2002 PSL Notice, supra note 25 (addressing only claims for
misrepresentation); September 21, 2001 PSL Notice, supra note 24 (halting all civil
litigation concerning securities).
119 See January 15, 2002 PSL Notice, supra note 25 (authorizing only private
securities litigation based on misrepresentations subsequent to the September 21,
2001 PSL Notice).
120 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 140 (indicating that
courts should deny recovery for the portion of a loss due to insider trading or
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The failure of the Supreme People's Court to provide private
causes of action for insider trading and market manipulation is
unfortunate. Market manipulation and insider trading are
certainly present in China's securities markets.121 In one celebrated
case, the CSRC brought administrative action against four
investment companies after they opened more than 600 securities
trading accounts and then acquired much of the publicly traded
stock of Yorkpoint Science & Technology Company through these
accounts. By trading among themselves, the investment
companies drove up the market price dramatically and then sold
their stakes to unsuspecting investors. The CSRC imposed a RMB
449 million fine (USD 54.25 million), confiscated an equivalent
amount of illegal income, and barred several individuals from
participation in China's securities markets' 22 Under the PSL Rules
no private securities litigation can be brought, even for such
egregious market manipulation. The defrauded investors are
without recourse against the perpetrators even though the CSRC
determined culpability and imposed administrative penalties
against them.
market manipulation). The drafters of the PSL Rules inconsistently point out that
false disclosure can be an element of insider trading or market manipulation, so
the private litigation authorized by the PSL Rules may help plaintiffs in some
insider trading or market manipulation cases. See id. at 83 (claiming that the PSL
Rules can reach cases of market manipulation and insider trading).
This raises the interesting question of how the PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY
will be applied by PRC courts. It is technically only persuasive authority. It is not
an enactment of the Supreme People's Court. Rather, it is a lengthy gloss on the
PSL Rules, which are themselves a judicial interpretation of the Supreme People's
Court (in other words, it is an interpretation of an interpretation). However, it
was written by the Supreme People's Court justices who were most responsible
for the drafting of the PSL Rules. It would thus seem to carry significant weight.
121 See, e.g., Zaloom & Hongchuan, supra note 80, at 26, 30-31 (noting that
"[clhapter 11 of the [PRC] Securities Law contains 36 sections on the details of
administrative punishment for violations of the Securities Law .... [sleventeen of
those sections impose criminal liability... [tjhe intent of the legislators is clearly
to curb widespread fraud, manipulation, and other wrongdoing in securities
markets by imposing harsh penalties").
122 See Zhengjianfazi [20011 7 hao [Administrative Penalty Decision No. 7, 2001]
China Securities Regulatory Commission, Apr. 23, 2001 (assessing penalties of
income confiscation and fines against four companies that illegally traded in the
shares of Yorkpoint); Securities Market Calls for Civil Compensation, supra note 27
(noting the Yorkpoint case and discussing the inability of defrauded investors to
obtain civil compensation despite strong administrative penalties for illegal
activities); see also Karby Leggett, Lawsuits Flood China's Securities Industry-
Shareholders Allege Rife Manipulation, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2001, at C1 (discussing
how a "flood of litigation is engulfing China's securities industry").
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The drafters of the PSL Rules and other commentators observe
that while Article 63 of the PRC Securities Law provides a basis for
civil liability for disclosure fraud, no parallel provisions explicitly
authorize civil damages for insider trading or market
manipulation.123 Only administrative and criminal sanctions are
mentioned in the provisions of the PRC Securities Law.124 There
are several problems with accepting this as an adequate reason for
the narrow scope of the PSL Rules. First, the PRC Securities Law
does not prohibit civil liability for insider trading or market
manipulation; it simply fails to provide an explicit basis for it. The
Supreme People's Court could have found an "implied private
cause of action" in the PRC Securities Law.125 Alternatively, the
Supreme People's Court could have allowed plaintiffs to sue for
insider trading or market manipulation based on a tort theory
under the PRC General Principles of Civil Law. 26 In the PSL
Rules, the Supreme People's Court did neither of these things.
Sadly, the Supreme People's Court's refusal to read the PRC
Securities Law liberally in favor of investors is matched by a
willingness to disregard some of the law's explicit provisions. If
Article 63 of the PRC Securities Law enables civil suits for
123 PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 186 (noting no basis for civil
liability for insider trading, but only criminal and administrative punishments, in
PRC Securities Law); ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG WENTI BAOGAO [CHINA
NEGOTIABLE MARKET ISSUE REPORT] 404-05 (Wan Guohua ed., 2003) [hereinafter
CHINA NEGOTIABLE MARKET ISSUE REPORT] (discussing PRC Securities Law, art. 63
on disclosure fraud, art. 183 on insider trading, and art. 71 on market
manipulation, and finding that only the first provides a basis for civil liability
while the other two mention only criminal and administrative sanctions).
124 PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, arts. 183-84 (market manipulation); see
also CHINA NEGOTIABLE MARKET ISSUE REPORT, supra note 123, at 404-05 (noting that
the PRC Securities Law provides only criminal and administrative sanctions for
market manipulation and securities fraud).
125 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975)
(affirming existence of private right of action under Rule 10b-5); Kardon v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (finding an implied private
right of action under Rule 10b-5).
126 Some PRC commentators have suggested private securities litigation be
allowed with respect to market manipulation on a tort theory. See CHINA
NEGOTIABLE MARKET ISSUE REPORT, supra note 123, at 405 (noting that in the
absence of civil damages, investors' losses are uncompensated even when
administrative or criminal penalties are imposed). Indeed, it is unclear why the
drafters of the PSL Rules did not embrace this notion, given their own description
of tort liability. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 1 (providing for tort liability when
"a party with a disclosure obligation violated law provisions by making
misrepresentations and thereby caused him to incur loss").
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disclosure fraud, then the PRC Securities Law was violated by the
Supreme People's Court Notice of September 2001, which
temporarily barred all private securities litigation.127 The PSL
Rules also violate Article 63 by stripping some victims of
disclosure fraud of their rights to sue.
Supreme People's Court officials indicate rules expanding the
scope of private securities litigation to include insider trading and
market manipulation will be forthcoming "when market and legal
conditions are ripe."128 Early promulgation of such enabling rules
is desirable. If the PRC Securities Law is not quickly amended to
provide explicitly for civil liability and for insider trading and
market manipulation, the Supreme People's Court should issue
such rules based upon a tort theory.
3.2. Even Some Victims of Disclosure Fraud are Denied Recovery
Under the PSL Rules, some investors harmed by clearly
fraudulent disclosure will be denied recovery.129 The problem
arises because the PSL Rules instruct courts not to find causality
between false disclosure and an investor's losses when an investor:
1) buys a security prior to the false disclosure being made about
that security, or 2) sells a security before the relevant falsity of
disclosure is publicly revealed. 130 This means, for example, that if
an issuer fails to disclose good news, creating the impression that it
is in worse condition than it actually is, investors selling shares
prior to the public revelation of the good news will be denied
recovery.
The scenario is likely to arise when a number of investors sell
their shares in a particular listed company thinking that the firm's
current performance indicates dim prospects, only to later discover
that the issuer withheld material positive information. Actually,
the company was not in dire straits. Instead, it has recently signed
several major contracts for lucrative work and entered into a
127 Compare September 21, 2001 PSL Notice, supra note 24 (declaring that civil
compensation cases concerning securities will temporarily not be accepted) with
PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 63 (imposing liability on issuers for damages
suffered as a result of their fraudulent disclosures).
128 PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18.
129 See XUAN WEIHUA, XUJIA CHENSHU MINSHI PEICHANG Yu TOUZIZHE QUANYI
BAOHU [CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS AND THE PROTECTION OF INVESTOR
INTERESTS] 19 (Fala Chubanshe 2003) (discussing three types of victims of
fraudulent disclosure who cannot sue under the PSL Rules).
130 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 19.
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merger agreement with a multinational conglomerate willing to
pay a large premium to acquire the company's shares. Once this
information is revealed, the company's share price increases
substantially. If this information had been disclosed in a timely
fashion, the value of the company's shares would have increased
sooner. Consequently, investors who sold their shares before the
information was revealed suffered losses (by getting a lower price)
due to their reliance on the issuer's materially inadequate
disclosure. The PRC Securities Law would impose a duty of timely
disclosure on the listed company in this hypothetical.' 31 Even
when the issuer's breach of that duty causes investors to suffer
damages, the PSL Rules deny recovery to such investors. Because
of the time at which they sold their shares (before the falsity of the
disclosure was publicly revealed), such investors are barred from
establishing causality between their losses and the issuer's false
disclosure. 32 This inability to establish causality means they
cannot recover under the PSL Rules. 33
Ironically, this means the presumption of causality afforded by
the PSL Rules will not benefit victims of disclosure fraud who are
situated as the plaintiffs were in Basic Inc. v. Levinson'34 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the very "fraud on the market"
theory the drafters of the PSL Rules acknowledge was incorporated
into the PSL Rules.135 The defendants in Basic, Inc. repeatedly
denied that an issuer was in merger talks. In fact, such talks had
been underway. Once the merger talks were disclosed, the stock
price rose. Plaintiffs in Basic had sold their shares after the false
denials of merger talks were made and before the truth was
revealed. Consequently, they sold at a price lower than the price
they could have obtained if the false disclosure had not been made
or if they had waited to sell until the true information was
revealed. The Basic plaintiffs were able to recover damages
through private securities litigation in the United States based on
131 See PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 63 (requiring immediate
disclosure of major contracts and merger agreements by listed companies).
132 PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 108.
133 See XUAN, supra note 129, at 19 (stating that the significance of articles 18
and 19 of the PSL Rules is that investors who sell before a disclosure date cannot
obtain compensation).
134 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
135 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 25, 27 (discussing fraud
on the market theory (shichang qizha lilun) and the principle of inferred reliance,
(xinlai tuiding yuanze)).
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these facts. However, if the Basic plaintiffs had sued under the PSL
Rules, they would not have been able to establish causality because
of the time at which they sold their shares. Similarly, if the
president of a PRC-listed company withholds material positive
information in order to acquire shares at a depressed price for
himself, the sellers will have no cause of action against that
president under the PSL rules. This is the precise fact pattern that
caused the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt Rule
10b-5 in 1947.
The drafters of the PSL Rules indicate situations in which good
news is withheld (youkong xujia chenshu) are more complex and
rare than instances in which a company inflates its share price by
disclosing false information (youduo xujia chenshu). They also
indicate the CSRC rarely brings administrative sanctions in such
situations, but that if it did, the defrauded investors could seek a
case-specific approval to sue from the Supreme People's Court (ge
an pifu). While all this may be true, the denial of relief to victims of
disclosure fraud in these situations has no basis in the PRC
Securities Law. Liability for fraudulent disclosure is imposed by
Article 63 regardless of whether the fraud arises from the creation
of false good news, 136 the withholding of important bad news, or
silence concerning material good news. Moreover, Article 62
requires that major contracts, mergers, and other potential sources
of good news be disclosed on an ad hoc basis.137 Thus the PSL
Rules should be revised so that they do not strip this category of
investors of their rights to sue.
3.3. Requirement of Enabling Government Action
A devastating weakness of the PSL Rules is that they require
specific government action as a prerequisite for any private
securities litigation. 138 Under Article 6 of the PSL Rules, no private
136 PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 23.
137 See id. art. 62(3) (requiring immediate disclosure of major contracts); id. art.
62(9) (requiring immediate disclosure of merger decisions).
138 The PSL Rules evidently require enabling government action with regard
only to the alleged instance of misrepresentation, not with regard to each specific
defendant. This conclusion is implied by, but not overtly stated in, the PSL Rules.
Article 5 provides that in calculating the starting date for the limitations period,
the earliest administrative penalty's publication date is to be used if there are
multiple administrative penalties or administrative penalties and criminal
findings. Although multiple agencies could issue administrative penalties against
a single party (or a single party could incur both administrative and criminal
634 [Vol. 24:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss3/2
2003] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA 635
securities litigation can be adjudicated by a Chinese court unless an
administrative penalty (xingzheng chufa jueding) or a criminal
penalty has already been imposed. Thus, even when claims are
based on bad disclosure and thus are within the scope of the PSL
Rules, investors may not seek relief without enabling government
action. This requirement has no basis in the PRC Securities Law
and it strips investors of the right to sue for disclosure fraud
explicitly provided for in the Securities Law. The requirement
effectively puts the threat of private securities litigation under
government leash.139 It substantially removes the "private" aspect
of private securities litigation; under the PSL Rules, the
government must sanction all "private" litigation. This
significantly dilutes the potential of private securities litigation to
create incentives for compliance with China's disclosure laws. No
army of private attorneys general will be unleashed without
specific government sanction in each instance.1 40 Just as stock
sanctions), it seems more likely this provision addresses the issuance of
administrative penalties by one or more agencies against multiple defendants
involved in a single instance of misrepresentation. Article 6 requires a plaintiff to
submit evidence of the administrative penalty or criminal judgment as the
foundation (yiju) for an action, but does not clearly state such action must be
against each specific defendant. Thus, it appears CSRC action against a listed
company could be the basis of private suits against the listed company and those
associated with it such as the company's directors, supervisors, and executives
and the securities, accounting, appraisal, and law firms that may have assisted the
listed company. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 5-6 (discussing the statute of
limitations for civil damages actions and the acceptance of cases). But see Liu &
Ren, supra note 97, at 31 ("Before the court accepts and hears a misrepresentation
case, the government authority in charge must have already imposed
administrative or criminal punishments on the persons responsible for making the
misrepresentation.").
139 See Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 97, 110-11 (2003) [hereinafter China's
Legal System] (noting, with regard to the CSRC, the prior action requirement in the
January 15, 2002 PSL Notice permitting courts to accept private securities
litigation that "[tihe Court apparently agrees with the plaintiffs that they have a
valid claim under the Securities Law, but has interposed, without any statutory
foundation whatsoever, the CSRC as a gatekeeper in order to ensure that claims
not approved by the government will not come before the courts"); Posting of
Donald C. Clarke, "Re: 'joint action' shareholder suits," to CLNET (Dec. 17, 2002)
(on file with author) (noting with regard to the PSL Rules that a requirement of
enabling government action "has no basis in the Securities Law and is
transparently a device to maintain government control over this kind of
litigation").
140 The drafters of the PSL Rules are well aware that civil liability can
stimulate compliance with law. See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at
185 (noting potential of civil liability to suppress illegal activity).
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markets exist in China without privatization of ownership, private
securities litigation exists in China without fundamental
privatization of the cause of action.
Although the requirement of enabling government action is
disappointing, the PSL Rules do improve upon the initial Supreme
People's Court Notice of January 15, 2002 that required that the
CSRC itself impose an administrative sanction on a listed company
before private lawsuits could be brought.141 The PSL Rules still
require government action before a private suit can be brought, but
now such action does not have to be specifically from the CSRC. In
the PSL Rules, the requirement for enabling government action can
be met with criminal findings by a court or with an administrative
penalty from some source other than the CSRC.142 The Ministry of
Finance is in charge of accounting standards in China.14
3 Its
determinations of violations of financial accounting disclosure
rules are likely to be the grounds for many suits brought under the
PSL Rules. Indeed, the first private securities litigation involving a
foreign party was predicated on such non-CSRC action.'4
This broadening in the PSL Rules of the ways to meet the
enabling government action requirement should be helpful to
some plaintiffs, but obtaining the required government enabling
action may remain difficult for many potential plaintiffs. The
CSRC itself may now be in a slow-down phase in terms of its
enforcement efforts. The CSRC has new leadership. Its former
chairman Zhou Xiaochuan has become head of China's central
bank. 45 Under Zhou, the CSRC in recent years increased its
141 See January 15, 2002 PSL Notice, supra note 25, art. 2 ("[alccording to the
law, a People's Court shall not accept a case unless the party concerned files a civil
legal proceeding" based on an investigation by CSRC).
142 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 6 (discussing the necessary evidence that
needs to be submitted when an investor institutes securities misrepresentation
civil damages proceedings). The nuances of this may be complex in practice. See
infra note 15860 and accompanying text.
143 See Kuaiji Fa [PRC Accounting Law], ch. 1, art. 6 ("A state uniform
accounting system shall be formulated by the Finance Department of finance...").
144 See Ema Ma, KPMG Sued by Chinese Investor, BEIJING YOUTH DAILY ONLINE,
Feb. 23, 2003 (reporting that the triggering of the litigation involving KPMG was
predicated upon an administrative penalty imposed by the Ministry of Finance),
at http://www.bjyouth.com/article.jsp?oid=2150576 (last visited June 1, 2003).
145 See Zhou Xiaochuan Appointed Governor of Central Bank, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Dec. 28, 2002 (discussing the appointment of Zhou Xiaochuan as the
governor of the People's Bank of China), at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
200212/28/eng20021228_109224.shtml (last visited June 1, 2003).
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enforcement efforts, proclaiming 2001 a "year of market
supervision" and bringing a record number of administrative
actions against listed companies.146 However, these enhanced
enforcement efforts were perceived by many Chinese to be part of
the cause of significant market declines.147 Under the new PRC
and CSRC leadership,148 rhetoric has shifted away somewhat from
aggressive enforcement of securities laws. Previously, CSRC Vice
Minister Laura Cha (a.k.a. Shi Meilun, a former Hong Kong
securities regulator with U.S. legal training) remarked that, "what
regulators should do is regulate; that is their duty... [als far as
declines in market indexes are concerned, investors should
broaden their vision to find another explanation."149  More
recently, Shang Fulin, the new CSRC chairman, has emphasized
that reform must be kept at pace with market development and the
markets' capacity for accepting change.150 Thus, it seems there is
now less political momentum in China for aggressive enforcement
of disclosure rules by the CSRC. If the CSRC is less interested in
146 See "Year of Supervision" for China's Stock Market: Roundup, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Dec. 30, 2001 (reporting CSRC followed through on promise to make 2001
a year of market supervision, bringing more than forty enforcement actions and
adding staff to investigate listed companies), at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn
/200112/30/eng20011230_87763.shtml (last visited June 1, 2003).
147 The markets have responded positively to the apparent slowdown in
reforms and enforcement. See China's New Top Regulator May Rain on Market Rally,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2003 (reporting on market rallies following
replacement of CSRC head Zhou Xiaochuan with Shang Fulin, whom many
investors hoped would be different than Zhou, who "often unsettled the markets
with his campaigns to crack down on market manipulation and to improve
corporate governance") (on file with author).
148 For a discussion on the PRC power transition, see generally CHINA'S
LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE RISE OF THE FOURTH GENERATION
(David Michael Finkelstein & Maryanne Kivlehan eds., 2002).
149 See Laura Cha Discusses Regulatory Supervision, supra note 50 (discussing an
interview with Laura Cha, in which she stated "jianguanzhe yao zuo de jiushi
jianguan, zhe shi tamen de renwu.... women zuo women yinggai zuo de shiqing, jin
women di zhize. Zhiyu zhishu xiadie, touzizhe ying yi geng gangkuode shiye qu xunzhao
yuanyin").
150 See Tuijin Shichang Gaige Kaifang he Wending Fazhan [Promoting Market
Reform and Opening and Stable Development], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN, BAO [CHINA
SEC. J.], Jan. 27, 2003, at 1 (summarizing remarks of Shang Fulin at the National
Securities and Futures Workshop held Jan. 24-26, 2003). Reading the tea leaves of
the official PRC press suggests enforcement will slow down in 2003 compared
with the previous two years. Many articles in early 2003 about meetings of
regulators indicate market normalization must be kept apace market
development. This differs from previous leadership comments that investor
protection does not mean assuring investors will earn money.
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enforcing disclosure requirements, it is unlikely other agencies,
whose charge is not market regulation, will do so, even if the PSL
Rules contemplate that actions by these other administrative
agencies can enable private securities litigation.
Even if the political will to enforce disclosure rules remains
strong, the resources of the CSRC and other agencies are limited.
The CSRC is likely to become a bottleneck because it cannot
monitor, investigate, and prosecute all, and perhaps not even most,
cases of bad disclosure. China now has more than 1,200 listed
companies. The CSRC has a small staff. Its enforcement division
has few professionals.' 5 1 Help is provided by investigators from
public security, but even so the CSRC is stretched too thin to
monitor all disclosure. There is no indication that other agencies
are likely to add significant additional resources to the task of
securities law enforcement, which they are unlikely to regard as
relevant to their core missions.
Indeed, now that imposing administrative sanctions for bad
disclosure can unleash private securities litigation, the CSRC and
other agencies are likely to be more reluctant to impose such
penalties. All administrative penalties concerning disclosure -
presumably even negligible fines and mere warnings -can now
trigger follow-on private litigation. This seems to effectively
narrow the spectrum of penalties for bad disclosure the CSRC has
at its disposal; whatever penalty the CSRC imposes, private
securities litigation can follow in the wake of the CSRC action. The
CSRC will no doubt consider this before imposing penalties. Also,
defendants will no doubt contest CSRC investigations more
strenuously, knowing an adverse determination authorizes private
litigation. Because the stakes are now higher than simply whatever
penalty the CSRC (or another agency) imposes, it seems likely
enforcement actions will be less common.
Making government action a prerequisite for private securities
litigation also underscores a potential conflict of interests arising
from the ownership structure of most PRC listed companies. 52
Most listed companies in China are government-owned
corporations.153  Therefore, the requirement of enabling
government action mandates that the government essentially agree
151 See Cai, supra note 17, at 138-39 (noting the limited resources of the CSRC
by stating that only 27 of its approximately 300 employees work in enforcement).
152 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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to let itself be sued, or at least allow a political subdivision to be
sued.
This does not mean there will not be administrative penalties
enabling private securities litigation in China. There is a potential
conflict of interest, but the policy dynamics are complex. The
Chinese Communist Party, which under the PRC Constitution has
the ultimate authority to govern China,' 54 has been pursuing
market-oriented reforms for more than twenty years.5 5 There are
clearly reform-minded officials who wish to establish robust
capital markets in China.156 For these and other reasons, the
interests of the CSRC and other agencies that might impose
administrative penalties may not be aligned with the interests of
other government entities that own listed companies. The PRC
state is hardly monolithic. There is a spectrum of ideology among
leaders and competition among regulatory institutions, as well as
central-versus-local power dynamics that can influence
government actions. In some instances, these dynamics may foster
rather than retard the use of private securities litigation. Perhaps
central authorities will find that unleashing private securities
litigation (through CSRC or other administrative enabling action)
is a useful tool when they need to reign in a particular provincial
government.
Also, regulatory agencies may seek to take actions that enable
private securities litigation to be used as a weapon in inter-agency
or intra-governmental conflict. The PSL Rules do not specify
which agencies beyond the CSRC may take actions that enable
private securities litigation, nor do they require that the enabling
administrative penalty come from a central government agency.'5 7
154 XIANFA [Constitution] pmbl. (1999) [hereinafter PRC Constitution].
155 See generally THE CHINA READER: THE REFORM ERA (Orville Schell & David
Shambaugh eds., 1999) (containing documents and commentary covering the
post-Mao reform era).
156 See KAITuO ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XIN JUMIAN [DEVELOPING
THE NEW PHASE OF CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKETS] (Zhou Zhengqing ed., 2002)
(containing speeches by PRC officials expressing hopes for growth in PRC
securities markets); see also Inside the CSRC: Gao Xiqing, CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar.
2000, at 35-39 (containing an interview with the former CSRC vice-chairman in
which he expressed hopes that in twenty years PRC capital markets will "be a
major force in the world").
157 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 5(2) (stating that the limitations period shall
run from "the date on which the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of
China, or another administrative authority or an authority with the power to
impose administrative penalties, publishes its decision to punish the
misrepresenting party").
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Thus, some agencies could become entrepreneurial in this regard,
creating interesting conflicts. One can imagine scenarios in which
one province or agency takes actions designed to unleash private
securities litigation against entities that are controlled by its
rivals.'58 However, the PSL Rules require that suits be brought in
the defendant's home jurisdiction, where the connections among
local courts, local listed companies, and local governments suggest
that plaintiffs cannot easily prevail. 5 9 Therefore, such tactics are
unlikely to be very effective. Moreover, the Chinese Communist
Party retains macro-level authority over both provinces and
agencies. It could quash such internecine warfare.
Overall, it seems likely that the interests of the Chinese state as
a shareholder in listed companies will depress regulatory
enforcement efforts. Given the choice, the Chinese state will most
likely not authorize massive litigation against itself or its assets on
a routine basis. Thus, the requirement that government action
precede private securities litigation will probably significantly
decrease the amount of such litigation. There are at least two
unfortunate results caused by decreased private securities
litigation. First, some defrauded investors will probably be unable
to recover damages because they lack the enabling government
action. Second, the capacity of private securities litigation to
encourage compliance with China's securities laws will be
diminished. 160
3.4. Lack of U.S.-Style Class Actions
Another factor that may diminish the effectiveness of private
securities litigation in China is the absence of an effective class
15s See Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalties,
art. 11 (providing that local regulations can be the basis for administrative
penalties), at http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAWArticles.jsp?CatID=23&
LanglD=O&StatutesID=10379&ChapterlD=-1# (last visited Sept. 30, 2003); see also
PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 191 (discussing the power of
provincial governments to impose penalties that can be the basis for private
securities litigation).
159 See infra Section 3.5 (discussing how jurisdictional requirements in the PSL
Rules favor defendants).
160 Of course, the moral hazard or rent-seeking opportunites of CSRC and
other administrative officials will increase under the PSL Rules. Because any
penalty they impose for bad disclosure can unleash private securities litigation,
there is a danger that listed companies seeking to avoid such litigation risks will
bribe CSRC officials or other regulators to avoid the imposition of administrative
penalties that trigger such litigation.
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action mechanism.161 The PSL Rules permit private securities
litigation to be brought as individual actions (dandu susong) or as
joint actions (gongtong susong).162 These joint actions permitted
under the PSL Rules do resemble a U.S.-style class action in some
respects but fall short of the U.S. model in other critical ways.'
63
Many commentators, including the drafters of the PSL Rules,
distinguish the joint actions available under the PSL Rules from
U.S.-style class actions (jituan susong).164
China's approach is similar to a U.S.-style class action suit in
that private securities litigation can ostensibly involve large
numbers of plaintiffs with lead plaintiffs representing the "class"
161 Prior to promulgation of the PSL Rules, the absence of an effective class
action mechanism was discussed as a general problem. See Cai, supra note 17, at
148 (contending "the skeletal nature of such [PRC class action] provisions has led
to the reluctance of Chinese courts to hear class action cases. Effective
enforcement by private action requires a wholesale reform of the current
system").
162 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 12 ("The plaintiffs in securities-related
civil damages cases covered hereby may choose to institute either individual or
joint actions.").
163 There has been some confusion in the international press over the issues of
whether and what type of collective litigation China permits with respect to
private securities litigation. The Economist Intelligence Unit incorrectly reported
that "joint suits have not been permitted in China. Up until January this year
[2003] each investor had to file his case individually and courts were expected to
judge each on its own merit." Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 31, at 2.
Actually, joint suits were permitted even under the January 15, 2002 PSL Notice,
supra note 25, sec. IV, that initially authorized private securities litigation for
disclosure fraud. In the same piece, the Economist Intelligence Unit did correctly
report that China's joint actions under the PSL Rules are not the equivalent of
U.S.-style class actions. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 31, at 2 (quoting
Professor Donald C. Clarke). Dow Jones described the acceptance of one suit as
China's first class action for securities fraud. China Court Accepts First Class Action
Shareholder Suit, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Feb. 17, 2003. A subsequent version of the
story, quoting the Author of this Article, backed off that characterization. James
T. Areddy, China Shareholder Case Falls Short Of Class Action, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003 (on file with author). But see Nailene Chou, Supreme Court to
Issue Guidelines on Shareholder Lawsuits, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 16, 2002
(distinguishing correctly between PRC joint actions and class actions in other
jurisdictions) (on file with author).
PRC sources acknowledge the PSL Rules do not permit full-blown U.S.-style
class actions. See Renmin Wang, Shoulie Zhengquan Gongtong Susong Fayuan
Shoulie Daqing Lianyi Minshi Peichang [First Joint-Action Civil Compensation
Securities Litigation Accepted by Court Against Daqing Lianyi], PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2003 (noting that joint actions may in time lead to the
development of class actions) (on file with author).
164 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, ch. 7, at 205-17 (discussing
PRC gongtong susong and a U.S. jituan susong in detail).
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of plaintiffs. 165 China's securities markets are dominated by retail
investors, therefore aggregating many small claims is necessary to
make private securities litigation viable for many plaintiffs. 166
Having a small number of lead plaintiffs should facilitate the
logistics of such actions. PRC lawyers have been aggressive in
rounding up plaintiffs for private securities litigation with several
hundred plaintiffs being listed in some of the first actions to be
filed' 67 However, at least two PRC courts have already required
that joint actions be split into smaller groups.168 One court even
required a group of only sixty-one plaintiffs to be split into groups
of no more than ten plaintiffs each-not because of any similarity
in their damage claims or other issues, but simply as a requirement
for accepting the litigation. 69 In practice, it is unclear how much
utility joint actions will have for aggregating claims in private
securities litigation.
Even if courts allow lawyers to group many claims in a joint
action, a more potent form of class action could make the PSL
Rules more effective in encouraging good disclosure. In a U.S.
class action, lead plaintiffs can represent (and the results of the
litigation can bind) claimants not specifically before the court as
165 Article 12 of the PSL Rules provides that actions may be brought
individually or jointly. PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 12. Litigants in joint
actionsmay select lead plaintiffs, and there is no express limit on the number of
cases that can be joined in joint actions. In these respects, the PSL Rules will
permit a large number of claims to be gathered into a single action. Concerning
class action litigation in China, see generally Note, Class Action Litigation in China,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1998). Concerning the mechanics of class certification in
U.S. private securities litigation, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class
Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 REV. LITIG. 405 (2003).
166 For example, one early suit against KPMG, as auditor, and the
underwriter of PRC-listed Jinzhou Port sought damages of only USD 1880. See
KPMG Faces Suit from Minority Shareholders, supra note 4. The drafters of the PSL
Rules acknowledged that most investors will have small claims. See PSL
DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 211.
167 See Wang, supra note 163 (reporting acceptance by Harbin Intermediate
People's Court of private securities litigation involving 381 plaintiffs seeking RMB
10,221,826.11 in compensation in a joint action). See also PSL DRAFTERS'
COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 202.
168 See Zhengquan Minshi Susong Xin Wenti: Gongtong Susong Yuangao Renshu
Shou Xian [A New Problem in Securities Civil Litigation: The Number of Plaintiffs in
Joint Actions are Limited], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO [SEC. TIMES] (reporting that courts in
Qingdao and Harbin are already limiting the number of cases lawyers can
aggregate), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030409/




2003] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA
name plaintiffs. 70 Under the U.S. approach, claimants may need to
opt out of litigation to avoid being bound by the results.17'
However, the PSL Rules require that claimants opt in to specific
litigation before the trial commences. 172 While this reduces the
danger that claimants will be bound by results they may not like,
the opt-in requirement will make it harder to aggregate a massive
number of claims (e.g., all of the persons trading a company's
shares in a particular time) into a single action. Litigation on
behalf of fewer plaintiffs will probably result in litigation that seeks
smaller damages. This may reduce issuers' fears of private
securities litigation and thus reduce the effectiveness of such
litigation in prompting good disclosure. Another possible
consequence is the reduction of incentives for lawyers to bring the
suits.
Prior to adoption of the PSL Rules, many people advocated that
China should permit U.S.-style class actions for private securities
litigation. Yale School of Management professor Chen Zhiwu
published a law review article in China prior to the adoption of the
PSL Rules that provided a detailed explanation of the U.S. model
and advocated that the U.S. model be adopted.173 Several PRC-
based commentators made similar arguments. 174 The drafters of
the PSL Rules directly consulted with Professor Chen prior to the
adoption of the PSL Rules, and a commentary on the PSL Rules
written by the drafters displays a thorough understanding of U.S.-
style class actions and its advantages over PRC joint actions of the
kind adopted.175 The absence of a U.S.-style class action is thus not
due to a lack of knowledge. Drafters of the PSL Rules claimed that
the time was not ripe for class actions in China and that such an
innovation would not have had a legal basis under Chinese law. 7 6
However, these reasons seem disingenuous. The drafters of the
170 FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a).
171 Id. at23(c)(2).
172 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 14.
173 Chen Zhiwu, Zhengquan Jituan Susong zai Meiguo de Yingyong [The Utility of
Securities Class Actions in the United States], 2 ZHENGQUAN FALU PINGLUN [SEc. L.
REv.] 260-294 (2002).
'74 See, e.g., XUAN, supra note 129, at 111 (reporting that CSRC assistant
chairman Jesse Wang Jianxi told a gathering of accountants in Hong Kong,
"[o]ther than the existing enforcement mechanisms, we should introduce class-
action lawsuits").
175 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 205-09.
176 See id. at 207-08.
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PSL Rules did not choose the most potent form of multi-plaintiff
action even though it falls within the range expressly authorized
by PRC Civil Procedure Law. PRC Civil Procedure Law provides
for two kinds of joint actions with lead plaintiffs-one with a
definite number and one with an indefinite number of plaintiffs at
the time the action is filed.177 However, the PSL Rules prohibit
joint actions in which a litigation representative acts on behalf of an
unascertained number of plaintiffs.178 The PSL Rules permit joint
actions only with a definite number of plaintiffs who explicitly opt
into the litigation before a trial commences. Moreover, the
Supreme People's Court, by its own description, was "filling in a
gap in PRC legislation" with the PSL Rules.179 Given that the
Supreme People's Court acted as a legislature in creating the PSL
Rules, filling in gaps in procedural legislation to fashion a more
robust class action remedy would not have been a conceptual
breakthrough had the court been inclined to do so. Why would
"interpreting" the class action mechanism provided for in the
recondite PRC Civil Procedure Law be different than
"interpreting" the right to civil compensation found in the PRC
Securities Law? The Supreme People's Court boldly imposed an
initial temporary ban on all private securities litigation claims, and
later imposed a "prior government action" requirement on all
plaintiffs. Neither action has a basis in PRC Securities Law. Thus,
the failure of the PSL Rules to provide a more robust class action
mechanism does not stem from a lack of knowledge or the
Supreme People's Court's perception of its institutional authority
to interpret laws.
The explanation for the failure to adopt the U.S.-style class
action mechanism is more likely economic and political in nature.
Large class actions could expose state-owned listed companies to
massive private securities litigation judgments. This exposure may
be reduced by limiting the number of claims that can be
177 See PRC Civil Procedure Law, art. 54-55 (on file with author).
178 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 14 (mandating that the number of
plaintiffs be decided before the hearing). A more potent form of litigation would
have been achieved had the PSL Rules allowed joint actions with lead plaintiffs
representing an unascertained number of claimants. Still, that form of PRC
litigation falls short of a U.S.-style class action because each "unascertained"
plaintiff must still opt into the litigation by registering his or her rights (dengli
quanli) or suing individually. See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at
216.
179 See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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aggregated to parties who specifically opt into specific litigation.
Beyond the economic incentive, political unease is another reason
for the lack of a U.S.-style class action mechanism. The
organization of interest groups, through the approximation of class
actions permitted under the PSL Rules, has the potential to sharpen
conflict between dispersed individual investors (san hu) and the
state. The concentration of large numbers of aggrieved
shareholders into an organized group triggers anxiety in a regime
lacking popular legitimacy through sufferage. Prior to the release
of the PSL Rules, Professor Chen and others met with members of
the Supreme People's Court urging them to adopt potent class
action mechanisms. However, Supreme People's Court judges
expressed anxiety regarding the political risks associated with
creating groups of aggrieved investors.180 A Supreme People's
Court judge told Professor Chen, "[tihe word 'class' is in the name
of this legal device. You are going to get all the angry shareholders
organized in one class. That is politically too dangerous."181 As
one commentator has stated, "limiting the scope of the 'class' ...
contains the general social impact of such suits, preventing the
spread of a more general shareholder activism that could be
politically threatening." 82  With respect to private securities
litigation, class struggle-which Maoist revolutionary ideology so
emphasized in other forms8 3-is shackled by Chinese political and
economic legacies that elevate the interest of the Communist Party
and its state above individual rights.
3.5. Jurisdictional Requirements Likely to Favor Defendants
The PSL Rules include jurisdictional provisions that are likely
180 See Susan V. Lawrence, Shareholder Lawsuits: Ally of the People, FAR E. ECON.
REV., May 9, 2002 (discussing meetings about private securities litigation in China
in which Chen Zhiwu, Yale School of Management professor, and Guo Feng,
Beijing lawyer and Renmin University professor, encouraged adoption of a class
action system) available at http://www.feer.com/articles/2002/0205_-09/p026
china.html (last visited June 1, 2003). The drafters of the PSL Rules acknowledge
that Professor Chen provided background on U.S.-style class actions. See PSL
DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 206.
181 PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 206.
182 Posting of Matthew C.J. Rudolph, to clnet@u.washington.edu (Feb. 19,
2003) (discussing with Author the press reports about private securities litigation
in China) (on file with author).
183 See generally STUART SCHRAM, THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG (1989)
(discussing the influence of Maoist thought on China throughout the twentieth
century).
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to discourage plaintiffs as well. Under the PSL Rules, plaintiffs
must sue a listed firm in an intermediate-level people's court
located in a provincial capital, specially designated city or special
economic zone.184 If a plaintiff sues multiple defendants such as
investment banks, accounting firms, or individual directors in
addition to the listed firm as permitted by the PSL Rules, 85 then
the suit must be brought in the intermediate-level people's court
where the defendant is located.8 6 For example, a suit against the
maker of Tsingtao Beer ("Tsingtao" is also Romanized as
"Qingdao") and its directors would have to be brought in the
Qingdao Intermediate People's Court. This is consistent with the
PRC General Principles of Civil Procedure Law. 87 However, this
jurisdictional provision is likely to disadvantage plaintiffs because
local courts and many listed companies in China are essentially
subsidiaries of the same local government. In other words, when a
plaintiff files private securities litigation in China, the majority
shareholder of the defendant is likely to have substantial leverage
over the adjudicating court.188
Until 2001, the PRC employed an explicit quota system for
184 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 8.
185 Id. art. 7.
186 Id. art 9.
187 See, e.g., PRC General Principles of the Civil Law, supra note 18, art. 135
(providing a two-year default prescribed period for litigation for civil cases).
188 An early private securities litigation case anecdotally suggests the
likelihood of difficulty. A group of investors sued a Chengdu-based listed
company in the Chengdu Intermediate People's Court. The case languished for
nearly four years without resolution, but the litigants agreed to court-directed
mediation shortly before the Supreme People's Court issued the PSL Rules. The
national business press paid considerable attention to the case. At least three
major PRC financial papers and five national television stations sent reporters to
cover the proceedings. Local media, however, appeared uninterested. A reporter
for China's International Finance paper noted the disparity between national and
local coverage and quoted a source's explanation that "[iut is not that the local
press is uninterested, but in general they are not permitted to report" on such
proceedings. See China's First Securities Civil Compensation, supra note 32
(reporting that eleven plaintiffs settled claims through mediation against the
former Hong Guang Company after three years of litigation, jointly obtaining
RMB 220,000).
Prior to promulgation of the PSL Rules (and before promulgation of the PRC
Securities Law), Matthew D. Latimer recognized the difficulty of enforcing
shareholder rights because of the affiliation between local governments and local
enterprises and the lack of independence of courts. See Matthew D. Latimer,
Note, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion of Shareholder Rights in China, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 1097, 1109-11 (1994) (discussing how the political influence of large SOEs
can interfere with judicial enforcement of shareholder rights).
[Vol. 24:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss3/2
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA
determining which companies' securities could be listed. 189 Each
provincial government was given an allotment of listing
opportunities- an IPO quota, determined by central authorities in
accordance with economic plans (creating the paradox that stock
markets, a putatively market-oriented reform, were built through
central planning, the system which is ostensibly being abandoned).
Such capital market access provided the enticing ability to raise
capital at comparatively low cost with no payback requirement
and no significant loss of control to firm managers or owners.
During this era of IPO quotas, the allotment of listing quotas
predictably went to favored provincial industries which were often
substantially owned by the provincial governments.190  This
ownership structure has generally remained in place after the IPOs
of companies which were awarded the listing slots. The drafters of
the PSL Rules acknowledge that generally two-thirds of the shares
of a listed company are illiquid, unlisted shares.'91 These unlisted
shares are generally directly held by government divisions as state
shares (guoyou gu), or indirectly as legal person shares (faren gu)
through other government-controlled corporations, as described
above in the "Special Characteristics" Section.192 Thus, defendant
listed companies will likely be substantially government-owned,
often by the provincial governments which also control the courts
adjudicating private securities litigation.
In China, a fundamental obstacle to the progress of the rule of
law is that local courts are subject to the control of local
governments. Local governments in China appoint judges to local
courts and control the promotion of such judges.193  Local
governments in China also control the budgets of local courts. 94
Beyond the powers of appointment and budget, Chinese courts are
189 See Liu, supra note 56 (reporting quota system scrapped in 2001). But see
Li Wenfang, More Non-State Firms to be Listed, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 4, 2001 (Hong
Kong ed.) (reporting that the quota system was abolished in 1998 but quotas given
out previously were used through 2001), available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-12/04/content_96640.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003).
190 See generally WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 78, at 112-14 ("This [quota
system l also makes clear why non-state enterprises are extremely unlikely to have
the opportunity to list. They do not belong to the state, but the quota does.").
191 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 26.
192 Supra Section 2.3.
193 See BROWN, supra note 48, at 33 ("The State Council [has] responsibility to
fund the Court and to decide its staffing levels.").
194 Id. at 37 (describing how the Ministry of Finance funds all courts).
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subject to oversight by political-legal committees which are
comprised of extra-judicial personnel. 95 Thus, the intermediate-
level people's court judges who will adjudicate private securities
litigation cases against government-owned corporations are subject
to substantial influence from government cadres at the same level.
These judges, lacking in meaningful independence, may find that it
is not in their interest to grant relief to plaintiffs, regardless of the
merits of the fraudulent disclosure claims.
Under China's Civil Procedure Law, litigants dissatisfied with
an initial judgment can appeal to a higher level court.'% However,
the PSL Rules have placed initial jurisdiction with the
intermediate-level people's courts.197 Thus, appeals will be to the
higher-level people's courts' 98 within the same province. In other
words, the appeal will be to a higher court controlled by the same
government that controlled the court of the first instance and
which is likely to often be a substantial owner of the defendant
company. Local trials of cases against local listed companies may
not, then, be impartially adjudicated before a plaintiff's remedies
are exhausted.
To reduce such moral hazards, an alternative, in lieu of the
much-needed structural reform of PRC courts, is to create a
national special court or courts specifically for securities litigation,
staffed by experts not controlled by local governments. This
would reduce the likelihood of partiality when the listed company
is provincially-owned. For the largest listed companies that are
held at a national level, the structural problem could persist, but
specialized courts may be better able to fend off interference. 99
Given the institutional weakness of Chinese courts, this suggestion
might seem appropriate for almost every category of significant
195 Id. at 34 (noting the committees which "supervise" the courts).
196 See PRC Civil Procedure Law, supra note 177, art. 147.
197 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 8 (explaining that securities litigation is
under the jurisdiction of "intermediate people's courts").
198 See PRC Civil Procedure Law, supra note 177, art. 18 ("The basic people's
courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over civil cases, unless
otherwise provided in this Law.").
199 It would also not reduce the rent-seeking opportunities of individual
judges, though monitoring would be easier if high-stakes litigation were
centralized. There is a general lack of an independent judiciary in China. See, e.g.,
What's Law Got To Do With It?, supra note 86, at 57-64 (discussing problems and
effects of non-independent Chinese judiciary); Power and Politics in the Chinese
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cases - intellectual property claims, administrative litigation, and
serious criminal cases might all benefit from specialized, central
courts. It would be problematic to create specialized central courts
for every kind of action. However, the argument has special force
with regard to private securities litigation. These cases are likely to
have vast numbers of plaintiffs and the amounts in controversy are
likely to be exceedingly large.200 Thus, PRC officials should
investigate this option for private securities litigation.
3.6. Will Private Securities Litigation Flourish in China?
Based on the foregoing, the PSL Rules seem to be a fragile
weapon -plaintiffs must sue government-owned companies in
government-controlled courts, the ability to leverage claims
through class actions is limited, relief can only be sought for
disclosure fraud, not insider trading or market manipulation, and
some victims of disclosure fraud will be denied relief. In addition
to this list of weaknesses, no private right to sue exists unless a
division of the PRC government takes action to enable it. Given
these obstacles, the PSL Rules may not stimulate the type of
lawyer-driven "entrepreneurial litigation" that has helped, if not
caused, the private securities litigation which flourishes in the
United States.201
200 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 27 (noting that the
absence of obstacles to the ease of bringing private securities litigation could have
negative social affects).
201 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Large Class Actions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987)
(discussing causes and issues involved in "entrepreneurial litigation").
Congressional action to reform private securities litigation in the United States
through the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was motivated in part
by the excesses of attorney entrepreneurialism. See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL 75 (Jan. 2002) ("The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 was designed to remedy the perceived problem that securities
class actions were being brought and controlled by lawyers rather than class
plaintiffs." (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995))), at http://www.ca3.
uscourts.gov/classcounsel/final%20report%20of%20third%20%circuit%20task%2
Oforce.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
Recently, substantial attention has been given to how lead counsel-i.e., the
leading fee earner if plaintiffs are successful-is chosen in U.S. private securities
litigation. See, e.g., AnaLisa Valle, Comment, To the Lowest Bidder? The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act and Auctioning the Role of Lead Counsel, 74 U. COLO.
L. REV. 359 (2003) (presenting problems related to how lead counsel is chosen in
lawyer-driven litigation); James L. Tuxbury, Note, A Case for Competitive Bidding
for Lead Counsel in Securities Class Actions, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 285, 300 (2003)
(addressing criticisms about competitive bidding in securities class actions).
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In deciding whether or not to pursue private securities
litigation, Chinese lawyers and plaintiffs will evaluate the chances
of succeeding in relation to the costs of bringing the action and the
amount, if any, they can recover if successful.202 Plaintiffs who
have lost money because of declines in the value of a company's
publicly traded securities may face negligible costs if lawyers offer
to pursue claims on a contingency fee basis.203 The Supreme
202 Economic analysis is a powerful tool for understanding the world, but
some find it unattractive because of the way it flattens human decision-makers
into rational analyzers of costs and benefits. Some have inveighed that such
analysis can misconstrue behavior because humans do not always act in, or know
what is in, their own narrowly-defined self-interest. See, e.g., Behaviourists at the
Gates: How Economists Are Using Psychology to Question Orthodox Policy
Prescriptions, THE EcONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 67 (discussing behavioral
economics, including the effort to offer an alternative to the traditional
undergraduate neoclassical course at Harvard University).
203 However, even requirements that initially appear to be de minimis may
influence the willingness of some plaintiffs to pursue private securities litigation.
For example, the PSL Rules require that plaintiffs provide to the court their
original national identification card (shenfen zheng) or a notarized (jing gongzheng)
copy. PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 6(1). To most foreigners, this seems like an
innocuous requirement, but some PRC commentators on the PSL Rules have
indicated it will be a barrier sufficient to deter some plaintiffs. It is not practical to
turn one's identification card over to a court for an extended period; one must
show one's identification to purchase a plane ticket, check into a hotel, and do a
large number of routine things in China. However, providing the alternative
notarized copy can be problematic as well. First, there is a fee involved. The fee
in Beijing for obtaining a notarized copy of a national identification card is RMB
80, or about USD 10. Interview with Beijing Notary, China (May 19, 2003) (on file
with author). For some PRC investors, this is not a nominal sum. For example,
the PRC has millions of furloughed (xia gang) workers from SOEs. The monthly
subsidy provided to such people may be only RMB 200400 a month. For such
persons, the fee for notarizing a document is a significant obstacle to becoming a
plaintiff in private securities litigation. (One could argue such people should not
be investing in the stock market at all, but of course they might have invested
before being furloughed). Second, travel may be required to obtain a notarized
copy of one's identification card. China has an internal residency permit (hu kou)
system; PRC citizens do not automatically have the right to move wherever they
wish within the PRC mainland. For example, a person from Hefei in Anhui
province may not, without official consent, change the status of their hu kou and
move to Beijing. In practice, this system has broken down somewhat, with
millions of people now constituting a floating population that works and resides
in places other than the official residences reflected on their hu kou. However,
PRC identification cards reflect official residences and a Beijing notary will
generally refuse to notarize an identification card showing a non-Beijing address.
Id. In such a situation, to obtain a notarized copy of his or her identification card,
an investor might have to return to the place listed on his or her hu kou. Xuan
Weihua, a Shanghai lawyer who has written a book on private securities litigation
in China and is active in bringing these suits, states that about 20% of potential
plaintiffs calling her office live in a location that is different from their official
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People's Court drafters of the PSL Rules anticipate that Chinese
lawyers will bring cases on a contingency fee basis and, if
successful, potentially reap large rewards by taking a percentage of
the judgment or settlement awarded to plaintiffs as their
compensation.204  Indeed some lawyers may find that the
requirement of prior government action imposed by the PSL Rules,
though eliminating many potential plaintiffs' claims, increases the
incentives for bringing suits when such government action has
occurred. CSRC or other government action will have already
established that there has been a violation of disclosure duties,
easing the lawyers' burden to establish some key facts.205
However, if other obstacles to the success of plaintiffs identified
above are perceived as making the potential for success too low in
relation to the costs of pursuing relief, Chinese lawyers and
plaintiffs will not bring private securities litigation even when
authorized to do so.
Lawyers offering to champion these claims will incur up-front
expenses with respect to organizing and bringing the litigation.
The joint actions allowed under the PSL Rules require that the
residence. She indicates some investors have decided not to become plaintiffs in
private securities litigation just because of the requirement to provide their
identification card or a notarized copy. See XUAN, supra note 129, at 18-19. The
drafters of the PSL Rules indicate that the requirement of providing one's
identification card or a notarized copy is designed to bar from the courthouse
plaintiffs who opened accounts fraudulently, using someone else's name. See PSL
DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 204-05.
24 Prior to adoption of the PSL Rules, a commentator writing for the
Columbia Journal of Asian Law argued that private securities litigation in China
will be hampered by two things that can now apparently be dismissed as concerns
based on stances taken by the justices of the Supreme People's Court involved in
drafting the PSL Rules. First, he doubted that any recovery in private securities
litigation can go to the plaintiffs because Article 209 of the PRC Securities Law
requires recovery to be turned over to the state. Second, he noted that the lack of
a basis for contingency fee litigation could hamper the development of private
securities litigation in China. See Cai, supra note 17, at 149, 151 ("Private securities
litigation in China is inhibited by so many road blocks insuperable to public
investors as to make private securities litigation nonexistent."). The drafters of the
PSL Rules clearly assume that funds awarded to plaintiffs in private securities
litigation will in fact go to plaintiffs. See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note
18, at 187 (describing priority of civil damages over fines). The drafters of the PSL
Rules also expect contingency fee litigation. Id. at 202 (discussing contingency
fees and efforts of PRC lawyers to solicit clients for private securities litigation).
205 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 261 (stating "xingzheng
chufa jueding tiaojian jianshao yuangao de fudan" [the Administrative Department
decided to reduce plaintiff's burdens]).
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number and identity of plaintiffs be determined before trial,2 6 so
lawyers seeking to gather claims must pay for public
announcements or advertisements to gather plaintiffs. Resources
will then be required to screen potential plaintiffs, ask eligible
plaintiffs to sign a power of attorney, gather documentary
evidence of each eligible plaintiff's losses, and keep plaintiffs
informed of the progress of the case. Substantial court filing fees
may have to be paid.20 7 In addition to these up-front monetary
costs, resolution of private securities litigation cases is likely to
require substantial time. Recall that in the absence of a criminal
judgment, administrative action is required to enable private
securities litigation in China. To avert an onslaught of private
securities litigation, defendants will probably seek to exhaust all
remedies against the imposition of an administrative penalty.
Under Chinese administrative law, those upon whom
administrative sanctions are imposed may apply for administrative
review or bring administrative litigation.208 Some PRC lawyers
predict that this process could take three to four years, and the PSL
Rules provide that litigation can be suspended while appeals of
administrative action are pending.209 Such delays further impinge
on the incentives for bringing these suits because they could
reduce the value in real terms of any recovery and increase the
associated opportunity costs to lawyers.210
Even if ultimately successful in establishing a defendant's
206 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 14.
207 See XUAK, supra note 129, at 71 (commenting that in the Daqing Lianyi case
the court permitted fees to be delayed); Jiedu Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Sifa Jieshi,
Xin Guiding Yinfa Xin Wenti [Explanation of the Securities Civil Compensation
Interpretation, New Rules Cause New Problems], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO
WANGLUOBAN [SHANGHAI SEC. TIMES ONLINE EDITION], Jan. 10, 2003 (noting
comments of lawyer Yang Zhaoquan who stated that it is not clear if court fees
can be reduced, avoided, or paid after a case is tried); see also Class Action Litigation
in China, supra note 165, at 1534 (discussing PRC court filing fees based on the
amount in controversy as a possible obstacle to joint actions, though noting courts
have the power to reduce filing fees under the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC).
208 See Xingzheng Fuyi Fa [PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law], art. 6
(1999) (providing right to apply for shenqing [administrative reconsideration] of
administrative acts); Xingzheng Susong Fa [PRC Administrative Litigation Law],
art. 2 (1989) (providing right to contest administrative actions through litigation).
209 PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 11.
210 The PSL Rules provide for interest to be paid on losses, but as described
below, it is likely plaintiffs will recover only a portion of their actual losses, even
without taking attorney fees into account, so the net present values of funds
eventually recovered will be reduced by extensive time delays.
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liability, the amounts plaintiffs will recover are likely to be at a
substantial discount to actual losses, if recoverable at all. The PSL
Rules provide that plaintiffs may recover actual damages equal to
the difference between the price at which a security was bought
and its market value after the bad disclosure is revealed
(disregarding any price decline attributable to systemic market
factors or other influences besides.the false disclosure).2 ' The PSL
Rules expressly "encourage" mediation and settlement of private
securities litigation,212 and some defendants facing staggering
judgments might be eager to settle. However, many defendants
may find that time is on their side. By dragging out proceedings,
defendants may induce plaintiffs to accept steep discounts from
their actual losses. Given the defendant-friendly jurisdictional
requirements of the PSL Rules, defendants may be successful in
employing such tactics. Moreover, regardless of settlement or
judgment awarded, the defendant listed companies in these actions
may be on the verge of bankruptcy. Of the actions currently
pending, most are against companies that have been designated
"ST", or special treatment, meaning the companies- are in danger of
being delisted by the securities exchange because of successive
years of losses or other problems. 213  If a listed company is
211 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 29-30 (describing payment of damages
and the scope of liability for damages to be borne by the misrepresenting party).
The PSL Rules also allow the recovery of the portion of commissions and stamp
taxes paid because the share price was inflated by bad disclosure. Id. art. 30.
212 See id., art. 4 ("When hearing securities misrepresentation civil damages
cases, the People's Courts shall emphasize and encourage conciliation by the
parties.").
213 Companies can be designated special treatment ("ST") after two
consecutive years of losses. ST firms trade only 4.5 hours per day and their prices
may fluctuate no more than 5% per day, less than the 10% fluctuation cap for
other listed firms. Formerly, companies could also be designated as particular
treatment ("PT"). Such companies were subject to even more onerous restrictions
such as trading only on Fridays. However, the CSRC has eliminated PT status
and indicated that it will be strict regarding delisting firms that lose money for
more than three consecutive years. See Kuisun Shangshi Gongsi Zanting Shangshi he
Zhongzhi Shangshi Shishi Banfa (Xiuding) [Implementing Measures for the Temporary
Listing Suspension and Final Listing Termination of Loss-Generating Listed Companies
(amended)], China Securities Regulatory Commission, Nov. 30, 2001; Guanyu
Zhixing "Kuisun Shangshi Gongsi Zanting Shangshi he Zhongzhi Shangshi Shishi Banfa
(Xiuding)" de Buchong Guiding [Supplemental Regulations Concerning Application of
the "Implementing Measures for the Temporary Listing Suspension and Final Listing
Termination of Loss-Generating Listed Companies (amended)"], China Securities
Regulatory Commission, Mar. 18, 2003. Delisting under-performing companies is
allowed by the PRC Securities Law and PRC Company Law. See PRC Securities
Law, supra note 6, art. 49 (authorizing delisting based on CSRC decision); PRC
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"judgment proof," the provisions of the PSL Rules allowing
plaintiffs to seek recovery against directors and executives of the
listed firm as well as professional firms such as investment banks,
accounting firms, appraisal firms, and law firms (and individual
professionals within these firms) may be of use.214 However, while
issuers are subject to strict liability for bad disclosure under the
PSL Rules, these other potential defendants can escape liability
even when there has been disclosure fraud provided they can
demonstrate that they were not themselves at fault.215 Even if such
fault for one of the members of this larger group of defendants is
established, judgments against such a defendant, like a judgment
against a listed company itself (even when solvent), may be
difficult to enforce. Failure to enforce judgments has been a
chronic problem of the PRC judicial system.216
Furthermore, analysis of the PSL Rules reveals that many
obstacles to the development of private securities litigation in
China have deep roots. Giving investors tools for self-protection
through private securities litigation is a reform in conflict with
important political and prudential concerns. Class actions touch
upon political nerves in China because they can create organized
interest groups of citizens in opposition to the state in its guise as
the dominant shareholder of listed companies and arbiter of the
judicial system. Prudential concerns arise because if cases are
routinely successful, private securities litigation could exert
pressure on listed companies, threatening current market prices
and inhibiting the capital-raising and reform process of SOEs
which China's securities markets are designed to assist. Thus,
Company Law, supra note 35, arts. 157, 158 (authorizing temporary suspension of
listing and permanent delisting). However, only a few permanent delistings have
occurred. See, e.g., Leggett, supra note 122, at C1 (reporting a lawsuit against the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and that CSRC was prompted by the delisting of
Shanghai Narcissus Electric Appliance Company).
214 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 7 (listing eligible defendants).
215 See id., art. 21 (providing exculpation for the listed company's faultless
directors, supervisors, and senior executives if they produce evidence showing
they were not at fault (wu guocuo de), but denying this exception to an issuer or
listed company itself); id. art. 23 (providing exculpation for the underwriter's
faultless directors, supervisors, and senior executives); id. art. 24 (providing
exculpation for faultless professionals in intermediary service organizations); see
also PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 128-29 (discussing strict liability
for issuers and possible exculpation for other potential defendants).
216 See generally Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System, supra note 84
(exploring the effects of non-enforcement of civil judgments on legal rules).
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besides underscoring the widely-recognized need for structural
reform of PRC Courts, the PSL Rules indicate the need for
structural reform of China's securities markets.217 Fundamental
reform of Chinese courts and securities markets, however, does not
appear imminent.
With many factors that seem to disadvantage plaintiffs and
favor defendants, one could conclude the PSL Rules are highly
unlikely to have any meaningful effect.218 However, there are
reasons to be less pessimistic. Contemporary PRC society is too
pluralistic to assume automatic outcomes. There are multiple
actors in China with a variety of agendas. The mere existence of
the PSL Rules indicates some willingness to allow private securities
litigation in certain situations. Despite the disincentives described
above, entrepreneurial lawyers have been aggressive in organizing
private securities litigation.219 The financial press in China has
217 Substantial government control of courts would be less of a problem in
this context if defendant listed companies were not substantially government-
owned. Changing either side of the equation would lessen the problem with
respect to private securities litigation. Government controlled courts might fairly
adjudicate cases against private companies, or independent courts might fairly
adjudicate suits against government-owned companies. Ideally, though, both
halves will be reformed so that both PRC courts and PRC capital markets would
become less subject to government control. More independent courts are likely to
better serve the interest of justice, and more independent stock markets will better
serve the long-term developmental goals of the Chinese government. Companies
able to conduct IPOs on the basis of full disclosure and acceptance by investors
with meaningful choices, rather than on the basis of alignment with central
planning that favors government ownership, are more likely to contribute to
China's long-term development.
218 This was the conclusion reached by one informed commentator about the
prospects for private securities litigation in China prior to promulgation of the
PSL Rules. See Cai, supra note 17, at 143 (asserting that "the current civil system in
China is riddled with structural impediments so numerous as to make securities
civil actions virtually nonexistent. Unless those impediments are removed, civil
actions will not pose a real threat to securities violators.").
219 See, e.g., Leggett, supra note 122, at C1 (reporting on efforts of a PRC
lawyer from Beijing Zhonglun Jintong Law Firm to orchestrate private securities
litigation); see also infra notes 32018-22 and accompanying text (discussing the
impact of entrepreneurial lawyers in China).
Lawyers that have brought initial cases include: Yan Yiming, an attorney in
one of the first PSL cases to reach settlement who has filed suits against listed
companies Yin Guang Xia and Hongguang Shiye; Yang Zhaoquan, an attorney
with Beijing Huatang Law Firm; Song Yixin, a partner with Shanghai's Wenda
Law Firm and author of Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Shiwu Shouce, a guidebook
to private securities litigation; Xuan Weihua, a partner with Shanghai's Guohao
Law Firm and author of Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Yu Touzizhe Quanyi
Baohu, one of the first books published about the PSL Rules after their
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paid close attention to the development of these suits.220 Press
attention should increase awareness of the cause of action and may
help stimulate fair adjudication of claims. Recent regulatory
changes discussed in Section 4 below open PRC securities markets
to greater foreign participation and may produce investors willing
to seek relief in court when their interests are harmed. The growth
of the funds industry in China may also produce institutional
investors with greater incentives and willingness to exercise
shareholder rights. Furthermore, promoting the development of
securities markets is officially part of the PRC agenda. Robust
capital markets, including mechanisms for investor protection such
as private securities litigation, are perceived by some to be part of
the package that supports China's development goals.
Competition among agencies and central-versus-local power
struggles may also abet the development of private securities
litigation.22' If private securities litigation proves too anemic under
the PSL Rules, further reforms may be made.
Even as they exist, the PSL Rules are not devoid of plaintiff-
friendly provisions. Although the joint actions provided for by the
PSL Rules fall short of U.S.-style class actions, they do allow
lawyers to leverage multiple claims. The possibility of
agglomerating many individual claims in joint actions and earning
large net rewards through contingency fees may induce lawyers to
aggressively bring private securities litigation. Also, the PSL Rules
adopt the U.S. "fraud on the market" theory so that eligible
plaintiffs do not have to prove individual reliance on false
promulgation; Wang Jianhui, a lawyer with the Fuyuan Law Firm in Fujian
province who filed suit against ST Dongfang and was forced by the Qingdao
Intermediate People's Court to sever a joint action of sixty-one plaintiffs into
seven smaller claims; and Guo Feng, a People's University Law School scholar
and editor of China's Securities Law Review.
220 See Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Sifa Guiding Deng Tai Liangxiang [Judicial
Rules on Civil Securities Compensation Take the Stage] (demonstrating that the
People's Daily maintains a collection of press accounts concerning the PSL Rules
and their implementation), at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/222/10110/
index.html (last visited June 1, 2003).
221 Central-versus-local power struggle has long been a theme of the Chinese
political economy., For a recent treatment, see Richard Baum & Alexei
Shevchenko, The "State of the State", in THE PARADOX OF CHINA's POST-MAO
REFORMS 333, 334-38 (Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar eds., 1999)
(chronicling the development and effects of China's political decentralization in
the 1980's); James Feinerman, The Give and Take of Central-Local Relations, CHINA
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 16 (discussing the ongoing political decentralization in
China and its effects).
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statements. 222 As discussed above, the PSL Rules establish a
rebuttable presumption of causality between a plaintiff's losses and
fraudulent disclosure, though the availability of the presumption
does not operate as broadly as it should. Other provisions of the
PSL Rules are less significant but nonetheless potentially helpful to
plaintiffs. As discussed, the PSL Rules broaden the types of
government action that can enable private litigation.223 Criminal
sanctions as well as penalties imposed by agencies other than the
CSRC can be the basis for private securities litigation.224 This is a
liberalization of the January 15, 2002 PSL Notice allowing private
securities litigation, which previously required CSRC action as the
basis for private claims. The PSL Rules also have a more plaintiff-
friendly method for calculating the two-year statute of limitations
period for bringing a suit. This two-year statute of limitations
period is standard under Chinese law.225 However, the January 15,
2002 PSL Notice provided that the statute of limitations period for
bringing an action would begin to run when the CSRC issued an
administrative penalty. 226 The PSL Rules changed this practice so
that the two-year statute of limitations period will begin to run
when the administrative action is publicly announced.227 This is
222 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 18 (stating the requirements for causation,
which do not include individual reliance, thereby adopting the "fraud on the
market" theory). The U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the "fraud on the market"
theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). The idea is that because
a security's market price reflects information disclosed by the issuer, purchasers
have relied on that information in purchasing the security and thus need not
otherwise prove personal, direct reliance on disclosure provided by the issuer.
However, an assumption that PRC market prices reflect disclosed information
about a company-under the efficient capital market hypothesis-is a
presumption that could be contested. See Gu & Art, supra note 60, at 120 (noting
highly speculative behavior of PRC investors who buy shares without specific
analysis concerning the company and who lack appreciation for risk of loss).
223 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 5-6 (noting that investors can bring
proceedings "based on the relevant authority's administrative penalty decision or
the people's court criminal judgment"). .
224 See id. (denoting that investors who institute securities misrepresentation
proceedings shall submit "the administrative penalty decision or public notice or
the written criminal judgment of the People's Court").
22 PRC General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 18, art. 135.
22 January 15, 2002 PSL Notice, supra note 25.
227 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 5(1) (showing that the statute of limitation
can start on the date of publication of administrative penalty by CSRC); id. art.
5(2) (showing that the statute of limitation can start on the date of publication of
administrative penalty by the Ministry of Finance or other administrative
authority).
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helpful because PRC regulatory bodies do not always publicly
reveal their actions when taken. Indeed, the PSL Rules themselves
were adopted by the Supreme People's Court on December 26,
2002 but not publicly revealed until January 9, 2003.228
One should also bear in mind that private securities litigation
was not engineered from the top down in the United States.
Rather it evolved in a fashion that was probably not expected by
the drafters of the 1933 Securities Act or of subsequent regulations.
For example, Rule 10b-5 was the workhorse of U.S. private
securities litigation.229 The same might be said of many other
provisions of U.S. law, including now-treasured notions of
equality. Though the institutional context for legal innovation in
the PRC is radically different, one cannot entirely discount the
possibility that private securities litigation in China may amount to
more in practice than one might anticipate from a skeptical reading
of the PSL Rules. Private securities litigation may be
inconsequential in the PRC, or it may break through the
considerable constraints outlined.230 If it takes the innovative role,
228 Some PRC commentators refer to the PSL Rules by the date of this press
conference, not the date of their adoption by the Supreme People's Court.
229 Recently Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, Tyco, Sunbeam, Waste
Management, Adelphia, Xerox, and Global Crossing have all been sued based on
alleged violations of Rule 10b-5. Concerning the unexpected development of Rule
10b-5, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(affirming the existence of private right of action under Rule 10b-5 and describing
the rule as a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn."); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (1947) (finding an
implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5). For a critical view of the legacy
of this development, see Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading
Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1999) (calling U.S. insider trading law
"astonishingly dysfunctional").
230 It will be interesting to observe the development of PSL in China.
Forward-looking questions to monitor include: how will "class struggle" play out
with respect to private securities litigation? What will the judicial responses be to
the entrepreneurialism of lawyers in gathering claims for joint litigation, or
gongtong susong? Will investment funds or institutional investors initiate
significant private securities litigation in China? Will foreign participation-
through joint venture fund management companies or the QFII system-make a
difference? Will having to sue listed companies in their "home courts"
discernibly affect outcomes? Will the provision in the PSL Rules enabling
administrative penalties imposed by organizations other than the CSRC prompt
some government actors to authorize private securities litigation as a competitive
weapon? Will the CSRC's enforcement of disclosure rules decrease now that
administrative sanctions for bad disclosure will unleash private securities
litigation? Will the scope of permitted private securities litigation expand beyond
disclosure fraud so that suits based on insider trading and market manipulation
become possible? More generally, will courts become more independent in
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private securities litigation in China could have consequences in a
number of critical areas, as Section 4 next explores.
4. THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION IN CHINA
At first glance, private securities litigation in China may appear
to be an esoteric subject. Chinese securities markets have largely
been cut off from world capital flows, so the international impact
of private securities litigation in China may seem insignificant.
Even domestically, the subject may appear marginal. Despite their
rapid growth, China's securities markets make relatively minor
contributions to corporate finance within the Chinese mainland's
economy. Most enterprises continue to fund their development
through bank loans and cash generated from their own
operations.231 Several aspects of the PSL Rules that will impede the
development of private securities litigation in China have been
identified above.232 What are the PSL Rules, then, but regulatory
miasma from an unimportant stock market? Actually, the PSL
Rules are potentially significant for many reasons.
4.1. Importance to PRC Domestic Investors and Securities Industry
Participants
China's rules on private securities litigation are of considerable
domestic importance. Securities markets have been developing
with official sanction in the PRC for more than a decade. 233 There
are now more than 1,200 companies listed on China's two
securities exchanges. m About 70 million securities brokerage
China? Will rulemaking become more transparent? Will the rule of law continue
to evolve in China?
231 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 17 (estimating that 70%
of financing for Chinese SOEs comes from bank loans and only 1% comes from
securities markets, while 20% of financing for U.S. enterprises comes from
securities markets); see also Karby Leggett, China's Success Doesn't Lift Stocks, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 27, 2002, at B7 (noting that the PRC stock market declined in 2002
despite the overall growth of the PRC economy).
232 See supra Section 3.
233 See Hutchens, supra note 5, at 36 (stating that "China has been developing
securities markets for over a decade," and that Chinese stock markets have grown
rapidly).
234 CSRC Statistical Report System (Monthly Report Major Index), Table 1-1
Major Index [hereinafter CSRC Statistical Report System], available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/tongjiku/199908/ehtml/y2003/07/a20
0307.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
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accounts have been opened in China, most of them by individual
rather than institutional investors.235 Firms listed on the two
mainland exchanges have raised capital through initial or
secondary public offerings, and daily trading volumes on the
secondary markets averaged RMB 297.271 billion (USD 35.9
billion) in January 2003.236 PRC sources claim that market
capitalization has reached RMB 4.253 trillion (USD 513.65
billion).23 7  These statistics, though requiring important
qualification, accurately suggest that China's securities markets
have grown rapidly and have achieved a noteworthy scale.238 In
2002, the Sixteenth Party Congress of China's Communist Party
adopted a platform calling for the energetic promotion of the
shareholding system,23 9 suggesting that China's securities markets
235 Id.
236 Id. In comparison, the Nasdaq national market has approximately 2,700
listed firms and daily trading volume averaged USD 1.8 billion in July 2003.
Nasdaq Market Data, at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/MarketData/News_mrkt
data_home.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). The New York Stock Exchange also
has more than 2,700 listed firms and a market capitalization of USD 9,557 billion
at year-end 2002. NYSE Listed Securities (year end), 2002, at http://www.nyse
data.com/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode=tables+key=32+category=5 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
237 CSRC Statistical Report System, supra note 234. These routinely-cited
numbers should be qualified in important ways. For example, the market
capitalization figure is accurate only insofar as unlisted shares are valued at listed
share prices. Recent experience in trying to unload state-owned shares suggests
this is not a fair valuation method, because the prices of liquid shares would
collapse if unlisted shares came on to the market. See generally GUOYOUGU JIANCHI
ToUSHI [EXAMINATION OF THE REDUCTION OF STATE-OWNED SHARES] (Fang Jun ed.,
2003). The market capitalization of listed shares in China is RMB 1.3825 trillion
(USD 166.97 billion) -still an impressive number, but significantly smaller than
the USD 500 billion figure. CSRC Statistical Report System, supra note 234.
Similarly, the number of stock-trading accounts does not clearly suggest the
number of market participants. This number may be overstated because investors
must open separate accounts to trade on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges.
Many accounts are inactive until IPOs are issued, and some investors open
multiple accounts in an attempt to manipulate the market or disguise their trading
for other reasons. The cited number of accounts, conversely, may understate the
number of investors, because many accounts are established by groups of people
who pool their resources to meet minimum account levels or to, in effect, create an
unauthorized investment fund. Nonetheless, these numbers do accurately
suggest that China's stock markets have grown rapidly and have achieved
noteworthy scale. Stock markets in China are now an important economic and
cultural phenomenon.
238 "Cong wu dao you" [from nothing to something], as PRC commentators
sometimes describe the progression.
239 See Shiliu Da Yu Zhengquan Shichang [The Sixteenth Party Congress and the
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will continue to play an important role in Chinese economic
reforms. All the key participants in China's developing securities
markets -investors, issuers, investment banks, accounting firms,
law firms, and individuals within these organizations-may now
become involved in private securities litigation.240 Thus, China's
approach to private securities litigation is potentially significant
because it may impact important parts of the large and rapidly
growing Chinese economy.
4.2. Importance to Foreign Investors
In addition to the possible impact on domestic PRC actors, the
potential for foreign investors to be affected by private securities
litigation in China is substantial and growing.241 The Chinese arm
of KPMG, the international accounting firm, has already been
named as a defendant in such litigation in connection with its
audits of a listed Chinese company.242 Underwriters can also be
named defendants in Chinese private securities litigation. For
example, Morgan Stanley is a significant stakeholder in one of the
leading Chinese investment banks.243  In addition to being
stakeholders in entities that can be defendants in Chinese private
securities litigation, some foreign investors will likely become
Securities Markets], CHINA SEC. J., available at http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/xwzt
_16d.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) (discussing the impact of the Sixteenth Party
Congress on China's securities markets).
240 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 7 (listing entities who may be defendants
in private securities actions).
241 China has for many years been a magnet for foreign direct investment
("FDI"). Total FDI inflows to the PRC reportedly reached USD 53 billion during
2002 and totaled USD 450 billion overall by the end of 2002. PRC Ministry of
Commerce, Statistics about Utilization of Foreign Investment in 2003 (1-4)
[hereinafter Statistics about Utilization], available at http://english.mofcom.gov.
cn/article/200305/20030500090069_.xml (last visited Aug. 27, 2003). Alongside
this enormous inflow of foreign capital, China's securities markets have grown
rapidly. Already, China's stock markets are the third largest in Asia, behind only
Japan and Hong Kong. Whenever foreign investment and Chinese securities
markets intersect, the potential for foreign entanglement in Chinese private
securities litigation is created.
242 See KPMG Faces Suit from Minority Shareholders, supra note 4 (reporting
private securities litigation in the PRC against KPMG for its role as auditor for the
PRC-listed company Jinzhou Port; the plaintiff also sued Jinzhou's underwriter
and the chairman of the company); Ma, supra note 144 (reporting that a Chinese
investor sued KPMG for disclosure of misleading information).
243 Specifically, the Author here refers to China International Capital
Corporation ("CICC").
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plaintiffs in such litigation as well. More than one hundred PRC
companies have issued B-shares, a type of stock traded in China
that is denominated in foreign currency and was previously sold
only to foreign investors.244 Now domestic investors may use
foreign currency to buy B-shares. Under China's rules on private
securities litigation, investors in B-shares will be able to, in some
cases, sue issuers for bad disclosure.245 Besides these existing
foreign investments, recent regulatory changes create new
possibilities for foreign involvement in private securities litigation
in China. At least five new avenues have been created within just
the last two years.
4.2.1. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors
Regulations adopted in November 2002 allow foreign
institutional investors to seek approval to invest in China's
securities markets as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors
("QFIIs").246 Such designation permits investment in A-shares, 247
244 See Rules of the State Council on Foreign Capital Stock Listed in China by
Joint Stock Limited Companies (listing the rules that standardize the issuing and
trading of China-listed foreign capital stock), at http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/
law/LAW Chapters.jsp?LangD=O&StatuteslD=134065&CatID=231 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2003). China's stock markets include B-shares, which are denominated in
foreign currencies and which were originally intended for foreign investors.
245 If the CSRC issues an administrative penalty against the company for false
disclosure, its B-share shareholders will have the right to bring private securities
litigation against the firm under the PSL Rules. See, e.g., Shares Drop Slightly in
Absence of Fresh Leads, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2003 (reporting the decline in trading
price for B-shares of Shandong Zhonglu Company after the company revealed
that it is under CSRC investigation), available at http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/
en/doc/2003-02/28/content_56230.htm.
246 See Hege Jingwai Jigou Touzizhe Jingnei Zhengquan Touzi Guanli Zanxing
Banfa [Provisional Measures on the Administration of the Domestic Securities Investment
of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors], China Securities Regulatory
Commission Order No. 12 (Dec. 1, 2002) (providing regulations for administration
of foreign institutional investors in China's securities markets), at
http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAW-Chapters.jsp?LangD=O&StatuteslD=
2003656&CatID=368.
247 QFIIs may buy and sell A-shares, but there are restrictions to reduce
speculation or foreign capital flight. If a QFII brings foreign currency into China,
the currency will not be allowed out for one to three years, at which point it can
only be taken out incrementally. Also, the amount of money a QFII can invest
must be approved by China's Ministry of Foreign Exchange Control ("SAFE"),
and no QFII may acquire more than ten percent of the shares of a particular
issuer. See Interim Provisions on Administration of Foreign Exchange of
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Investing in Domestic Securities, SAFE
Public Announcement (Dec. 1, 2002) (PRC) [hereinafter QFII Forex Provisions
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the most common type of shares on China's stock markets.248
Leading foreign financial firms, such as Morgan Stanley, intend to
obtain QFII status. 249 As holders of A-shares, QFIIs could become
plaintiffs in private securities litigation in China or hold economic
interest in companies that are defendants in such litigation.
Also, the PSL Rules may affect the ability of the QFII system to
function in the way PRC policy makers expect it to function. Many
PRC commentators expect that QFIIs will have a salutary impact
on PRC securities markets because QFIIs are expected to employ
fundamental analysis in making investment decisions. PRC
commentators also suggest investment behavior based on such
analysis is preferable to the speculative behavior of many current
PRC retail investors. However, the anemic nature of private
securities litigation under the PSL Rules may encourage QFIIs not
to model reliance on fundamental analysis, but to act more like
existing PRC retail investors.250 PRC retail investors probably do
not give great weight to publicly disclosed information when
making investment decisions, because such information is not
perceived as reliable. The PSL Rules seem unlikely to create new
incentives for PRC-listed companies to comply honestly with
(describing the rules regulating foreign institutional investors investing in China's
securities), available at http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAWChapters.jsp?
LangID=O&StatutesD=2003792&CatID=368.
248 Denominated in RMB, the PRC's own currency, A-shares were previously
off-limits to foreign investment. An online investor education module by the
Shanghai Securities Times discusses the impact of foreign participation through
the QFII system or other methods. Refer to the cnstock.com webpage at
http://www.cnstock.com/sq/school/bgyjj/200301020660.htm (last modified Jan.
2, 2003).
249 See, e.g., James Kynge, Renminbi-Denominated Shares: Wider Access to China
for Foreigners, FIN. TIMEs, May 27, 2003, at 24 (reporting approval of QFII status for
UBS, a leading Swiss bank, and for Nomura Securities, a leading Japanese firm).
In addition, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Merrill Lynch
submitted applications for QFII approval, while the PRC operations of three other
foreign banks, Citibank, HSBC, and Standard Chartered have been approved to
serve as the required custodians for QFII funds. See Karby Leggett, U.S. Banks
Seek A-Shares of China, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2003, at C14 (reporting that Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley have applied to the CSRC to establish class A-share
investment funds as QFIIs); Morgan Stanley Confirms Has Applied For China QFII
Status, Dow JONES, Mar. 25, 2003 (reporting Morgan Stanley's confirmation of its
application for QFII status).
250 Of course, QFIIs may find other ways to evaluate listed companies-
perhaps through investing in research that probes non-public sources. However,
"fundamental analysis" that relies on non-public information again seems
unlikely to cause retail investors to make the analysis of public disclosure a more
common trading strategy.
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disclosure requirements. The absence of effective enforcement
mechanisms should tend to foster notions that disclosure is
unreliable. If public disclosure is not perceived as reliable, QFIIs
are no more likely to rely on it than existing PRC retail investors.
4.2.2. Foreign-Invested Fund Management and Securities
Companies
In accordance with China's commitments for World Trade
Organization accession, 25 in 2002 China enacted regulations that
allow foreign investors to become minority shareholders in fund
management and securities companies that operate inside China.252
Many of the world's largest financial firms have eagerly pursued
these opportunities. 2 3 Foreign-invested securities companies can
become entangled in private securities litigation through their roles
as underwriters and analysts.2 4  Foreign-invested fund
251 See Accession of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 10, 2001, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WT/L/432, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?PDFDocuments/+/WT/L/432.d
oc (last visited Aug. 27, 2003) (describing the terms and conditions of the PRC's
accession to the WTO).
252 See Waizi Cangu Zhenquan Gongsi Sheli Guize [Rules on the
Establishment of Securities Companies with Foreign Capital Equity Participation],
China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 8 (July 1, 2002) (describing
the rules of participation of securities companies with foreign capital equity in
China's securities markets), at http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/Law_
Chapters.jsp?LangID=O&StatutesID=5012975&CatlD-370 (last visited Sept. 1,
2003); Waizi Cangu Jijin Guanli Gongsi Sheli Guize [Rules on the Establishment of
Fund Management Companies with Foreign Capital Equity Participation], China
Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 9 (July 1, 2002) (describing the rules
of establishing fund management companies with foreign capital participation), at
http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAW-Chapters.jsp?LanglD=O&StatuteslD=
5012976&CatID=368 (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); see also Hutchens, supra note 5
(discussing China's rules on foreign investment in fund management and
securities companies); Bill Savadove, Nod for Open Sales Channel, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 9, 2002, at 4 (discussing new rules for fund management and
securities firms).
253 See, e.g., Hutchens, supra note 5 at 35 (providing a list of announced deals
for the establishment of such ventures); James Kynge, ABN On Course to Join
China's A-Share Market, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2003, at 29 (reporting on the agreement
of Dutch ABN Amro Asset Management to acquire a stake in Shanghai-based
Xiangcai Hefeng Fund Management, among other deals to establish foreign-
invested fund management companies in the PRC).
254 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts, 7(2), 7(3), 7(7) (identifying issuers of listed
companies, securities distributors, and other organizations as potential
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management companies255 could become entangled in such
litigation through their roles as shareholders or as issuers of funds
with disclosure duties.256
4.2.3. Foreign Investment in Unlisted Shares in Chinese Listed
Companies
Under regulations promulgated in November 2002 that reverse
a policy in place since 1995,257 foreign investors may now acquire
unlisted legal person shares ("faren gu") in Chinese-listed
companies.258 Purchasers of unlisted shares do not have any
remedies as plaintiffs under China's rules on private securities
litigation.25 9 Thus, purchasers of such shares are likely to be
concerned with the possibility that any listed company in which
they invest may be a defendant in private securities litigation. For
example, in May 2003, the International Finance Corporation
("IFC"), the World Bank's private finance arm, announced plans to
acquire a stake in Minsheng Bank, one of the four banks currently
255 Foreign-invested securities companies, however, cannot make trades with
their own accounts, so they are therefore unlikely to be plaintiffs under Foreign-
Invested Securities Company ("FI-SC") Rules.
256 Foreign-invested fund management companies could become plaintiffs
(or hold economic interest in defendants) through their roles as shareholders of
listed companies. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 7(1) (providing that controlling
shareholders (konggu gudong) can be defendants in private securities litigation).
However, funds are limited in the PRC to holding a maximum of ten percent of
the shares of any single listed company, so a controlling position is unlikely. See
QFII Forex Provisions, supra note 247, art. 26 (describing the maximum
investment amount for close-ended funds).
257 See Guanyu Zanting Jiang Shangshi Gongsi Guojai Gu De Faren Gu
Zhuanrang Gei Waishang De Qingshi De Tongzhi [Notice Regarding Request for
Instructions Concerning Temporary Halt on Transfer of State-owned shares and
Legal Person Shares to Foreign Commercial Interests], State Council, Sept. 23,
1995 (PRC).
258 See Guanyu Xiang Waishang Zhuanrang Shangshi Gongsi Guoyougu He
Farengu Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [Issues Relevant to the Transfer of State-owned
Shares and Legal Person Shares in Listed Companies to Foreign Investors Circular],
China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, the Ministry of Fin., and the State Econ. and
Trade Comm'n, CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 57 (Nov. 1, 2002)
(authorizing the transfer of state-owned shares and legal person shares in listed
companies to foreign investors).
259 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 3 ("These provisions shall not apply to
civil actions arising from ... share transactions occurring outside stock
exchanges...."). This does not mean purchasers would be without relief.
Agreements to acquire such shares will presumably contain standard
representations and warranties from sellers that could be a basis for contract
claims.
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listed on the PRC's stock exchanges.260 In January 2003, Citibank
acquired 5% of Pudong Development Bank, another PRC-listed
bank, and San Francisco-based Newbridge Capital attempted to
purchase a significant stake in PRC-listed Shenzhen Development
Bank.261
China's putative legislature, the National People's Congress,
262
met in early March 2003 and approved reforms that may make
sales of unlisted shares in state-owned firms more common.263
Therefore, all deals in which foreign investors acquire unlisted
shares in PRC-listed and state-owned companies link the interests
of foreign investors to PRC private securities litigation.
In addition to purchasing unlisted shares in companies already
listed, foreign investors may also acquire interests in Chinese
companies that are preparing to list in China. In response, some
260 See Christine Chan, World Bank Buys Stake in Minsheng, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 14, 2003, at 3 (reporting that the Orient Group is selling part of its
7.51% stake in China Minsheng Bank to the IFC).
261 See Tom Holland & Paul Beckett, Citigroup's New China Front: Stake in Local
Partner is Unusual Shift in Strategy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at A12B (counting
Citigroup's USD 67 million acquisition of 5% of Shanghai Pudong Development
Bank). Newbridge's deal to gain exclusive control of Shenzhen Development
Bank collapsed, resulting in litigation. See Christine Chan, Newbridge Insists on
SDB Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 13, 2003, at 1 (reporting that Newbridge's
interim management structure plan would be canceled because of the failure to
reach an agreement with shareholders concerning the transfer price, though
Newbridge claimed that the cancellation would violate the agreement related to
the acquisition); Christine Chan, Newbridge Near China Deal, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 26, 2003 (reporting that Newbridge said it was close to a deal to buy
"nearly 20 percent of Shenzhen Development Bank"); Newbridge's China Deal,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2003, at C3 (reporting on the collapse of the deal and the
resulting lawsuit Newbridge launched against Chinatrust Commercial Bank of
Taiwan for tortious interference).
262 See generally Michael W. Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and
Operations of the National People's Congress, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1997)
(discussing the development of the NPC and lawmaking in China).
263 See Allen T. Cheng, New Streamlined Government Wins Congress Approval, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 2003, at 7 (reporting the legislative creation of a
new State Asset Management Commission, which, if implemented fully, would
act as a privatization ministry, giving outright ownership of SOEs to private
individuals at various levels); Stephen Green, Wen Has to Roll Back the Chinese
State, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at 13 (describing the new State Asset Management
Commission as a mechanism that may thwart or help the cause of privatization);
James Kynge, China Ushers in Era of New Leadership and Political Reform, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2003, at 12 (reporting on the commencement of the 10th National People's
Congress that "will pave the way for the redistribution and sale of some state
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Chinese banks and insurance companies that have absorbed or
plan to absorb significant amounts of foreign investment are
seeking to conduct IPOs.264 This, too, may eventually entangle
foreign investors in private securities litigation in China.265
4.2.4. Listing of Foreign-Invested Enterprises on China's
Domestic Stock Exchanges
Few companies listed on China's stock exchanges have
significant amounts of foreign investment.266 Nonetheless, since
1995, it has been theoretically possible to establish a foreign-
invested enterprise in a format eligible for listing on China's
domestic stock exchanges. 267 PRC officials periodically indicate
264 As China prepares for greater foreign market access under the terms of its
WTO accession, it has sought to strengthen certain domestic enterprises by both
attracting foreign capital and listing shares on domestic or overseas stock
exchanges. See, e.g., Christine Chan, China Life Secures Four Banks to Co-ordinate
Global Share Listing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 20, 2003, at 3 (reporting that
CICC is among four investment banks tapped to lead the China Life Insurance
IPO); Christine Chan, China Re Adding Expertise Ahead of Listing, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 2003, at 1 (reporting efforts of major PRC insurance
companies to attract foreign investors and to prepare for IPOs); Christine Chan,
Ping An Moves on Rivals in Listing Race, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 2
(reporting on the reorganization of Ping An Insurance in anticipation of the IPOs
of the three largest PRC insurers: Ping An, China Life Insurance, and People's
Insurance Co. of China); Shan Jinliang, Cold Dawn for CITIC Securities, BEIJING
YOUTH DAILY ONLINE dan. 10, 2003) (reporting on the weak IPO of CITIC
securities and quoting an analyst saying that four to five other mainland securities
companies hope to conduct IPOS in 2003), at http://www.bjyouth.com/article.
jsp?oid=2076539; Shan Jinliang, State-owned Banks Talk Listing, BEIJING YOUTH
DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2003) (reporting that Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of China
have all expressed IPO intentions and that "listing plans come in light of China's
WTO commitment to further open its financial markets and the large-scale entry
of foreign banks"), at http://www.bjyouth.com/article.jsp?oid=2118499; Mark
O'Neill & Eric Ng, HSBC Eyes No. 5 Mainland Bank, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
3, 2003, at 1 (reporting Hong Kong-based HSBC Holdings is in talks to acquire
fifteen percent of China's Bank of Communications).
265 That is, presuming such IPOs are listed on the two mainland stock
exchanges. Overseas listings do not create causes of action in the PRC. See PSL
Rules, supra note 2, art. 2 (defining "securities market" for the purposes of the PSL
Rules as one approved by the PRC government).
266 See Clark T. Randt, Jr. & Shawn X.Y. Li, Foreign Acquisition of SOE's, In
Buying a Business In the PRC, ASIA L. & PRAc. (1998) (mentioning Ford's purchase
of an 80% equity stake of Jiangling Motor Corporation's B-shares as an exception
to the general difficulty of acquiring controlling blocks of stock in Chinese
companies).
267 See Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint
Stock Companies Limited, PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation
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that more foreign-invested enterprises will soon be permitted to
list in China.268 In November of 2001, the CSRC and Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC)269 went so
far as to issue new rules concerning listings on China's stock
markets by foreign-invested enterprises. The CSRC subsequently
issued special rules concerning the disclosures it would require in
a foreign-invested enterprise's IPO prospectus.270 Recently, the
first of these "foreign" enterprises was approved for listing on the
Shanghai stock exchange, and other foreign-invested firms have
indicated interests in conducting IPOs in China.27' If China does
begin to allow more foreign-invested enterprises ("FIEs") to list
securities on domestic exchanges, 27 2 these issuers can be sued
(Jan. 10, 1995) (outlining how foreign-funded joint stock companies limited can be
established in China). For a commentary on these rules, see Jim Jinpeng Zhang &
Jung Y. Lowe, Foreign Investment Companies Limited By Shares: The Latest Chinese
Organization for Major International Ventures, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 409 (2001).
268 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Expected to Sell Stakes to Foreign Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at C1 (reporting that Wang Jianxi, a CSRC official,
stated that the PRC will allow multinational corporations to sell shares in their
Chinese operations to Chinese citizens); CHINA STOCK MARKETS DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: 2002, supra note 54, at 22 (reporting that vice-premiere Wu Yi commented
on September 19, 2002, at a conference on multinational investment in China, that
the PRC was enthusiastically exploring foreign investment enterprise ("FIE")
listings). Cf. Report: China to Allow Foreign Firms to List On Stock Mart, PEOPLE'S
DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 10, 2001) (describing foreign firms restructuring their
businesses in preparation for listing on China's stock market), at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200109/10/eng20010910_79770.html.
269 MOFTEC has been merged into a new Ministry of Commerce in
accordance with a decision by the NPC on March 10, 2003. See China Briefing: The
Commerce Ministry Takes Over, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 20, 2003, at 22 (reporting on
the PRC government reorganization that replaced the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation and the State Economic and Trade Commission with
the Ministry of Commerce).
270 Gongkai Faxing Zhengquan de Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Bianbao Guize Di 17
Hao -Waishang Touzi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhaogu Shuomingshu Neirong Yu
Geshi Tebie Guiding [Standards for the Content and Format of Information
Disclosure by Companies Publicly Issuing Securities, No. 17-Special Rules for
Share Prospectuses of Foreign-Invested Companies Limited by Shares], China
Securities Regulatory Commission, Mar. 19, 2002.
271 See Ningbo Firm Breaks New Ground in Share Sales, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 14, 2003 (reporting that Ningbo Tongmuo New Materials gained CSRC
approval to issue A-shares and that HSBC Holdings, Unilever, Bank of East Asia,
and other firms are interested in doing the same).
272 A significant number of FIE listings could threaten the status quo of
China's stock markets, which are designed to feed capital into SOEs. It thus
seems unlikely that there will be more than a trickle of FIE listings in the near-to
medium-term. See Mark O'Neill, Outbreak Delays Listing of Foreign-invested Joint
Ventures in China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 3, 2003, at 3 (reporting that the
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under the PSL Rules, creating another avenue for international
entanglement in Chinese private securities litigation.
4.2.5. Individual Foreign Entanglement in Chinese Private
Securities Litigation
China's rules on private securities litigation allow not only
firms, but also individuals, to be named as defendants. 273 Such
individual defendants can include a listed company's executives,
directors, supervisory board members, and controlling
shareholders. 274 Responsible individuals in professional service
firms, such as investment banks and accounting firms, can also be
sued under the PSL Rules.275  Thus, individual foreign
entanglement in private securities litigation could arise when an
individual foreigner takes a board seat or a senior management
position in a PRC firm that violates its disclosure duties.
Foreigners working in professional services firms can also become
entangled in private securities litigation in China if their clients are
involved in disclosure fraud.276
4.3. Importance for Academic Discourse
Besides its importance to foreign and domestic interests,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS") outbreak delayed the progress in
listing FIE approvals, and that the PRC press discussed CSRC officials' preference
for small FIEs for listing, so as not to disturb the market).
273 PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7.
274 Id. Supervisory boards are a feature of PRC corporate law reflecting
German influence. Cf. Art & Gu, supra note 70 (describing the ideology, structure,
and application of China's first national corporation law).
275 PSL Rules, supra note 2, arts. 2(6), 2(7).
276 See Christine Chan, Minsheng Rules Out Foreign Control, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 5, 2003 (reporting comments of the president of PRC-listed Minsheng
Bank that board representation by a foreign strategic partner would be
considered, but a controlling stake in the bank would not be allowed); see also
Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Notice on Issuing the Guideline on the
Management of Listed Companies], art. 39, China Securities Regulatory
Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission, Jan. 7, 2002 (providing
that listed companies may procure liability insurance for directors and officers,
upon the approval of shareholders), available at http://www.isinilaw.com/jsp/
law/LAW._Chapters.jsp?CatD=370&LanglD=o&StatutesD=5007987. Recently in
the United States, the threat of costly private securities litigation has made such
insurance more costly. See Tamara Loomis, D&O Insurance Not a Sure Thing,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 2002 (stating that recently, in the U.S., the threat of costly private
securities litigation has made such insurance more costly), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1030343771067.
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China's approach to private securities litigation offers rich material
for comparative law scholars.277 In recent years, there has been a
robust debate concerning how securities markets and their
regulatory regimes develop, as well as what constitutes an optimal
corporate finance system. 278 That discussion has largely ignored
the important case of China. Perhaps this results from the lack of
English publications thus far about PRC stock markets, coupled
with a lack of securities law scholars who can read Chinese.
279
Although major laws such as the PRC Company Law and
Securities Law are readily available in translation, the stream of
277 Economists, political scientists, and others who theorize and advise about
the appropriate sequencing, pace, and scope of reforms for transition economies
and developing economies should also find developments in China's securities
markets of interest.
278 See, e.g., Stuart Banner, lAat Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (describing how market crashes cause
new securities regulation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (2000)
(examining different theories of advanced economies' path dependence-
structure-driven and rule-driven-as it pertains to differences in corporate
structures); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001) (discussing how legal and market
institutions that foster confidence in information about a company and its
managers are necessary to develop a strong securities market); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001) (examining various countries and
their securities markets to determine what legal and political preconditions lead to
strong securities markets); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic
Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996) (examining
the link between corporate governance and economic efficiency); La Porta, Law
and Finance, supra note 93; La Porta, Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra
note 93 (demonstrating that countries with poorer investor protections, measured
by legal rules and their enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets);
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145 (1998) (examining
diversity and convergence in corporate governance by comparing corporate
governance in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea); Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539
(2000) (describing how weak social democratic pressure on American business
firms was a political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United
States).
279 See John W. Head, Codes, Cultures, Chaos, and Champions: Common Features
of Legal Codification Experiences in China, Europe, and North America, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2003) (speculating that the prior dearth of attention to
China in "comparative codification" literature arose from a lack of materials on
traditional Chinese law that are available in Western languages, and noting the
current availability of such materials); Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An
American Perspective, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 36 n.2 (2001) (citing English
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regulatory enactments that pours forth from the CSRC is often not
readily accessible in translation. Also, prior to the raft of changes
with respect to foreign participation, China's securities markets
were largely sealed off from world capital flows due to the
inability to convert China's currency. This suppressed
international interaction with, and perhaps academic interest in,
China's securities markets. Whatever the reasons for the dearth of
academic attention, China is a useful test case for hypotheses on
how to develop and optimally regulate a securities market. China
can be used to test hypotheses such as: whether having a common
law legal system is helpful in developing robust capital markets;
whether capital markets will flourish or perish in the absence of
investor protections needed to overcome information asymmetries;
and whether economic development depends on having legal
institutions that support secure property and contract rights.280
In addition to providing a test case for theories concerning
market regulation, Chinese private securities litigation is also a
useful entry point for studying contemporary Chinese law and
society. The PSL Rules are embedded in a network of other legal
enactments, including PRC Corporate and Securities Laws, Civil
Procedure Law, and Administrative Law.281 Additionally, to
understand private securities litigation in China, one must
understand the capital structure of the majority of listed companies
in China, the demographics of participants in China's securities
markets, and the structure and control of Chinese courts. Thus,
China's approach to private securities litigation provides a
window into contemporary Chinese society. Section 5 elaborates
on this point more specifically, contending that China's treatment
of private securities litigation not only constitutes an important
development in the regulation of Chinese financial markets but
also illuminates a number of general characteristics of China's
developing legal system.
5. MATERIAL DISCLOSURE ABOUT THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM?
This part expands the analysis into a discussion of what the
PSL Rules and China's handling of private securities litigation
2N See Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The
China Problem, 51 AM. J. CoMP. L. 89 (2003) (arguing that the PRC's recent history
challenges the notion that reliable contract enforcement is a prerequisite for
economic development).
281 See infra Section 5.3.
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suggest about China's developing legal system.282 The hypothesis
is that several observations gleaned during study of the PSL Rules
can be generalized, providing material disclosure about the status
of China's legal system. In some cases, the validity of generalizing
these observations will be obvious. For example, the assertion that
China now possesses a substantial legal and regulatory context
into which new enactments are placed underscores a material
difference from twenty or even ten years ago; however, that is
unlikely to be a controversial assertion. In other cases, further
evidence is required to confirm whether one of these "material
disclosure" propositions is characteristic not only of China's
handling of private securities litigation, but also whether it is an
apposite characterization of China's overall legal system.
5.1. Ignorance Plays a Limited Role
The PSL Rules have many deficiencies, but none of those
identified herein appear to be the fruit of ignorance. For example,
the drafters of the PSL Rules are aware of how class actions and
private securities litigation function in the United States and other
jurisdictions.283 It is easy to buy books in China that catalog the
approaches of various jurisdictions to particular legal problems.
Also, China has many knowledgeable comparative law scholars.
These scholars often advise on, or participate in, the drafting of
new legislation. Thus, it appears that PRC lawmakers do not
generally act out of ignorance, at least not at a national level.
When Chinese legal enactments fall short of what outside
observers would like, it is rarely because China has failed to
observe the outside world.284 It is more likely that perceived
deficiencies in Chinese law arise from political and prudential
282 Whether China even has a "legal system" is a contested issue. Without
becoming engrossed in these nuanced theoretical debates, in this analysis, "legal
system" means the collection of state-sponsored or approved texts and
institutions designed to regulate social and governmental activities in China. That
is a sweeping definition, but it is serviceable for the list of observations made.
283 PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 205-07.
284 For example, the general absence of reliance on civil enforcement in
China's securities law is not from lack of knowledge that such tools are important
elsewhere in the world. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 80, at 1011, n.200 (citing
Richard M. Phillips et al., ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA (Chinese translation of a presentation to the International Forum on
Securities and Futures Trading Law held during Jan. 9-17, 1997 in Beijing)
(showing that the Chinese are aware the U.S. considers private actions to be an
effective means of assuring compliance with securities laws).
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constraints.
5.2. Commitment to State Control Persists
China's approach to private securities litigation, both the
substance of the rules and the process by which they were
developed, discloses a commitment in Chinese law to the principle
of "wei jing pizhun bu ke," or "you can do nothing without
government approval." This principle is reflected in the PSL Rules
by the requirement of enabling government action allowing private
litigation, and by similar requirements in many other areas in
Chinese law.285 For millions of Chinese, changes made in the
reform era have expanded space for their private lives and added
to their prosperity, but Chinese law continues to limit the exercise
of private discretion. Chinese law tends to preserve state
discretion.2 6 Incorporating a business, issuing shares to the public,
forming a non-governmental organization, or establishing a
charitable trust are all matters subject to government approval.
The government's broad discretion to intervene in commercial
affairs has been a frequent complaint of foreign investors 2 7 and
has hampered the development of the domestic PRC economy by
distorting markets.288
25 See, e.g., PRC Company Law, supra note 35, arts. 152(1), 153-54 (requiring
government approval for IPOs); id. art. 139 (requiring government approval for
secondary offerings); PRC Securities Law, supra note 6, art. 10 (mandating
government approval for IPOs); Xintuo Fa [PRC Trust Law] art. 62 (requiring
government approval to establish a charitable trust). See generally PETER HOWARD
CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (1997)
(noting that governmental influence permeates the courts' decision-making
processes and undermines their value as a supervisory institution).
286 See Susan V. Lawrence, Navigating the Shake-up, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 20,
2003, at 27 (reporting the observation of a Chinese academic that "the central
government now handles some 28,000 matters, such as permits, approvals and
registrations. It needs to cut that to 3,000 within 20 years... to bring China in line
with international standards.").
287 See Christian Murck, Rule of Law and Business Conditions in China,
Testimony Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (June 6,
2002) (noting that in the reform process since 1979, the National People's Congress
has typically written broad legislation stating general principles to be later
amplified by implementing regulations issued by the relevant Ministry or other
agency, and stating that the implementing regulations often contained not
objective standards, but rather subjective standards that could only be applied to
specific facts by recourse to government personnel on a case-by-case basis),
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/060602/murck.php.
288 See James Miles, A Dragon Out of Puff, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 4
(giving examples of China's history of disturbing markets).
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5.3. A Substantial Legal Framework Exists
While China's handling of private securities litigation
demonstrates that a commitment to state control persists, it also
shows that a substantial legal framework has grown to shape the
exercise of that power. The PSL Rules are embedded in a network
of existing laws and regulations, reflected by explicit reference in
the PSL Rules to the PRC General Principles of Civil Law, PRC
Civil Procedure Law and PRC Securities Law.289 China's handling
of private securities litigation also implicates the PRC Criminal
Law, a large array of CSRC regulations, and various administrative
laws governing administrative penalties. 290  Industry-specific
government regulators such as the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission, the People's Bank of China, and the State
Administration of Drug Administration have enacted regulations
that may also become relevant for private securities litigation.291
This expansive network of laws and regulations connected to the
PSL Rules suggests that a codification explosion has occurred in
Where once China was able to able to boost the economy by releasing the
pent-up power of sectors restrained by Maoist folly (first agriculture,
then small private and mixed-ownership enterprises), it has now run out
of easy sources of new growth potential. It must get the marketplace to
deploy labour and capital much more efficiently. Both are still being
stifled by government interference.
Id.
289 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, pmbl. ("These provisions are formulated in
accordance with such laws and regulations as the PRC Civil Law General
Principles, the PRC Securities Law .... "); see also id. art. 6 (making reference to the
application of civil procedure law in determining jurisdiction).
29D See PRC Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 208 (stating that the
law is intended "for the purpose of ensuring the correct and prompt handling of
administrative cases by the people's courts"); PRC Administrative
Reconsideration Law, supra note 208 (discussing the Administrative
Reconsideration Law's "preventing and setting right illegal and inappropriate
administrative acts"); Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui,
Zhongguo Zhengquan Shichang Xinxi Pilu Guifan [Disclosure Requirements of
China's Securities Market], China: Securities Regulatory Commission (2002)
(compiling more than 400 pages of relevant laws and regulations).
291 Regulations from these agencies could create disclosure duties directly or
could govern when interaction between the listed company and agencies should
be disclosed, for example when companies apply for a license to sell a particular
type of insurance, or submit an application to market a drug. Additionally, the
PSL Rules provide that administrative penalties imposed by government organs
other than the CSRC can be the basis for private securities litigation. Therefore,
these agencies could conceivably supply the required government enabling action
for private securities litigation. See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 6.
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China in recent years.
292
While merely printing laws and regulations is insufficient to
create the rule of law, China's mass of laws does more than just
consume paper; it influences life of the citizenry in China.293
Increasingly, law is shaping the behavior of the Chinese people, as
a 1999 amendment to the PRC's slogan-laden constitution
directs.294
5.4. Courts Remain Weak
For a foreign observer, the timidity with which PRC courts
approach private securities litigation is striking. PRC judges
dismissed the first private securities suits brought in China. They
held that the CSRC is the government department responsible for
securities markets and that plaintiffs have no right to relief through
private litigation, despite provisions of the PRC Securities Law and
PRC General Principles of Civil Law that would seem to provide a
292 See The X-Files, supra note 82, at 38 ("New laws and regulations are being
issued at breakneck speed, old laws and regulations are amended continually,
and whole new regulatory regimes and institutions are being created.").
293 The numbers of ordinary PRC citizens (laobaixing) one sees reading and
often scribbling notes from law books in large Chinese bookstores provide some
anecdotal evidence. Although personal connections continue to be important in
China, the actions of these PRC citizens suggest law is at least a factor in the way
things get done in contemporary China. See id. at 79 (describing the relevance of
courts, law, and the possibility of law sometimes outweighing personal
relationships and connections).
294 The NPC amended the PRC Constitution in 1999 to indicate the emphasis
on law. Article 5 of the constitution provides that "the People's Republic of China
practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a socialist
country of law." PRC Constitution, supra note 154, art. 5.
In addition to some greater use of law in governance, China's constitution
also calls for the adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, Deng Xiaoping
theory, democracy, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. There are obvious
conflicts in this list of ideologies.
On the PRC Constitution, see, e.g., Puzzling Observations, supra note 98, at 105
(observing that the PRC Constitution might best be conceptualized as a "National
Declaration," providing aspirational statements such as the right to the "pursuit
of happiness" found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence); William C. Jones,
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 707, 710 (1985)
("The constitution seems to bear no relation to the actual government of China.").
But see Shen Kui, Is It the Beginning of the Era of the Rule of the Constitution?
Reinterpreting China's "First Constitutional Case," 12 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 199
(2003) (discussing and offering an English translation of the Supreme Court's
Reply No. 25, issued on August 13, 2001, which indicated that a plaintiff's
invocation of rights to education under the PRC Constitution was actionable).
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basis for fashioning such a remedy.295 In January 2002, the
Supreme People's Court authorized lower PRC courts to accept
private securities litigation based on false disclosure.296 However,
during the year following that notice, not one PRC court rendered
judgment in a private securities case. They waited for further
instructions from the Supreme People's Court concerning the
calculation of damages and other particulars.
Li Guoguang, the Vice President of the Supreme People's
Court, said in a press conference on January 9, 2003, that the PSL
Rules "fill in a blank" in Chinese litigation.297 Xi Xiaoming,
another Justice of the Supreme People's Court, cited the lack of
detail in the liability provisions of the PRC Securities Law as an
example of a common problem of over-generality in PRC
legislation. 298 The PSL Rules provide more details than any prior
legal provision on how to adjudicate private securities litigation.
However, it is unclear if a judge would be acting beyond the scope
of his or her powers if he or she provided relief based on the PRC
Securities Law, or some other legal provision that existed before
the PSL Rules, when faced with a claim for relief based on false
disclosure. PRC judges, for example, routinely impose criminal
295 See supra notes 6, 18, and accompanying text.
296 See PSL Rules, supra note 2, art. 1.
297 See Li Guoguang Jiedu Zhengquan Peichang Guiding [Li Guoguang Interprets
the Securities Compensation Rules], GuoJp JINRONGBAO [INT'L FIN.] (Jan. 10, 2003)
(reporting that during a press conference held to unveil the PSL Rules, the Vice
President of the Supreme People's Court said: "Zhe ge guiding dui you de
yuanzexing de zhengquan falt! guiding jinxingle xihua, tianbule sifa shijian
shiyong falt! de kongbai. [These rules make more detailed the general-principle
nature of securities laws and regulations and fill in a blank in the practical use of
laws in the administration of justice.]"), available at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/jinji/35/159/20030110/904945.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
298 See Xinhua Fangtan, "Liang Hui" Xilie [2003], Teyao Jiabin: Gao Famin Er
Ting Tingzhang Xi Xiaoming Boshi, Fangtan Zhuti: Renmin Fayuan Jin Nian Lai
Jinrong Anjian Shenli Qingkuang [Xinhua Discussions: The NPC and Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference Meetings Series 2003, Dr. Xi Xiaoming,
Presiding Judge of the Second Division, Supreme People's Court (Honored
Guest)/The Handling of Financial Cases by People's Courts in Recent Years
(Discussion Topic)] (commenting on what he would like the NPC and CPPCC to
do, Justice Xi said it would facilitate the application of laws by courts if legislation
were more specific and less "in principle." He cited the Securities Laws as an
example, noting it provides for compensation in some instances, but does not
provide a method for the calculation of damages or the causal relationship that
must exist between false disclosure or insider trading and investor losses), at




2003] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA 677
penalties based on provisions of the criminal code that are
notoriously vague. The provisions of the PRC Criminal Law that
are related to securities market disclosure fraud provide simply
that false disclosure can constitute a crime in cases with "serious
consequences, or [cases] of a serious nature" (houguo yanzhong).299
Therefore, providing a specific formula for civil damages already
authorized by the PRC Securities Law seems like much less of a
leap than imposing criminal liability when circumstances are
"serious."
There are a number of explanations for the reluctance of PRC
courts to try cases prior to the promulgation of the PSL Rules.
First, judges who make the wrong decision in China may face
graver consequences than those who do nothing. Chinese law has
tended to rely heavily on administrative and criminal penalties
and has put less emphasis on civil liability, perhaps making courts
particularly hesitant to grant relief to plaintiffs in private securities
litigation.300 Also, PRC local courts are not administratively
independent from local governments, which could have led to
reluctance on the part of judges to allow suits against companies
owned by local governments. Some courts might have dodged
complex private securities litigation because they lacked adequate
human resources to handle such cases.301 PRC judges are usually
not trained lawyers; a significant number are former military
officers with no legal training prior to assignment to the bench.302
However, this explanation seems flawed because some of the cases
were dismissed in Shanghai and Beijing, where court personnel
with legal training are commonly available. It is likely that PRC
courts are themselves subject to the tendency to seek approval
before acting, which is a theme of Chinese law - the wei jing pizhun
bu ke principle.303
299 PRC Criminal Law art. 160 (1979) (amended 1997), translated at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
300 See PSL DRAFrERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 183.
301 See Class Action Litigation in China, supra note 165, at 1533 (noting that the
complexity of class actions and lack of trained court personnel may make courts
reluctant to accept class action cases).
32 See China's Legal System, supra note 139, at 108 (reporting estimates that
only about 10% of PRC judges have a degree in law); see also What's Law Got to Do
With lt?, supra note 86, at 10 (noting that many of China's judges and legal officials
have little or no professional training in law). But see The X-Files, supra note 82, at
78 (noting a reduction in the number of untrained and former military judges).
303 See infra note 305 for an example of the application of the wei jing pizhun
bu ke principle.
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In other systems, legal innovations often percolate up from
lower courts, with higher courts functioning to review specific
cases and to harmonize the approaches developed by the lower
courts. For example, in the United States, the development of
private securities litigation has often exemplified Justice Marshall's
axiom that it is the "duty of the judicial branch to say what the law
is." 304 This is quite different from the wei jing pizhun bu ke
principle, which requires inaction pending approval.305 These two
maxims epitomize a fundamental difference in legal systems and
the role of courts within them.
Whatever the reasons for the failure of PRC courts to
adjudicate claims for securities disclosure fraud prior to enactment
of the PSL Rules, the failure suggests that PRC courts are far from
ideal forums for the weak and the oppressed seeking to vindicate
their rights.
5.5. Black Box Rulemaking is Common
While lower PRC courts appeared frozen until the Supreme
People's Court enacted the PSL Rules, the process that the
Supreme People's Court itself used to develop the PSL Rules
discloses another material aspect of China's legal system: non-
transparent, black box rulemaking is common. Note that although
the PSL Rules are issued by the Supreme People's Court, they take
the form of legislation or regulations rather than a case decision.
They were not a result of a case decision, and there was no specific
plaintiff or defendant before the Supreme People's Court when it
considered the PSL Rules. The issuance of regulations by a court is
curious to a U.S. lawyer, because U.S. courts generally cannot
engage in rulemaking without adjudicating specific cases or
controversies.0 6 China has nothing equivalent to the "cases and
304 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
35 Although the PSL Rules are issued by the Supreme People's Court, it is
not clear that the court was free to enact the rules without interference from other
departments of government. The drafters of the PSL Rules acknowledge that the
court had extensive consultations with other departments of the PRC government
before issuing the PSL Rules. While these "consultations" may have simply been
the court's diligent attempts to gather information, they also could have been
meetings in which the court sought instructions, not input. See PSL DRAFTERS'
COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 22.
W6 See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (limiting the judicial power to "all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made" and various specific circumstances such as diversity or
alienage jurisdiction). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Jurisprudence of Article III:
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss3/2
2003] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION IN CHINA 679
controversies" clause of the U.S. Constitution to bar such action,
and China does not purport to be a common law jurisdiction. In
fact, China's Supreme Court routinely issues judicial
interpretations (sifa jieshi) that have the appearance of legislation.
30 7
Although there is no direct ban on this practice under the PRC
Constitution, there is also no explicit basis for it. The PRC
Constitution vests lawmaking authority in the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee.308 Furthermore, the PRC
Legislation Law does not contemplate such rulemaking by the
Supreme People's Court.30 9 The Legislation Law specifically
provides that it is the duty of the NPC Standing Committee to
make laws more specific and to provide instructions on their
application in practice.310 The Organic Law of the People's Courts,
adopted by the NPC, gives the Supreme People's Court power to
interpret laws in a fashion which is to be binding on lower courts,
though the parameters of this power are not spelled out.
311
Whatever its basis in Chinese law and constitutional theory, a
weakness of the Supreme People's Court's approach is that
concerned parties, such as advocates for small investors in the case
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979)
(discussing limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts); see also John C. Reitz,
Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 461 (2002) (arguing
that "differences in standing rules are likely to fit differences in political
economy").
37 See Supreme People's Court, supra note 84, at 188, 190 (discussing the
proliferation of this practice by the Court and its uncertain legal basis).
308 See PRC Constitution, supra note 154, art. 62(3) (giving the NPC authority
to enact laws); id. art. 67(2) (giving the NPC Standing Committee power to enact
laws except "those which should be enacted by the [NPC]"); id. art. 67(4) (giving
the NPC Standing Committee power to interpret laws); id. art. 67(7) (giving the
NPC Standing Committee power to annul regulations that violate laws or the PRC
Constitution).
309 See Lifa Fa [PRC Legislation Law], art. 7 (Mar. 15, 2000) (vesting legislative
power in the NPC and its Standing Committee); id. art. 42 (vesting power of legal
interpretation (fali jieshi quan) in the NPC Standing Committee); id. art. 43
(authorizing the Supreme People's Court, among others, to request that the NPC
Standing Committee provide a legal interpretation (falfi jieshi)).
310 Id. arts. 42(1), 42(2).
311 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the PRC, arts. 32, 33 (1983). For a
discussion of judicial interpretation by the Supreme People's Court, see generally
Peter H. Come, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369,
409-11 (2002), noting that judicial interpretations "could represent, in effect, an
encroachment on the legislative power bestowed by the Legislation Law on the
legislative and the executive, in which there is no mention of the [Supreme
People's] Court's own power to interpret law."
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of the PSL Rules, may not have an opportunity to brief the court
before rules are issued.3 2 Because there were no contending
parties before the court in making the PSL Rules, the Supreme
People's Court did not capture the advantages of an adversarial (or
even inquisitorial) dispute resolution system. Meanwhile, the
Supreme People's Court was not bound by and did not, on its own
initiative, observe any public process in drafting the PSL Rules. In
fact, this black box rulemaking could have occurred even if the PSL
Rules had been drafted by the CSRC or some other agency. China
lacks an administrative procedure law, and no "notice and
comment" process is required when PRC agencies make rules.
313
Thus, the process of issuing judicial interpretations seems to
combine the disadvantages of being neither an adequate dispute
resolution process nor a good public rulemaking process.
Unfortunately, this black box rulemaking is common in China.
314
In the case of the PSL Rules, the Supreme People's Court did
act with careful deliberation. The Court consulted a number of
PRC and foreign experts during the drafting process of the PSL
Rules. 315 It examined approaches to private securities litigation in
the United States, England, Japan, and Germany.316 It also
consulted many interested PRC parties.317 However, this process
was not obligatory and those outside of the process had no way to
influence it, give input, or even know that it was occurring. The
absence of procedural safeguards to rulemaking means that the
Chinese legal system may or may not produce rules on the basis of
broad and thorough input.
312 In stark contrast to the PRC Supreme Court's approach, when the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed a controversial issue with significant economic and
political repercussions, briefs were submitted not only by direct litigants but also
by many other interested parties. See Peter Schmidt, Hundreds of Groups Back U. of
Michigan on Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 28, 2003 (noting a
deluge of amicus briefs in the recently decided Michigan affirmative action cases),
available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v49/i25/25aO2401.htm (password
required).
313 See Peerenboom, supra note 89, at 161 (discussing China's efforts to create a
modem administrative law regime over the last twenty years).
314 See, e.g., Brian Palmer, The View From China: Big Business Confronts China's
Huge Potential -and Problems, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 211, 214 (reporting on the
Fortune Global Forum held in Shanghai where in discussing China's future, "[tihe
need for transparency and the rule of law, in particular, was mentioned
repeatedly").
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5.6. Entrepreneurial Lawyers Influence Developments
The process leading to the PSL Rules and their subsequent
implementation shows that entrepreneurial lawyers have become a
factor in shaping Chinese legal developments. Lawyers seeking to
specialize in bringing these kinds of cases actively lobbied the
Supreme People's Court during the drafting of the PSL Rules.318
Entrepreneurial lawyers have publicized the new cause of action
by running advertisements to gather potential plaintiffs.319 At least
one book on private securities litigation has been published by
members of the emerging private securities litigation plaintiffs' bar
in China.320 Song Yixin, a lawyer who wrote one of these books,
also maintains a website with extensive information regarding
private securities litigation, including lists of companies subjected
to administrative sanctions so as to make them eligible
defendants. 321 The emergence of an enterprising and tenacious
legal profession in China may encourage further positive reforms
of the legal system and contribute to the development of civil
society in China.322
5.7. Public Discourse is Vibrant and Critical with Respect to Certain
Matters
Although the formal process of rulemaking in China leaves
much to be desired, the development of the PSL Rules discloses a
salutary development in the Chinese legal system: public
discourse in certain areas is vibrant, critical, and substantially
318 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 180, at 26-28 (reporting that Guo Feng
actively lobbied the Beijing No. I Intermediate Court and the Supreme People's
Court regarding private securities litigation).
319 See PSL DRAFTERS' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 202 (noting lawyers
have advertised in newspapers to gather clients for private securities litigation);
see also Clay Chandler, In China, Stock Scams Burn Small Investors, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2001, at Al, A16 (reporting that Beijing lawyer Guo Feng placed
advertisements on the Internet and in China's financial press to gather plaintiffs
for shareholder lawsuits prior to the PSL Rules).
320 See XUAN, supra note 129.
321 See Song Yixin's website for the list of companies, at http://www.syxlaw
yer.com.cn/111.htm (last visited June 1, 2003).
322 Law professors have also become active in lobbying for change. See Erik
Eckholm, Petitioners Urge China to Enforce Legal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at
A3 (reporting on the petition to the NPC Standing Committee filed by three
young law professors urging revocation of laws on detention of migrant laborers
that violate PRC Constitutional provisions on individual rights).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
unfettered by political constraints.
It is not always safe to publicly criticize government policies in
China. Though criticism is tolerated more now than at previous
points in PRC history, intolerance persists in many politically
sensitive areas.323 For example, it is very difficult to find mass
media discourse critical of Jiang Zemin's three representations (san
ge daibiao) political theory. 324 Public endorsements of the Fa Lun
Gong spiritual sect, Taiwanese independence, and the withdrawal
of PRC troops from minority regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet are
virtually non existent. Stock market policy, on the other hand, is
an area where civil discourse is tolerated, even when harshly
critical of government policies. With respect to the PSL Rules, a
number of lawyers and academics have published critical
reviews.325 There are other examples of harsh public criticism of
government policy regarding securities markets.326 In certain other
limited areas, public discourse is comparatively robust. This is not
to suggest that China has an adequate right to freedom of speech;
clearly it does not.327 Even when critical speech is tolerated,
organized opposition is not.328 However, many people outside of
323 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Four Chinese Given Long Prison Terms for Discussing
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A5.
324 The Sixteenth Party Congress of the China's Communist Party ("CCP")
changed the Party's Constitution to incorporate Jiang Zemin's awkward-sounding
"three representations" policy, which asserts that CCP should represent the most
advanced forces of culture and production, and the broad interests of the masses.
325 See Bei Hu, Lawyers Criticise China's Rules for Shareholder Suits, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at 3 (reporting for attribution criticism of the PSL
Rules by PRC lawyer Xuan Weihua).
326 Government efforts to sell state-owned shares, which contributed to the
loss of 40% of the market capitalization of China's two securities changes between
June 2002 and January 2003, inspired public vitriol. See Sebastian Heilmann,
China Analysis No. 15: The Chinese Stock Market: Pitfalls of a Policy-driven Market
(Sept. 2002) (discussing the robust public criticism regarding securities market
policies), available at http://www.chinapolitik.de/studien/chinaanalysis/no_15
.pdf. James Miles reported one colorful comment that China's stock markets are
the "congenitally deformed children born after the rape of capitalism by
socialism." See Miles, supra note 288, at 4.
327 See, e.g., Cong. Exec. Comm'n on China, Information Control and Self-
Censorship in the PRC and the Spread of SARS (May 7,2003) (arguing that lack of
press freedom aided the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), available
at http://wwwcecc.gov/pages/news/prcControl-SARS.pdf. It is noteworthy
that the SARS crisis has been linked frequently with a lack of transparency in
China. Private securities litigation is a tool to enforce the transparency mandated
by China's disclosure rules for listed companies.
328 Organized opposition groups or even groups perceived as potential
opponents of the Party-state are not tolerated.
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China do not appreciate the degree of critical speech that does exist
there.
5.8. Complex Policy Dynamics Reflect Fundamental Tensions in
Chinese Reforms and Make Forecasting Difficult
The dynamics of legal reform in China are complex. There are
multiple actors with different agendas, and specific organizations
and individuals are subject to competing imperatives. Often, the
next stage of reform in China calls for a greater relaxation of state
control. This puts China's reform ambitions in tension with
political intransigence and prudential concerns.329 This complex
dynamic gives reform an ambiguous character. Just as there are
evident impulses to cling to state control, there are also efforts to
broaden the space for private, non-governmental action, making it
difficult to predict how things will unfold.
The PSL Rules provide an example of these complex dynamics
and their uncertain fate. As discussed earlier, there are many
reasons to be skeptical that private securities litigation will flourish
in China, but there are other reasons to harbor some hope that the
PSL Rules will herald further changes. For private securities
litigation to advance, courts and stock markets require greater
independence. However, those changes would implicate political
power and prudential concerns over current market valuations and
the reform of SOEs. The PSL Rules compromise between greater
reform and no reform, granting private investors some rights to
sue, but limiting such rights in critical ways.330
This leitmotif is detectable with respect to private securities
litigation as well as in the general regulatory dynamics of PRC
329 An article in THE ECONOMIST provides an example:
Cleaning up the stockmarket may have done much to take the steam out
of rising share prices, but therein lies the [CSRC's] dilemma. It is
alarmed by the inflated valuations of domestic shares .... [alt the same
time, the Communist Party has a much broader concern: that middle-
class dissatisfaction with stockmarket losses, coupled with working-class
anger at the continuing wave of lay-offs at state enterprises, could
threaten the legitimacy of the party's rule.
Casino Capital: China's Financial Markets are Wild-and Often Less than Wonderful,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 11 [hereinafter Casino Capital].
330 See PSL DRAFrERs' COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 84 (noting that the
Supreme People's Court considered the contradiction (maodun) between balancing
market rectification (guifan) with stable development (wending fazhan) in drafting
the PSL Rules).
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securities markets. The PRC government asserts extensive control
over China's securities markets, but there are market-oriented
reform pressures as well. Competition among underwriters to
bring companies to market and the capital thirst of entrepreneurs
can be expected to exert pressures for reform. Some PRC leaders
want to develop robust capital markets, and the CSRC has pushed
reform ahead aggressively, at least more so than during the
preceding few years.33' Clearly some PRC officials want to foster
innovation, create companies that can compete globally, and use
resources efficiently. Although central planning does not readily
accomplish those goals, embracing alternatives would not be easy
either. Allowing private companies to list their securities on the
securities market without government approval might might result
in better resource allocation, but it would also lessen the power of
central authorities and likely siphon funds away from the
reforming SOEs that China's securities markets have been
developed to serve. If investors could buy shares in private
companies, the market value of current shares might also deflate,
causing losses for millions of current investors. These
"externalities" are more than theoretical dilemmas for PRC policy
makers. Even if changes will be positive in the long run, their
near-term effects can be daunting.
A specific example of this pattern can be seen in China's
establishment of a high-tech stock market. In recent years, there
has been extensive discussion in China about establishing a
Nasdaq-like second board to aid high-tech companies. In 2000, it
seemed this new market would soon be established. In fact, the
CSRC drafted regulations for this new market. 332 The PRC
Company Law was amended to allow for a market with less
stringent listing requirements.333 A-share IPOs were halted on the
331 See Casino Capital, supra note 329, at 11 (noting that the CSRC is "a body of
refreshingly modern-minded officials" who are "only too aware of the
shortcomings" of PRC capital markets).
332 See, e.g., Chuangye Qiye Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Shenqing Wenjian
Biaozhen Geshi (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) [Standards and Format for Application
Documents for Public Issuance of Shares by Growth Enterprises (Draft for
Comments)], China Securities Regulatory Commission, Oct. 19, 2000. The
Shenzhen Stock Exchange website maintains an extensive collection of draft
regulations prepared for the PRC growth enterprise market. English versions of
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Rules and Regulations, CSRC Regulations, are
available at http://www.sse.org.cn/sse/en/law/4-2.asp.
333 See Zhongguo Xiugai Gongsi Fa (Tebie Baodao) [China Amends Company Law
(Special Report)], PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas ed.) (reporting on the December 25,
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Shenzhen Stock Exchange in anticipation of the establishment of
the new board and the consolidation of the main boards in
Shanghai.334 However, the drive to establish this second board or
stock market for start-ups (er ban or chuangye ban) stalled.
335
Changes in the global economy, such as the bursting of the "dot
com" bubble are proffered as part of the explanation,336 but it is
also likely that regulators realized the second board could woo
investors away from the shares of SOEs listed on the main boards,
harming the interests of those who currently hold main board
shares and the prospects of SOEs hoping to conduct IPOs or
secondary issuances. Securities regulation, like other areas of
Chinese law, is subject to countervailing impulses, as China's
development agenda calls for reforms requiring a greater
loosening of state control, giving rise to economic and political
risks.
Securities law developments are only one group of reforms in
an overall scheme of reforms spanning the last twenty-four years
in China.337 The social and economic consequences of these
incremental, calibrated reforms have been enormous.338 Millions of
Chinese citizens now enjoy greater prosperity and individual
liberty than they have at any time in PRC history. However,
China's reforms have intentionally been restricted to economic
1999 amendments to the PRC Company Law by the NPC Standing Committee,
including the addition of a clause to Article 229 which allows the State Council to
formulate rules for the listing of high technology companies).
334 See Shenzhen - Listings, CHINA DAILY, May 30, 2003, at 6 (reporting that the
IPO halt that was instituted in September 2000 in anticipation of the founding of
the PRC's second board will be rescinded by October, 2003).
335 See No Timetable for QDII and CDR, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 22, 2002 (reporting
comments of the then-chairman of the CSRC, Zhou Xiaochuan, stating that
establishment of the second board requires "further study" and has mainly been
delayed because of the crash of the technology market in 2002).
336 Id.
337 See generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE
ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 (1995) (examining China's comprehensive economic
reforms).
338 For engaging accounts of the complex social transformation of Chinese
society after Mao, see generally NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA
WAKES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994), which describes
both the Chinese boom-state and the tottering dictatorship; PERRY LINK, EVENING
CHATS IN BEIJING: PROBING CHINA'S PREDICAMENT (1993); and ORVILLE SCHELL,
DISCOS AND DEMOCRACY: CHINA IN THE THROES OF REFORM (1989), which discusses
social and cultural developments in China post-Tiananmen Square.
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changes; fundamental political reforms have been quashed.339 The
Chinese Communist Party maintains sole authority to govern
China.340 Notwithstanding the success of its market-oriented
economic reforms, the Party remains unwilling to subject itself to
political competition. Despite falling short of liberal hopes, this
pattern of gradual economic reform and political stability has been
hailed by some as a model superior to the shock therapy or rapid
political change pursued by some other transitional economies.341
The Chinese economy continues to grow at an enviable pace and
attracts stunning amounts of foreign investment.342  China's
approach to reform, however, may have delayed rather than
avoided certain fundamental and painful restructuring issues.
Latent difficulties seem to abound.343 Indeed, to continue to grow
economically, many observers contend that China must further
339 The CCP, as evidenced by a titular communist party promoting the
market structure, does not base its legitimacy on the economic ideology of its
founding revolutionaries. Though the CCP is now almost entirely desiccated of
Marxism, it remains firmly committed to Leninism. The Party has been intolerant
of organized dissent, or even the threat of it, whether that perceived threat be
from labor unions, democracy activists, Protestants, Catholics, or devotees of the
Falun Gong spiritual sect. See generally U.S. State Dep't, 2002 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices-China (released Mar. 31, 2003) (detailing PRC human
rights violations in 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2002/18239.htm.
340 See PRC Constitution, supra note 154, pmbl. (describing the governing
structure of China according to China's history).
341 See generally Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the
Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97 (1995) (comparing PRC
reforms with "shock therapy" approaches applied in Eastern Europe).
342 See Statistics about Utilization, supra note 241 (providing statistical
information on the enormous inflow of foreign capital through foreign direct
investment).
343 For a superb general introduction to the collection of challenges facing the
PRC and an assessment of the Chinese government's capacity to deal with them,
see JOHN BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA'S ECONOMY,
HISTORY, AND POLITICAL CULTURE (2001); see also Baum & Shevchenko, supra note
221 (examining the impact of the PRC's economic reform on Chinese politics,
culture, and society); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION (1998) (describing threats to the PRC economy from the build-up of
non-performing loans in the banking sector); EDWARD S. STEINFELD, FORGING
REFORM IN CHINA: THE FATE OF STATE-OWNED INDUSTRY (2000) (discussing the
failure of repeated reforms to fundamentally address the problems of SOEs
because of the lack of hard budget constraints, and noting that the SOE crisis
threatens to drag down the entire economy). The foregoing books are based on
thorough research and thoughtful analysis. For a polemical and largely derivative
popular account, see GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001).
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liberalize politically.344 If this does not require embracing multi-
party democracy, it seems to at least require the continuation of
allowing the balance of power to shift from state to society.345 This
further development of civil society seems to call for greater
reliance on a system of effectively administered impartial rules.346
Building a legal system has indeed been an integral component of
China's reform efforts.347 However, further establishment of the
rule of law and allowing further growth of civil society could
threaten the cardinal principle of one-party rule and generate
social instability. 348 In this way, reform demands, in general,
34A See, e.g., James A. Dorn, Creating Real Capital Markets in China, 21 CATO J. 65
(Spring/Summer 2001) (arguing that political reform will be necessary for the
development of capital markets in China).
345 See, e.g., Chinese Privatization, supra note 48, at 16 ("Whether current
privatization efforts can work [in China] will depend on the government's ability
to muster the will necessary to relinquish political control and allow the
rudiments of the market to function.").
36 See Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then
and Now, 2002(1) COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 69 (2002) ("Good corporate governance in
China, however, will not result from mere changes in the Corporate or Securities
Laws. Good corporate governance will also depend heavily upon the successful
reform of government agencies and the legal system."); Chen Zhiwu, Fazhi
Shuiping bu Gao shi, Buyi Dui Gongzhong Zhengquan Shichang Qiwang Guoduo [High
Hopes Inappropriate for Public Securities Markets Without a High Degree of the Rule of
Law], 73 CAIJING (2002) (arguing that the development of capital markets requires
a strong legal system and an independent media).
347 For material discussing PRC legal reforms, see STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN
A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 4 (1999), which states that "Chinese
reforms, economic and legal, have begun to do nothing less than redefine basic
relationships among state, economy, and society"; RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S
LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); Power and Politics in the Chinese Court
System, supra note 84, at 2, which discusses how law, courts, and court judgments
are part of the framework within which economic reforms are being carried out in
China; and What's Law Got to Do With It?, supra note 86, at 57, which describes
how legal rules affecting enterprise incentives were often ineffective, and
examines Chinese societal institutions affecting legal rules. For a useful overview
by a non-specialist, see generally Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001), which discusses the meaning and purpose of law in
Chinese history and tradition.
348 The Four Cardinal Principles, expressed in the preamble to the PRC
Constitution, are: the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the guidance
of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; the people's democratic
dictatorship; and the socialist road; see also Deng Xiaoping Upholds the Four Basic
Principles, speech translated in SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 492 (Win. Theodore
de Bary & Richard Lufrano eds., 2000). Concerning the stress on social stability,
see Hu Jintao zai Quan Guo Zhenxie Xinnian Chahuahui Shang de Jianghua [Hu
Jintao's Speech at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference New Year
Reception], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 1, 2003 (stating that Hu Jintao, a senior leader
named PRC President in March, commented on the importance of social stability).
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contradict political intransigence and prudential concerns.
It is impossible to be oracular concerning where these complex
dynamics will lead. There is no assured outcome with respect to
private securities litigation, much less with respect to the overall
political evolution of China.349 At a minimum, however, it is clear
that any prognostication, whether trumpeting China's inevitable
triumph or its assured demise, is badly uninformed if it ignores
China's current complexity.350
6. CONCLUSION
"Investor protection" is routinely claimed as a reason for the
enactment of securities laws and regulations. The first sentence of
the PSL Rules repeats this investor protection mantra.
Nonetheless, the PSL Rules create many daunting obstacles for
investors seeking to protect their interests through private
securities litigation. Consequently, it seems doubtful that such
litigation will create meaningful incentives for compliance with
China's disclosure laws, and many harmed investors will not
obtain economic relief.
Still, the complexity of contemporary PRC society bespeaks
caution to those wishing to make predictions. A variety of new
and potentially powerful actors have emerged during China's
recent decades of economic transition. Masses of stock investors,
entrepreneurial lawyers, investment bankers, and market-oriented
349 Whether and how economic reform leads to political liberalization is
unclear. See MARGARET M. PEARSON, CHINA'S NEW BUSINESS ELITE (2000) (finding
that the PRC's business elites did not form a nascent civil society, but were likely
to seek alliances with the existing political structure).
350 The unexpected often emerges to make prognostication a humble
business. For example, no advance commentary on the recent PRC leadership
transition from Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng to Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao,
and Wu Bangguo (President, Premier, and Chairman of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee, respectively) contemplated the impact of SARS.
See Erik Eckholm, Rude Awakening, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, at Al (noting that a
short time ago, "[n]o one, neither critics nor partisans of the Communist Party,
imagined that a viral disease was about to cause the equivalent of a national train
wreck," and reporting that the crisis has humbled some PRC officials concerning
the PRC's system and approach to reforms), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/us/os/13/nyt.eckholm/; Minxin Pei, Don't Hold your Breath for Openness in
China, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at 21 (discussing the political implications of the
SARS crisis, noting that "[tihe resulting disunity within the elite could create an
opening for real change," and quipping "[i]f that happens, China will score a
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regulators did not exist in the PRC twenty years ago. While it is
unclear what will arise from the interaction of these new groups
with existing institutions, it is clear that the "special
characteristics" of China's securities markets will continue to
influence development. It is also obvious that private securities
litigation could become significant to many domestic and foreign
investors in China if it breaks free of the constraints imposed by
the PSL Rules. Finally, it is clear that private securities litigation
provides a useful entry point for the study of contemporary China;
specifically, the PSL Rules provide material disclosure about
China's rapidly changing legal system.
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